

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

PAUL LEROUX



Transcript of Reasons for Judgment delivered by the Honourable Justice J. Vertes, sitting at Inuvik, in the Northwest Territories, on the 14th day of August, A.D. 1998.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. S. Couper Ms. D. Sylvain For the Crown

Mr. J. Brydon

For the Defence

The accused, Paul Leroux, was THE COURT: originally charged with 44 counts in one 2 indictment. At the opening of the trial, he 3 pleaded guilty to 9 counts. He pleaded not guilty to 25 counts. He entered special pleas of 5 autrefois convict to 4 counts, and the Crown stayed 6 a further 6 counts. By the end of the Crown's 7 case, 16 counts were dismissed at the invitation of 8 the Crown due to either no evidence or because 9 those counts overlapped with others. I accepted 10 the special plea of autrefois convict on 1 count 11 and dismissed that charge. Not guilty pleas were 12 entered to the 3 counts on which I did not accept 13 the special pleas. 14 So at the end of the trial, I am left to deal 15 with 12 counts on which not guilty pleas are in 16 place. The issue on those is guilt or innocence. 17 I am also left to deal with the 9 counts on which 18 guilty pleas were entered, since there is a dispute 19 as to the facts on some of those offences. 20 I want to start by making some general 21 comments: 22 The totality of the evidence revealed a 23 pattern of conduct by the accused over many years. 24 Between 1967 and 1979, the accused was the senior 25 boys' supervisor at the Grollier Hall student 26 hostel here in Inuvik. The hall was run by the

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Catholic Church and provided accommodation for both boys and girls who were sent to Inuvik to attend school. Senior boys would be generally between the ages of 14 and 18 or 19. The accused's duties included supervision of the boys' daily activities, providing guidance and counselling, and maintaining discipline. He had living quarters adjacent to the senior boys' dorm rooms.

All of the complainants were young men, mainly teenagers at the time when these offences occurred. With two exceptions, they were residents of Grollier Hall who were under the accused's supervision. He was clearly in a position of trust and authority to them. He systematically, over many years, abused that trust by engaging in various kinds of sexual activity with these youngsters. He provided alcohol to them, showed them books and movies with explicit sexual content, and then enticed them into sexual activity. readily admitted this conduct during this trial. He readily admitted that he had an unhealthy sexual attraction to young men. He called it a disorder. He accepted responsibility for his conduct and says he now understands how harmful it was.

The 12 not guilty pleas relate to 8 charges of indecent assault, 3 charges of gross indecency, and 1 charge of inciting the complainant to an act of

buggery. The 9 guilty pleas relate to 8 charges of gross indecency and 1 charge of indecent assault. All of the offences occurred between 1968 and 1979, so it is necessary to say a few words about the laws that existed in those years.

The crime of indecent assault consisted of any deliberate application of force that by its nature or in the circumstances had the quality of indecency. It would be the equivalent of various forms of what we now refer to as sexual assault, sexual touching, and sexual interference. But, as with these current offences, if the complainant is 14 years or older and consents to the activity, then it is not criminal. Sexual touching by a person in a position of trust or authority to the victim is now the crime of sexual exploitation, first introduced into the Criminal Code in 1985. It does not matter if the victim consents if the victim is under 18 years of age.

The crime of gross indecency has no equivalent in our law today. Historically, it was an offence whereby all homosexual acts, even between consenting adults, were made illegal. To amount to gross indecency, an act must have constituted a marked departure from decent conduct. It was a crime of public morality. The act itself was the crime irrespective of the consent of the

participants. It was the same for the crime of buggery. It was only in 1968 that the law was changed so as to provide a defence to acts conducted in private by consenting adults. But to be an adult, one had to be at least 21 years old. Therefore the consent of someone under 21 was no defence.

This is significant because here all of the complainants were under 21 years of age. The evidence also revealed that many of them were 14 or older.

Throughout the trial, the question of consent was referred to. It was said that the complainants willingly participated in some of these activities. That may be true in some respects but not in all.

It is fair to say that, with one exception, there was no evidence to show that the accused used force or threats to compel people into sexual activities. Rather he used enticement, encouragement, and what he called affection. But it is not wholly accurate to say that the complainants consented to these activities. There is a distinction in the law between consent and submission. Every consent involves a submission, but that does not mean that mere submission involves consent. The common law historically held

that an agreement to engage in sexual activity by reason of the exercise of authority may constitute not consent but mere submission. The relationship of authority is a relevant factor to determine whether a complainant does in fact consent.

It certainly cannot be said conclusively that the mere submission of a child to the influence of an authority figure amounts to consent. Even without the use of overt force or coercion, the accused must have known that the students under his supervision would view him as a figure of authority, one who could dispense or withhold favours, even if he never did resort to such explicit tactics. Therefore, even though many of the complainants acquiesced to these activities, it is not fully accurate to describe it as knowledgeable consent on their part. This issue of mere submission versus consent, however, will have to be addressed, if pertinent, within the context of each specific charge.

I also want to make a general comment on the use of similar fact evidence in this trial. By an earlier decision, I allowed the use of evidence as between the counts to be used as similar fact evidence.

There is some controversy in the case law as to the standard of proof to be applied to similar fact

evidence. Some cases suggest that each count must be considered separately, and it is only if the accused's guilt has been determined on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in one of them, that the count may be used as similar fact evidence on the others. There are other cases that suggest that it is enough if the similar facts are linked to the accused by merely a preponderance of evidence. This is said to be consistent with the rule that proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to the ultimate issue.

I do not need to rule on this dispute in the case law. For this case, I am going to lean in favour of the stricter standard. Therefore, it is only the evidence on those counts that have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that I have relied on as similar fact evidence to support other counts.

I would say now that I have disregarded the evidence of Andy Andre in it's entirety. This was similar fact evidence not relating to any count. I found it too unreliable to support any conclusion with respect to it.

I will also say now that I have considered the question of collusion or collaboration among the witnesses. While no doubt many of the witnesses had opportunity, indeed, felt the necessity to

discuss things among themselves, there is no evidence to suggest collusion or collaboration so as to undermine the reliability of any particular witness's testimony.

This leads me to a brief comment on what we term as the credibility or the reliability of testimony.

In this case, all of the witnesses, including the accused, were testifying to events that allegedly occurred 20 to 30 years ago. Common sense tells us that in such circumstances people are prone to make mistakes in their recollection of events, especially where, as in this case, many of the witnesses were testifying about single specific incidents. Sometimes it is very difficult for even the most honest witness to sort out what it is that they actually remember as fact, and what is in reality memory that may have been influenced by subsequent events or information. We all suffer from that to greater or lesser degrees.

We may have a witness who is honestly trying to tell the truth, but is, in fact, honestly mistaken about some things. We may have witnesses who have, in hindsight, convinced themselves of past events, but in reality are trying to fill in information to explain gaps in their memory. These are all human traits, and we

have to be aware of them.

In a trial, such as this, we have to probe
what people say for signs of reliability. Is the
evidence consistent both internally and externally
with other known facts? Is it rationally
supportable? This is important in every case,
because we do not decide criminal cases on the
basis of guesswork, assumptions, and
generalizations. We decide criminal cases on the
basis of proven facts. We do not convict people
because of their general bad or immoral conduct.
We convict them of specific crimes supported by
specific facts.

Many judges have said that the law does not clothe a trial judge with a divine insight into the hearts and minds of witnesses. We cannot profess to be able to determine absolute truth. All we can do is apply the rules of evidence to determine whether an allegation has been proven to the one standard accepted by society, that being proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Where, as in so many cases, including this one, one is confronted by differing versions as to what happened, one does not have to decide necessarily which version is true. The issue is whether the evidence as a whole proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. For that

reason, when a judge says that a certain witness's evidence is unreliable, that does not necessarily mean that the judge thinks the witness is lying. All it means is that the evidence is insufficient to meet that level of certainty required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, I remind myself that neither the similar fact evidence nor the fact of the guilty pleas, nor, indeed, the mere fact that there are so many charges, should be used by me to simply infer that the accused is more likely to have committed the offences to which he has pleaded not guilty. Those must be assessed on the basis of the totality of the evidence, and the application to each count of the basic principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

I will now address each of the specific counts:

Counts 1 through 4 were offences relating to Phillip Ross. These were the four counts for which the accused originally entered special pleas of "autrefois convict". After hearing evidence and submissions on these pleas, I ruled that the plea should be accepted with respect to Count 1 only. That count, involving a charge of gross indecency specifying fellatio, was dismissed. The underlying facts on which that charge was based are the same

as a 1979 conviction of the accused for
contributing to the juvenile delinquency of Phillip
Ross. He was imprisoned at the time for it. You
can only prosecute and sentence a person once for
the same acts. Hence the dismissal of that
charge.

Count 2 is a charge of gross indecency, specifically taking photographs of Phillip Ross while nude. The accused admitted to taking such photographs, but said that he destroyed them many years ago. No such photographs were entered at the trial. Without the actual photographs, there is no evidence to determine if they meet the legal standard of gross indecency. The mere fact of taking such photographs is insufficient. The Crown more or less conceded this point during their submissions. Count 2 is therefore dismissed.

Counts 3 and 4 are charges of inciting Phillip Ross to commit buggery and indecent assault on Phillip Ross.

Phillip Ross was born in May of

1963 and resided at Grollier Hall between 1972 and

1979. Both he and the accused testified as to how
they had a sexual relationship during Ross' last
two years. The accused said the sexual
relationship was only during the time when Ross was
a senior boy. Ross said it overlapped his last

year as a junior boy since he did not go to senior section until he was 15. That would be 1978.

I accept Ross' evidence. This is also supported to some degree by a diary entry made by the accused expressing concern that the junior boys' supervisor would find out about him and Ross. During the two-year relationship, however, Ross was between 14 and 16.

Ross and the accused agreed that the sexual relationship involved sexual touching and fellatio. Ross testified at trial how he was scared of the accused because the accused threatened him with a knife. But this evidence has to be compared with the evidence from 1979 when the sentencing judge specifically referred to their relationship as consensual. I am not bound by that finding, but I cannot ignore it. It must have been based on some evidence before that judge.

Furthermore, in the 1979 statement, Ross never mentioned any threats. These inconsistencies cause me to have a serious doubt.

The evidence also revealed that the relationship between Ross and the accused (the nonsexual relationship) had grown through several years while Ross was a junior boy. He was hanging around the accused all the time. He said the accused gave him money. The accused denied any

1 threats.

Ross was the only witness to suggest at the trial that the accused resorted to threats. All the other evidence was quite opposite. The accused would resort to "seduction techniques", as his counsel put it, not violence. I therefore have a doubt and cannot accept the evidence of these threats.

Having said that, the charge of indecent assault comes down to determining whether a lack of consent has been proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt. Ross was, on the evidence, over 14 when the sexual contact took place. Considering the long-term nature of that relationship and notwithstanding the fact that the accused was in a position of trust, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to proof of non-consent. I therefore find the accused not guilty of Count 4 and dismiss that charge.

Count 3, however, is a charge of inciting Ross to commit buggery. Ross testified that a few times the accused would try to have anal sex with him. Each time Ross told him not to, and he desisted. The accused denied having anal sex with Ross. He relied primarily on his stated disinclination for anal sex.

26 This is somewhat curious. The accused 27 admitted to engaging in anal sex with the

complainant Grandjambe. He referred specifically to his relationships with Grandjambe and Ross as being somewhat special, more in the nature of two-way relationships as opposed to casual sexual encounters. The evidence of Grandjambe supports this interpretation (at least of his relationship with the accused). If the accused readily engaged in anal sex in one of his special relationships, it seems to me to make sense that he would engage in it in another one of his special relationships.

I reject the accused's evidence. Ross's evidence on this point was straightforward and unshaken. I note as well that Ross testified to how once he refused to do anal sex, the accused would put his penis between Ross's legs. This is similar to an act described by the complainant Manuel, evidence that has been admitted by the defence.

I accept Ross's evidence on Count 3. The issue, however, is whether Count 3 is properly framed. The offence of buggery is not one to which consent is a defence, so that is not pertinent. The act of "incitement" means to urge someone on to do something. Here nothing was done by Ross. At most, all that can be said is that the accused attempted to commit buggery.

Can I amend the count to conform to the

evidence? In my opinion, I can. The accused is 1 not prejudiced for two reasons: First, his defence 2 was a denial that the offence occurred at all 3 (hence his defence is unaffected whether the indictment said incited or attempted); second, the 5 penalties for inciting and attempting are the 6 same. 7 Count 3 of the indictment will be amended to 8 read: 9 10 "Did attempt to commit the offence of buggery contrary to Sections 147 11 and 406(b) of the Criminal Code." 12 Having made that amendment, I convict the 13 accused of Count 3. 14 Count 7 is a charge of gross indecency 15 with Alvin Yallee. The accused has pleaded guilty 16 to this charge. This count involves one incident 17 that occurred while Yallee was a senior boy, about 18 The accused admits that he 14 or 15 years old. 19 invited Yallee and another resident, now deceased, 20 to his room. He gave them wine and dinner. 21 provided them with pornographic magazines. Yallee 22 and the accused then engaged in mutual genital 23 fondling. 24 Yallee went further in his testimony and said 25 that the accused encouraged he and his cousin to 26

engage in anal sex. They did, and the accused took

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photos of them. The accused depied this part.

Having seen and heard the complainant Yallee, I find his evidence to be highly persuasive. He was unshaken on cross-examination. I accept his evidence as to the facts in support of Count 7. A conviction to that count will be formally entered.

Count 9 is a charge of attempted indecent assault on Andy Masazumi. This relates to one incident when Masazumi was 15 years old. He said that the accused came to his bed in the dorm room and rubbed his chest and groin area underneath his clothing. He said his hand briefly touched his penis. Masazumi testified that he pushed the accused's hand away. The accused denied this incident.

Defence counsel submitted that Masazumi was influenced by talking with others. Masazumi said he talked about this with Norman McDonald and Antoine Grandjambe before talking to the police. I fail to see why this would influence him. McDonald and Grandjambe had completely different experiences with the accused. Furthermore, there is evidence of similar conduct by the accused to others, evidence that I accept that supports Masazumi's story. I accept it. I find the accused guilty of Count 9 and a conviction will be entered.

Count 10 is a charge of gross indecency with

Lawrence Norbert. The accused pleaded guilty. The admitted facts revealed one incident when Norbert was a senior boy between 17 and 18 years old.

Norbert was in the accused's room. The accused gave him liquor and showed him some pornographic magazines. The two of them removed their clothes, and the accused briefly fondled the complainant's genitals. A formal conviction will be entered on count 10.

Count 12 is a charge of gross indecency with George Cleary. The accused admits performing fellatio once in his (the accused's) room. Cleary testified that the accused performed fellatio on him several times both in the accused's room and in Cleary's dorm room. He was 15 years old at the time. I found Cleary to be a very impressive witness. I accept his version of the facts. A formal conviction will be entered on Count 12.

Count 15 is a charge of gross indecency with Wayne Cockney. The accused pleaded guilty to this charge. The admitted facts are that one time when Cockney was 17 years old, the accused performed fellatio on him after an incident of genital fondling. I accept those as the facts for Count 15. Cockney described some other incidents of fondling and one of attempted digital penetration, but I am not convinced as to the reliability of

that further evidence. A formal conviction will now be entered on Count 15.

Count 22 is a charge of gross indecency with Antoine Grandjambe. The accused pleaded guilty to this charge. The admitted facts are that the accused and Grandjambe were intimate for a period of time from when Grandjambe was 14 years old and continuing until after Grandjambe left Grollier Hall. The sexual intimacy involved mutual masturbation, fellatio, and anal sex. The Crown and defence agree that the sexual contact was consensual. Consent, of course, is immaterial to this charge. Grandjambe himself testified that he was in love with the accused, and that he felt no pressure from him. I accept these facts. A formal conviction will be entered to Count 22.

Count 25 is a charge of attempted indecent assault on Walter Bayha. The accused pleads not guilty. Bayha described two incidents.

The first occurred when Bayha was a junior boy at age nine. He said that the accused sat beside him on a couch, put his hand on his back, and moved his hand down until it was on top of his buttock area. Bayha was in pajamas, and they were sitting in the supervisor's room with a group of other boys. The accused acknowledged putting his arm around Bayha but said it was simply an affectionate

gesture. I am not convinced as to the indecent quality of this act in support of the charge.

The second incident described by Bayha occurred when he was 17. He testified that the accused came to his dorm room one night, sat on his bed and touched his thigh area over the blanket. The accused left. Bayha also said that he had forgotten about these incidents until he heard about other charges against the accused. The defence counsel suggested that perhaps Bayha has blown these incidents out of proportion in hindsight.

I cannot say that, but I must say I have reservations about the reliability of this evidence as well as doubt as to proof of their indecent quality. I find the accused not guilty and dismiss Count 25.

Count 27 involves a plea of guilty by the accused to a charge of gross indecency with Robert Firth. The accused admits that on one occasion when Firth was 15 years old, he gave Firth a beer and briefly fondled his genitals. Firth testified to two other incidents when the accused would come to Firth's dorm room and tried to fondle him as he lay in bed. The accused denied doing this. I reject his denial and accept Firth's evidence as to the facts. A conviction will be entered to Count

1 27.

Count 28 is a charge of gross indecency with Leroy Omilgoituk. Omilgoituk related two incidents from when he was a junior boy. He said that one time he was going past the senior boys' section and the accused invited him to sit on his knee and play "horsey." Nothing else happened.

The second incident was when the accused allegedly took him and three other boys in the senior boys' shower area and touched them around the groin area over their pajamas and told them that it was important to wash there. On cross-examination, Omilgoituk acknowledged making some prior inconsistent statements about the second incident. The accused denies both incidents.

events, I have a reasonable doubt that they are evidence of a crime. The first incident is no offence in criminal law. The second incident, while highly implausible, also fails to convince me that there was any grossly indecent conduct. There are standards of proof within criminal law that have to be met, and no matter what my suspicion may be about the accused's intentions, that standard has not been met with respect to this offence. I find the accused therefore not guilty and dismiss Count 28.

Count 30 is a charge of indecent assault on Norman McDonald. McDonald testified to two incidents from the early 1970's when he was 14 and 15 years old. The first incident occurred when McDonald was drying off after a shower. He was dressed in shorts and a T-shirt. The accused started rubbing his shoulders and back. McDonald told him not to do it, and he walked way.

The second incident involved the accused coming up to McDonald in the gym, putting his hand on McDonald's chest and back, and then trying to put a hand down the back of McDonald's pants.

McDonald again told him to stop it, and the accused did. As he did so, he said to McDonald, something to the effect of, "I can make things easier for you or harder." The accused denied both incidents.

McDonald, in my opinion, notwithstanding some inconsistencies and despite acknowledging a lack of memory in the past, gave his evidence in quite a credible manner. He was not shaken on cross-examination, and, over all, I thought he was quite fair to the accused. He did not give any indication that he was overstating what he remembered. I accept his evidence. I find that with respect to both incidents there was an assault of an indecent nature, and there was clear non-consent on the part of McDonald. A conviction

will be entered on Count 30.

Count 32 is a charge of gross indecency with Isadore Manuel. The accused pleaded guilty. The agreed facts are that on one occasion when Manuel was 19 years old, the accused and Manuel removed their clothes, the accused touched Manuel sexually, and then placed his penis between Manuel's legs. A conviction will be entered on Count 32.

Count 34 is a charge of indecent assault on Lawrence Ruben. The complainant testified to one incident when he was in the senior boys' section. He said the accused came into his dorm room one night, sat on his bed, and then put his hands inside his pants and tried to fondle Ruben's genitals. This lasted very briefly. The accused denied the incident.

Defence counsel made a strong argument as to the implausibility of the story told by Ruben as to the surrounding circumstances of this incident. It does not, however, persuade me that Ruben's story is not true. He was a credible witness. I accept his evidence. I find the accused guilty on Count 34. A conviction will be entered.

Count 35 is a charge of gross indecency on

Tom Kakfwi. The accused pleaded guilty. The

agreed facts are that he, the accused and a third

person participated in some sexual activity as part

of a card game. The activity consisted of a brief exchange of fellatio. Kakfwi would have been 17 or 18 years old at the time. This was the only incident alleged. A conviction will be entered.

Count 39 is a charge of indecent assault on Bruce McPherson. This complainant described two incidents when he was 16 years old. Both times he came back to the hostel drunk, and the accused, instead of sending him to his own dorm room, told him to go into the accused's room. In both instances the accused attempted to fondle his genital area. The complainant left on both occasions. The complainant also gave some generalized evidence about how the accused was always grabbing at him. This evidence is immaterial to me, and I will concentrate on the two incidents described by McPherson.

The accused denied these incidents. He basically said, "Why would I put a drunk in my own room if he gets sick?" The answer may be to take advantage of that drunk. I accept McPherson's evidence. He was credible. I convict the accused on Count 39.

Count 40 is a charge of indecent assault on Brian Jerome. Jerome testified that he was sent to Grollier Hall at the age of five; from that early age he said he was the one requested by the junior

boys' supervisor to fetch the evening snack tray; and frequently when he would do so the accused would intercept him (since he passed close by to the senior boys' section) and as Jerome said, would grab him, tickle and pinch him, and generally touch him. He said it stopped when he was nine or ten years old. The accused denied doing these things.

I have a number of problems with Jerome's evidence, some of which came out during discussion in final submissions. First of all, the witness was quite adamant that he started at Grollier Hall at age five. The Crown led this evidence from him. Yet the Crown agreed in a joint statement of facts that Jerome did not start at Grollier Hall until he was eight years old.

Second, I find it implausible that such a young boy would be going on those errands regularly.

Third, even if I accept Jerome's evidence, I am not convinced it amounts to indecent assault. I am sure that a great deal of horseplay goes on in any children's group residence. The impressions of the intent behind such horseplay formed by someone looking back over 25 years ago are too unreliable to support a criminal conviction.

Something may have gone on, but I have a doubt as to exactly what or when, and as I said before, mere

suspicion is insufficient to convict someone of a criminal offence. Count 40 is therefore dismissed.

Counts 41 and 42 are respectively, charges of indecent assault and gross indecency with Kevin Coady. Coady resided in Inuvik between 1968 and 1987. His father was the Superintendent of Education in Inuvik. The accused knew the Coady family, and they knew him. Coady was living in Grollier Hall for only about six weeks in 1973 while his parents were on vacation. He was 11 years old at the time (although he testified he was 12).

These are the two counts, I must admit, that have caused me the greatest difficulty.

Coady presented a very sympathetic witness.

Coady testified that even though he stayed in the junior boys' section, he would often go to the senior boys' section to see his brother and to use the gym.

He said he was in the accused's room a few times. He recalled numerous incidents of the accused rubbing his legs and fondling his genitals. This eventually progressed to masturbation and to Coady performing fellatio on the accused. He said this lasted from the time he stayed in Grollier Hall to the spring of the

following year.

The position of the accused is simple: He says these things never happened. He says, basically, why would he do such a thing? He knew the family; the family knew him. Coady's father was an important man in town. It would be too easy to be caught is what he basically said. There is no external evidence or physical evidence connecting Coady to the accused in any intimate manner.

Defence counsel cross-examined Coady at length about his recollections. Coady acknowledged that he developed a very bad drinking problem after he left school. He acknowledged that he does not recollect a lot of things until 1995. He had flashes and images over time and tried to put them into some kind of context, but there are still gaps. He said, however, that his memories of this period are quite clear (even though there are some blank spaces).

There are difficulties with Coady's evidence.

One was a reference to a Martin Houston.

Mr. Houston apparently was a teacher in Inuvik

until 1962 when he was designated as a dangerous

sexual offender. He remained in prison until 1971,

and then was in a psychiatric facility. Coady

seems to remember seeing Houston at Grollier Hall.

This is highly improbable since Houston was convicted the year Coady was born, and after release from prison, Houston was prohibited from returning to Inuvik. Coady did not say when he supposedly saw Houston. There were some other references to how Coady may have been abused by others.

The other big difficulty is that sexually abusing a boy as young as 11 seems to be not part of this accused's method of criminality. It is established that even with Phillip Ross, the real sexual contact started when Ross was already 14. The allegations involving children younger than 14 involve incidents of touching or stroking as opposed to highly sexual acts such as masturbation and fellatio.

For example, if we look at the convictions recorded so far: Yallee was 15; Masazumi was 15; Norbert was 17 or 18; Cleary was 15; Cockney was 17; Grandjambe was 14 when the relationship started and lasted for several years; Firth was 15; McDonald was 14 to 15; Manuel was 19; Ruben was 13; Tom Kakfwi was 17 or 18, and McPherson was 16. The pattern is quite clear, at least to me.

The accused became sexually involved with boys who were under his supervision. He could control things that way. He could control them. That is

what made his sexual activities possible. He took advantage of it. He was not involved in a highly sexual manner with boys he could not control, for example, if they were living under someone else's supervision in the junior boys' section, or worse, if they were going home to the family of the Superintendent of Education. It stretches reason to think that even this accused would be so reckless as to risk an involvement with the 11-year-old child of the man who controlled the education system.

I am also concerned about Coady's admissions about piecing together his recollections.

Influences could easily be at work (albeit subconsciously). I do not think Coady is lying consciously. I think he genuinely believes what he is saying, but the totality of the circumstances cause me to be extremely cautious with respect to his evidence. I do not have that sense of certainty that must come with the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore dismiss Counts 41 and 42.

Count 44 is a charge of gross indecency with Wayne Reindeer. The accused pleaded guilty.

Reindeer was quite an impressive witness, straightforward and credible. He was not a resident of Grollier Hall but would come visit the

accused to drink alcohol. The accused would give him and others alcohol to drink, showed them pornographic books and movies and then encouraged them to take their clothes off and masturbate The visits started when Reindeer was themselves. 13 or 14 and ended when he was 17 or 18. accused also took nude photographs of Reindeer. Reindeer acknowledged that he was an active participant in these activities.

The accused admits these activities but says they were not as frequent as Reindeer said they were. That is not very significant. More significant is Reindeer's allegation that later on during the time of these visits, there were a few occasions when the accused performed fellatio on him. The accused denied this took place.

I accept Reindeer's evidence as to all the facts that he related. A conviction will formally be entered on Count 44.

In summary, 7 counts are dismissed.

Convictions are entered on 14 counts: 9 of gross indecency, 3 of indecent assault, 1 of attempted indecent assault, and 1 of attempted buggery.

Now, let me say one final thing: I recognize that my findings may disappoint some and may please some others, but I am sure everyone realizes, as counsel realizes, that a criminal trial must deal

1	with specific facts on specific allegations. It is
2	not a broad-ranging inquiry into whatever abuses
3	may have occurred in the residential school
4	system. That must be done in some other forum, as
5	I am sure it will be done. A criminal trial is
6	certainly not a healing process. It is badly
7	equipped to heal the victims of crimes. Victims
8	can only be healed through their own efforts,
9	through the assistance of their family and friends,
10	and through the work of the entire community. A
11	criminal trial deals with specific offences, and
12	the only question in a criminal trial is whether
13	there are facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt to
14	support a conviction on those offences. The
15	findings I have made here in this verdict are my
16	findings as to those facts that have been proven
17	beyond a reasonable doubt.
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