R. v. Raddi, 2001 NWTSC 50

S-1-CR-2001000002

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs.

ERNEST RADDI

Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence by The Honourable Justice J.Z. Vertes, at Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, on July 4th A.D., 2001.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. B. Lepage:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. A. Fox:

Counsel for the Accused

Plea under s. 236 Criminal Code of Canada

		5

THE COURT: The offender, Ernest Raddi, has entered a plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter.

The offence occurred on June 15, 2000 in the Hamlet of Tuktoyaktuk. The offender, 36 years old, was living in a common-law relationship with Rosa Chicksi, 43 years old. On that date, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Ernest Raddi stabbed Rosa Chicksi with a knife to her chest which perforated her heart. The police arrived on the scene within 30 minutes and discovered Rosa Chicksi dead with the offender kneeling beside her. He immediately said, "I stabbed her". The evidence indicates that the offender attempted to revive Rosa Chicksi by giving her CPR. All observations of the offender pointed to the conclusion that he was extremely intoxicated. Forensic examination revealed that the deceased was also intoxicated at the time of death. There are no clues as to the motivation behind this act.

Manslaughter is a crime that covers a wide range of possibilities. It encompasses conduct that could be labelled as going from one extreme of near-accident to the other extreme of near-murder. The penalties for manslaughter can therefore range from a non-custodial sentence to life imprisonment. In this case, from the facts presented to me, I would place this crime on the scale closer to the

1

3

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

near-murder end. The only factor that makes this crime manslaughter, it seems to me, instead of murder, is the evidence of extreme intoxication which of course acts to negate the requisite specific intention to kill to support a murder charge.

In this case, Crown and defence have joined in a submission that an appropriate sentence would be in the range of eight to ten years. I thank them since a joint submission, one that obviously reflects a consideration of all the relevant factors, is a great assistance to any sentencing Judge. Such a submission, in my opinion, should not be rejected in the absence of good cause.

Sentencing is a highly individualized process. In each case, one must find the appropriate balance between the circumstances of the offence and those of the offender.

The offence unfortunately is not unique. As the case law submitted by counsel on this hearing shows, cases of spousal homicide are all too frequent in this jurisdiction. Most of them occur in circumstances of alcohol abuse and a violent relationship. All of them result in lengthy jail terms since the Courts must give priority to the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The offender, of course, is unique but his

circumstances are indeed unfortunate. He has a lengthy and related record of crimes of violence. Between 1989 and 1999, he has been convicted of nine offences. He has been imprisoned; he has been on probation. In 1995, he was convicted of assault with a weapon. This was an assault with a knife on his common-law spouse at the time. In 1996, he was convicted of an assault causing bodily harm on that same spouse. In June of 1999, he was convicted of assault causing bodily harm of Rosa Chicksi and sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. He stabbed her with a knife. He was released from that offence just two months before he killed Rosa Chicksi. So he was still on parole from the 1999 conviction. All of this is extremely aggravating. As Crown counsel put it, the offender's degree of moral blameworthiness is very high. He has committed similar crimes before; he has been punished for them; he has gone through many counselling and treatment programs; and, all to no avail.

But that is not all that is pertinent about the accused.

I had the benefit of a comprehensive pre-sentence report. It details the offender's background circumstances. It is a poignant example of alcohol abuse and family violence as systemic and background factors that have contributed to this

1

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

offender's behaviour. There have been many tragedies within this offender's family. But yet people describe him as a good worker and an excellent hunter. He was raised in traditional ways. But also, as is common, many people say that while he is good when he is sober, he is violent and mean when he is drunk and no one wants anything to do with him. He has a 16-year-old son that he is trying to maintain contact with now.

The Criminal Code requires that I pay particular attention to the offender's circumstances since he is an aboriginal offender. That attention becomes particularly important when restorative measures are being considered as viable options. In this case, however, the question is not whether incarceration is an appropriate disposition but, rather, how long Mr. Raddi need be incarcerated to give full effect to all of the principles of sentencing. This offender's criminal activities have detrimentally affected his community. The victims of of this crime - the deceased's family and the deceased - were all members of this community. The pre-sentence report indicates how this type of crime alienates the community from the offender. In the result, this is a case in which the offender's aboriginal background, while relevant, does not justify a sentence other than a substantial period

1

2

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

of incarceration.

Crown and defence agree on the range of sentence. They disagree, however, on two issues.

The first is the period of credit to be applied to pre-trial custody. Normally this is credited at a ratio of two-to-one. The offender has been in custody since the date of the offence (approximately 12 and a half months). But, his sentence from the 1999 conviction did not expire until September of 2000. From then until now is approximately nine and a half months. I see no reason why the offender should be credited for both the pre-trial remand and the remainder of a previous sentence for the same period of time. Therefore I will credit him with 18 months, that being approximately a ratio of two-to-one for the period of detention since the expiry of his previous sentence.

The second issue is the Crown's submission that this is an appropriate case to exercise the discretion in Section 743.6 of the Criminal Code to increase parole ineligibility to one-half of the sentence. Crown counsel supports this by reference to the factors that I noted earlier as the ones creating a high level of moral blameworthiness on the part of the offender. I accept the line of authority that says there is no need for any special, unusual, or particularly aggravating

factors so as to invoke Section 743.6 although, as a general rule, an increase of parole ineligibility should not be ordered. (See R. v. Matwiy (1996), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 251). But, in my opinion, such an order must still be an exceptional one. It is a form of increased punishment which should be imposed with restraint. In my opinion, in this case, the range of sentence proposed by counsel adequately addresses the concerns of denunciation and deterrence without the need for the additional sanction of parole ineligibility. The Parole Board will be in the best position, in the years to come, to assess the rehabilitation of this offender and the risk that he poses in the future. I therefore decline to make such an order.

Having taken into account all of the aggravating and mitigating features of this case, including the offender's guilty plea and expressions of remorse, I have concluded that an appropriate sentence would be one of ten years' imprisonment. From that, I deduct the credit for pre-trial custody that I have already mentioned.

Stand up, Mr. Raddi.

Mr. Raddi, you have expressed how sorry you are to Rosa Chicksi's family and to the community and now it is really up to you to decide how the rest of your life will be lived. You will be released at

some point in the future. Whether you come back to this community or to another community is up to you, but I think there is still time for you to decide how you will live the rest of your life.

I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of eight and a half years.

I further order a firearm prohibition for life. Counsel, you can prepare the usual order with all of the customary provisions.

I will also order that a sample be taken for DNA analysis. And again, counsel, you can provide the requisite order.

You may have a seat, Mr. Raddi.

I have considered whether or not to make a recommendation that Mr. Raddi be allowed to serve his sentence at the Yellowknife Correctional Centre. Obviously, there are a number of factors that would favour that, the proximity of his family and some of the perhaps special knowledge that the correctional authorities there have in terms of treatment of northern aboriginal offenders that may not be available in southern penitentiaries. I am reluctant to make that specific recommendation however, but I ask, and this request will be forwarded to the correctional authorities because they will obtain a transcript of these remarks and they will obtain copies of all of the exhibits that have been filed,

so I will make a request that they give careful 1 consideration to that but particularly in light of 2 3 what available programs there may be throughout the federal and territorial Correction systems. I recognize that this man has gone through a number of programs previously. I recognize that they have been apparently utter failures but if he is to ever have a productive and meaningful life in the future, to 8 try and make up for what he has done both to his 9 community, to Rosa Chicksi's family and to himself 10 and his own family, I think some serious 11 consideration has to be given to whatever programs 12 are available for him whether it is with respect to 13 alcohol abuse, violent behaviour, or just dealing 14 with all of the things in his past that have led him 15 to act the way that he has acted here now. So, I 16 will make no formal recommendation but I will ask 17 the Correction authorities to give some serious 18 consideration to it. 19 Needless to say, there will be no Victim of 20 Crime Fine surcharge. 21 Is there anything else, counsel? 22 No, thank you, Your Honour. 23 MR. LEPAGE: 24 MR. FOX: No, sir. Thank you both for your efforts THE COURT: 25 in this matter. 26 The exhibits can, at the expiry of the appeal 27

period, if there are any in the possession of the Court, other than the exhibits that were filed on the sentencing, the other exhibits can be returned to the RCMP for disposal. MR. LEPAGE: Thank you, Your Honour. THE COURT: Thank you once again, counsel. (AT WHICH TIME THE ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED) Certified pursuant to Rule 723 of the Supreme Court Rules. Court Reporter

