IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– V-

AUGUSTINE CATHOLIQUE

Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence of The Honourable Justice J. Z. Vertes, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 27th day of April, A.D. 1999.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. L. Colton:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. G. Boyd:

Counsel for the Defence

THE COURT: The accused, Augustine Catholique, has entered a plea of guilty to a charge that he caused bodily harm in the commission of an assault. The offence occurred here in Yellowknife in September of 1998.

The facts have been succinctly set forward in an Agreed Statement of Facts, so I will not go over them at length.

It is agreed that last September the accused and his friend, the victim in this case, came to Yellowknife in a boat from Lutselk'e. They went to a bar here in Yellowknife. The accused left ahead of the victim. When the victim returned to the boat late at night in the dark, he was jumped by the accused and his face was slashed with a knife. The victim required six stitches in order to close the cut to his face.

The accused was arrested shortly thereafter and he has been in custody ever since, that being September 11, 1998.

The accused is 54 years old. He has a lengthy criminal record to say the least. Between 1975 and 1996 he has, by my count, over 80 criminal convictions. Most of them are what I think can be accurately described as petty crimes having regard to the relatively minor sentences that were imposed in each case. Nine of them were for crimes of violence,

but it certainly seems that those types of crimes are not his forte.

His counsel described his history as a life of petty crime and alcoholism and certainly, from a superficial examination of the record, that is an apt description.

Crown counsel has suggested a sentence in the range of two years. She has fairly conceded that a sentence that would allow the accused to serve his time in a Territorial institution would be appropriate. I think this is an important concession having regard to the fact that the accused, by serving his time in a northern institution, would be able to stay closer in touch with his family, and would be able to pursue whatever programs he has been pursuing during his time on remand.

I am told that he has gone through some type of healing program. I am also told, by his counsel, that prior to this unfortunate incident, the accused took positive steps to rehabilitate himself by returning to his home community, by refraining from the abuse of alcohol, and apparently met with some success. It is, therefore, truly unfortunate that he was not as successful in controlling his actions on the night when he slashed his friend's face.

Defence counsel urges me to consider the rehabilitative prospects and, of course, the question

of rehabilitation is always something that must be kept in mind in any sentencing.

Crown counsel, quite rightly, emphasizes the factors of deterrence and protection of the public but they, like rehabilitation, are factors that are present in every sentencing situation.

Recently, and indeed very recently, just a few days ago, the Supreme Court of Canada released its judgment in the case of Gladue. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada admonished and encouraged trial judges to give special consideration to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders such as Mr. Catholique, in recognition of the disgraceful overpopulation of aboriginal persons within the Canadian prison system. The Court recognized that there are unique systemic and historical factors that have led to that unfortunate situation, and that positive steps must be taken to alleviate this great disparity.

The Court provided a summary of some of the significant points in its decision and many of them, no doubt, are ones that are familiar to counsel, especially counsel practising in this jurisdiction, since the courts are required to deal with cross-cultural issues on a daily basis.

The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the fact that Part 23 of the Criminal Code, codifies the

fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing, and the factors that should be considered by a judge in striving to determine a sentence that is fit for the offender and the offence. In particular, Section 718.2(e) mandatorily requires sentencing judges to consider all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, and to pay particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

Section 718.2(e) is not simply a codification of existing jurisprudence, it is remedial in nature, according to the Supreme Court of Canada. Its purpose is to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing. There is a judicial duty, the Court tells us, to give the provision's remedial purpose real force.

Section 718.2(e) must be read and considered in the context of the rest of the factors referred to in that section and in light of all of Part 23. All principles and factors set out in Part 23 must be taken into consideration in determining the fit sentence.

But the Court emphasized, as well, in that decision that sentencing is an individual process, and in each case the consideration must continue to be what is a fit sentence for this accused, for this

offence, in this community.

Section 718.2(e) directs sentencing judges to undertake the sentencing of aboriginal offenders not only individually, but also differently because the circumstances of aboriginal people are unique. There may be certain types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that are appropriate in the circumstances for an aboriginal offender that may not be for other types of offenders. But I want to emphasize this: the Supreme Court also pointed out that in endeavoring to take into account these considerations, the trial judge will require information pertaining to the accused and to his circumstances.

It may be that judicial notice can be taken of the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts, and it may be that the courts -- I should say trial judges -- could take notice of the fact that aboriginal communities place an emphasis on restorative approaches as opposed to punitive approaches to sentencing; but, there is a limit to how much judicial notice can be taken.

I take, in this particular case, defence counsel's submissions as to the offender's attempts to rehabilitate himself in the two years prior to

this most recent offence at face value. I take defence counsel's submission at face value as to the offender's desire to put behind him his life of petty crime and alcoholism. All of that is to the offender's credit, and I give him credit for that. But there is only so far I can go in the absence of specific information and submissions as to what may be appropriate for this particular offender.

I have to consider what is an appropriate sentence for this offender, for this crime. I can not ignore his past record and, of course, that is not a question of sentencing him again for his past record, but it seems to me that the record reveals, while it may be a history of petty crime, it certainly reveals a history of criminal activity.

I think defence counsel, quite rightly, recognized that there is no alternative to a period of incarceration. The question is what would be an appropriate period of incarceration?

If I were to look at the circumstances of this offence simply in isolation without regard to all other circumstances, I would say easily the offender could be sentenced to a penitentiary term. It may not be a very lengthy penitentiary term, but certainly it was a serious crime of personal violence, an attack against an acquaintance with a weapon in circumstances where it's just fortunate for

the accused that more serious consequences did not result. If I were to try and put a range to that sentence, I would say it would probably be somewhere between two and a half and three years.

To that fact, I must give the offender credit for the pretrial custody that he has served. He has been in pretrial custody now for approximately seven and a half months. By the usual rule-of-thumb, that would be credited at somewhere about 14, 15, or 16 months. I also give him credit for his guilty plea. As Crown counsel notes, I can not credit him as much as I might have if the guilty plea came at an earlier time in these proceedings. It came at the last moment but, nevertheless, I think a guilty plea is still worthy of some consideration whenever it comes. So I give him credit for that.

Taking all of these factors into consideration,

I impose a sentence of 14 months imprisonment. I

don't think I need to impose any other penalty. I

will hear from the Crown with respect to the question

of a firearms prohibition.

(SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL REGARDING GUN PROHIBITION)

THE COURT: In addition to the sentence of imprisonment that I've just imposed, I have to consider the question of a firearm prohibition. The Criminal Code makes it mandatory that an order be issued for a conviction for this type of offence.

That the accused be prohibited from having in his possession any firearms or ammunition for a period of ten years.

Section 113 of the Criminal Code enables me, however, to authorize a Chief Firearms Officer to consider issuing an authorization or a certificate for the accused to possess firearms or use firearms for the purposes of hunting or trapping or for employment.

As I read the section, it is not up to me anymore to exempt the accused from a firearm prohibition order, but simply to authorize the otherwise competent authorities who are directed with the responsibility of issuing firearms certificates, to consider issuing this man a firearms certificate notwithstanding my prohibition order.

In my respectful opinion, notwithstanding the fact that a weapon, i.e. a knife, was used in the commission of this offence, there does not appear to be anything in this man's background to suggest a danger to the public if he were to possess firearms for the purposes of hunting or trapping or employment.

Since he comes from the community of Lutselk'e, and since I take it that he will be returning there after his period of incarceration has been completed, and recognizing the importance of traditional

1 activities to the people of Lutselk'e, I think it would be appropriate to authorize the Chief Firearms Officer to issue this man a certificate to possess or use firearms for those traditional purposes. In addition, if he were to obtain employment 6 such as I was told that he was employed previously as 7 a bylaw officer, if he is able to obtain employment 8 and if the use and possession of a firearm is 9 necessary for that employment within the community, 10 then that seems to me to be an appropriate cause to 11 exempt this man from the prohibition order. 12 So the prohibition order will issue as 13 mandatorily required by the Criminal Code; however, I make the order pursuant to Subsection(1) of Section 14 15 113 authorizing the Chief Firearms Officer to issue 16 this man a certificate notwithstanding the 17 prohibition order. Is that clear? 18 MS. COLTON: Yes, Sir. 19 THE COURT: Thank you for your assistance, 20 counsel. Is there anything else we need to address? 21 MS. COLTON: No -- actually there is the matter of 22 some exhibits. 23 MR. BOYD: Yes, that is correct. 24 THE COURT: Are these exhibits in the custody of 25 the police? 26

27

MS. COLTON:

right.

In the custody of the police, that's

1	THE COURT:	Any exhibits that are maintained in	
2	respect of	respect of this prosecution, other than the	
3	proceedings that are already on file with the		
4	Court other than exhibits that are already on file		
5	with the Co	with the Court, can be either returned or destroyed	
6	depending o	depending on the wishes of the police. Obviously if	
7	it's someth	it's something like clothing that is blood-stained	
8	and torn, then that can be destroyed. If it's		
9	something that can be returned in fairly decent shape		
10	to it's rightful owner, then it can be returned to		
11	its rightfu	its rightful owner.	
12	MS. COLTON:	I think the the only exhibit I	
13	think the p	think the police would wish to retain would be the	
14	knife.		
15	THE COURT:	The knife can be destroyed.	
16	MS. COLTON:	Thank you, Sir.	
17	THE COURT:	Anything else?	
18	MR. BOYD:	No, Sir.	
19	THE COURT:	Thank you, counsel.	
20			
21		ified pursuant to Rule 723 of the Supreme t Rules.	
22	Cour	t Rules.	
23			
24	S-23	india Duns ra Burns C.S.R. (A)	
25		t Reporter	
26			
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