Slw

R. v. Lafferty, 2000 NWTSC 61

CR 03856

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

MICHAEL ALEXANDER LAFFERTY

Transcript of the Reasons for Judgment and Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Justice J.Z. Vertes, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 14th day of September, A.D. 2000.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. S. Kendall and

Ms. S. Bond:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. R. Gorin:

Counsel for the Defence

(Charged under s. 271 of the Criminal Code)

THE COURT:

Many judges have said that the law does not clothe a trial judge with a divine insight into the hearts and minds of witnesses. We cannot profess to be able to determine absolute truth. All we can do is apply rational means to determine whether an allegation has been proven to the standard accepted by law and society, that being proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The law sets down only one requirement. I must examine all of the evidence and then determine whether the Crown has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. And where, as in this case, one is confronted with contradictory versions of what happened, indeed contradictory versions from the same witness, one does not have to decide which one of those versions is true, but rather whether the evidence as a whole proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. If I am left in a quandary, then of course the charge has not been proven. But I do not have to accept either version on an all-or-nothing basis.

The principle issue in this case is the credibility and reliability of the complainant. To put it perhaps more accurately, it is the credibility and reliability of two contradictory versions of reality put forth by the complainant. To assess this issue, however, I must consider all of the evidence together and not examine individual items of evidence

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in isolation. I must also avoid assumptions about human behaviour since many people may not perceive the world and their role in it the same way I do. This is a process of reason and rational analysis, not emotion and speculation.

The accused is charged with sexual assault on his wife. The uncontradicted evidence is this.

In the early morning hours of December 29, 1999, the complainant showed up at the home of Muriel Betsina in N'dilo. I accept Mrs. Betsina's evidence as to her observations and her conversation with the complainant. The complainant did not deny what she said at that time. The complainant was upset, crying, and bleeding. She said that she had been raped and beaten by her husband. The complainant called the police. The tape of her call, acknowledged by the complainant, reveals her to be anxious. She said her husband beat her up and raped her. When the police arrived, the complainant was standing outside of her home, on the porch, distraught and upset, repeatedly saying that she had been beaten and raped. She pointed behind her house. The police followed some footsteps in the snow and located the accused underneath a boat, wearing only a T-shirt, jeans, and socks. The police took the complainant to the hospital. There she was noted to be upset and crying. The nurse noted that the complainant appeared to have

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been drinking but was not drunk. She was said to be cooperative and responsive. A rape kit examination was conducted and, eventually, male DNA identified as likely coming from the accused and female DNA identified as likely coming from the complainant were found in material in a vaginal swab, a sample of a vaginal pool, and the accused's underwear.

The complainant was observed to have a prominent injury to her front teeth. Her gumline was swollen and oozing blood. She had a swollen eye and some superficial lacerations on her face.

At the hospital, the complainant spoke with Constable Aimoe. I have no doubt as to what the complainant said was accurately reported by the constable. The complainant talked about going home with her husband after being in the bars downtown, that he took her into a van parked in front of his mother's home, that he beat and raped her, and that she managed to leave and eventually went to the Betsina home. She also said she was afraid of her husband and would not testify if he was out of jail.

The accused, having been arrested, was placed into custody.

On January 11, 2000, the complainant attended at the office of James Brydon, a local solicitor, and swore an affidavit retracting her accusations. She said that she became upset and crying for no reason at

the time when she was at the Betsina house. She claimed that she told Mrs. Betsina, and subsequently the police, that she had been beaten and raped because she wanted to get away from her husband so that she could go back to the bars to drink. She denied that he beat or raped her. She also said that the last sexual intercourse between them was at 9 p.m. the day before while having a shower.

The complainant testified in Court that it was her idea to go see Mr. Brydon and that she retained him and paid his fee. Mr. Brydon testified that he recalls someone calling him asking him to meet with the complainant, but he could not recall if that someone was male or female. He does recall specifically cautioning the complainant about the consequences of swearing a false affidavit.

On February 16, 2000, the accused appeared at the preliminary inquiry into this charge. The complainant did not testify. According to Constable Bellamy, the complainant said she was too scared to testify but she would be willing to give a formal statement to the police. Subsequently that same day a statement was taken under oath after appropriate cautions and warnings, videotaped and audiotaped. In the statement the complainant repeated her original accusations. She gave a detailed description of the events consistent with what she had said on the night of the

alleged assault. She also stated that the accused had told her to see a lawyer and told her what to say.

Then, on March 2, 2000, the complainant wrote a letter to the accused, in jail, once again retracting her accusations. She made reference to an "Edward" forcing her to lie about what happened.

At this trial, the complainant testified. She adopted the statements in her January affidavit and the March letter. She acknowledged making the statement of February 16th and her utterances on the night of the alleged offence. But she swore on the stand that she lied to the police, that Edward Bourke (a man with whom she lived briefly after the accused's arrest) forced her through assaults and threats to lie about her husband. She reiterated that the accused did nothing.

he ever threatened or assaulted the complainant. He said that he had nothing to do with what the complainant did in relation to these charges because it was none of his business. I recognize, of course, that this witness, particularly in light of his extensive criminal record and the fact that he is now in jail, would not readily admit to assaulting or threatening the complainant even if he did do those things. His evidence may not be worth much, but at least the complainant's evidence on this point is not

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left unchallenged or uncontradicted.

Similarly, the complainant's evidence that

Constable Bellamy had spoken with Bourke about her

giving a statement was refuted by Constable Bellamy

(whose evidence I accept).

So we are confronted in this trial with a serious accusation which has been vehemently retracted by the complainant under oath. So some may ask, What is the point of these proceedings? What interests are we serving by this prosecution? If the complainant wants the accused back (no matter what he may have done), why should society at large and the criminal justice system concern itself about it? Well, in my opinion, these questions go to the very nature of criminal law in our society.

Criminal law is part of public law. Public law consists of those fields of law which are concerned with the relationship of the state to individuals, as opposed to private law which deals with relationships between individuals. The general aim of the criminal law is to discourage and prevent conduct that society has deemed to be harmful and to punish those who commit harm. Harmful acts, even if they directly affect only one individual, are viewed as harmful to the peace and security of the community as a whole. Thus, crimes are the concern of the state. It is not a matter of the individual victim seeking retribution

but that of the state seeking to reinforce society's When and how that is to be done is determined by the community and not the individual victim. victim is necessarily kept somewhat at arm's length in the justice system. The criminal law is not about seeking simply revenge; it is about restoring peace and security to the community. Deterrence and rehabilitation of the offender are just as important concepts as are retribution and denunciation. for example, we say that a victim's outrage is not the predominant factor in a prosecution, is it not also fair to say that a victim's change of heart (or mind) should not be the guiding factor? The focus is on what was done, not simply on how the victim feels If what was done was a crime, and if that crime is proven, does it really matter to society at large if the perpetrator is prosecuted even though the victim, for whatever reason, does not want that? think it does. A person who commits a crime but is not prosecuted for it is more likely to repeat that behaviour. Thus, the community is further endangered. At least if we are to maintain the philosophic underpinnings of our criminal justice system, we have to believe that. During the trial I ruled that the February 16th statement to the police was admissible for substantive

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I also ruled that the various statements

and utterances by the complainant on the night of the alleged assault were admissible, not for the truth of their contents, but for the fact that they had been made. They are necessary to have the complete context before us and to assist in the assessment of what, if anything, should be believed.

The issue is the reliability of the complainant's February 16th statement. Put another way, the complainant has put forth two versions of the truth, both under oath and both after having been warned as to the consequences of making false statements. There is no evidence of any mental incapacity or psychological disability on the part of the complainant. She did not appear to be operating under any delusions or compulsions. Indeed, she appeared to be very strong-willed and assertive and determined. So it is really a question of whether I am satisfied as to the reliability of the February 16th statement in the face of the adamant and repeated retractions by the complainant.

To assess that question I must consider all of the circumstances, what confirms or contradicts the statement, and what evidence there may be as to motive for the complainant to say what she has said on different occasions.

Defence counsel submitted that the complainant's general credibility is so damaged and unreliable that

the credibility of both versions of the truth is irredeemably undermined. He has a point. The complainant, besides stating straight out that she lied to the police, stated that she has made false accusations against the accused in the past. She also has an extensive criminal record which affects her credibility. She admitted to being an alcoholic and addicted to cocaine.

But when I consider all of the evidence, and in particular, as Crown counsel noted, the confirmatory extrinsic evidence, I have no doubt that the accused beat and raped his wife on the night of December 29th. There is the direct evidence provided by the observations of Muriel Betsina, Norman Betsina, the nurse, and the police officers as to the complainant's There is the direct physical and emotional condition. evidence of the phone call to the police. There is the evidence of the accused's attempt to evade the police. Now, I recognize that there may be all sorts of reasons why the accused felt compelled to hide beneath a boat, in the middle of winter, in Yellowknife, without a coat or shoes. But in the circumstances of this case, the only rational inference is that he was trying to evade arrest. There is the evidence of Corporal Brandford's observations of the complainant earlier in the evening. There is the evidence of the contents and

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condition of the van.

In my opinion the complainant has a motive to retract her accusations. She, for whatever reason, wants the accused back with her. Or, perhaps, she is frightened and intimidated (but I saw no evidence of that). It is not for me to judge the complainant's motivations. But it does seem to me that the only motive for the complainant to accuse her husband of beating and raping her is that he actually did it. Her story about just wanting to go back to the bars to drink defies reality, common sense, and my intelligence.

There are of course many other items confirming and contradicting aspects of both versions of the truth put forward by the complainant. But, when I consider all of the evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the contents of the February 16th statement. I therefore find the accused guilty as charged.

(SUBMISSIONS ON SENTENCE)

THE COURT:

The accused, Michael Lafferty,
has been convicted of the offence of sexual assault.

I do not need to go over the details of the evidence
again. Suffice it to say that the assault was a
violent one, it was a highly intrusive one involving
sexual intercourse, and the victim was his wife.

I have no doubt that the accused was intoxicated

at the time. There was evidence as to observations made by police officers earlier in the evening as to his intoxication and belligerence. But I also have no doubt as to the callous indifference of the accused.

The accused is 33 years old. He is a life-long resident of this region. He has an unenviable record of criminal convictions; some 29 convictions by my count between 1983 and 1996, many for crimes of violence.

I have to take into consideration, as his counsel urged me to, the fact that the accused is an aboriginal Canadian. In this case, while certainly the accused's aboriginal background is a factor to consider, there were no particular submissions regarding any unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing this particular aboriginal offender before the Court, nor submissions as to any types of sentencing procedures or sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his particular aboriginal heritage.

Unfortunately, in this case, as in many cases of serious personal violence, the question is not whether incarceration is the appropriate disposition but rather how long the accused needs to be incarcerated to give full effect to all the relevant sentencing principles.

In my opinion this is a case where the accused's aboriginal background, while certainly it is relevant, does not justify a sentence other than a substantial period of incarceration as would any other offender receive in this country with this offender's background and the circumstances of the offence.

Crown counsel suggests a total sentence of five years. Of course I have to take into account the nine months of pre-trial custody that the accused has already spent. In my view, perhaps Crown counsel's submission is a little to the high end of what I would consider appropriate, but it is not much higher.

Mr. Lafferty stand up. Do you have anything that you wish to say?

15 THE ACCUSED:

No, My Lord.

16 THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Lafferty, I am not

going to lecture you. You are old enough and, I suspect, smart enough to know what you have to do if you want to turn your life around.

It is the sentence of this Court that you be imprisoned for a term of two and a half years. Thirty months. You may sit down.

I will issue a firearm prohibition order for the mandatory term of ten years. However, considering the submissions made as to Mr. Lafferty's background and the fact that he pursues hunting and trapping activities for sustenance, I will authorize the Chief

1		Firearms Officer or the appropriate authority to issue
2		authorization to Mr. Lafferty to possess and use
3		firearms and ammunition for purposes of hunting and
4		trapping only after his release and for the term of
5		the prohibition order. Any such authorization does
6		not include authority for Mr. Lafferty to possess or
7		use firearms or ammunition within any municipal
8		boundaries in the Northwest Territories, whether it be
9		in Yellowknife, N'dilo, Dettah or any other
10		municipality.
11		Furthermore, there will be an order under Section
12		487 authorizing a warrant to seize a sample for DNA
13		purposes.
14		Is there anything else I should consider?
15	MR.	GORIN: No, Sir.
16	MS.	KENDALL: I would ask for an order
17		disposing of the exhibits, My Lord.
18	THE	COURT: The exhibits that are in the
19		Court's possession now, I will direct that the tapes,
20		the videotape and the audiotapes, be returned to the
21		Crown or to the RCMP to be held pending expiry of the
22		appeal period. The paper exhibits, the documentary
23		exhibits, will stay on the court file. Are there any
24		other exhibits that we have to deal with?
25	MS.	KENDALL: No, My Lord.
26	THE	COURT: In any event, the exhibits
27		returned to the Crown should be retained until expiry

ę ļ	of the appeal period. Thank you, Counsel. We're
2	adjourned.
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6	Certified Pursuant to Rule 723
7	of the Rules of Court
8	Table Boundaries CGD (A)
9	Jame Romanowich, CSR(A) Court Reporter
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