CR 03265

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- V -

MARVIN EUGENE MURDICK

Transcript of the Oral Judgement by The Honourable Justice
J. Z. Vertes, sitting in Hay River, in the Northwest
Territories, on the 25th day of March, A.D., 1998.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. S. Couper:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. A. Mahar:

Counsel for the Defence COURT



THE COURT: Many judges have often said that the law does not clothe a judge with divine insight into the hearts and minds of witnesses. We cannot profess to be able to determine absolute truth. All we can do is apply time-honoured means to determine whether an allegation has been proven to the standard that is the only one acceptable in criminal law, that being beyond a reasonable doubt.

The law sets down only one requirement. I must examine all of the evidence and then decide whether the Crown has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. And where, as here, one is confronted by contradictory versions of what happened, one does not have to decide which one of those versions is true, but rather whether the evidence as a whole proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. And if there is a doubt then the accused must be acquitted.

On a philosophical and practical level a trial should be a search for the truth. But judges are not detectives, they are judges. And what they must judge are not the individuals but the evidence. Has the evidence firmly convinced the judge of the accused's guilt? So, often when there is an acquittal, that does not automatically mean that the complainant was found to be lying. On the contrary, a complainant may honestly believe and recount what she thinks happened but the evidence as a whole fails to meet the criminal

standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because, in the final analysis, if the evidence fails to leave the judge feeling sure that the accused committed the crime, then the case must be decided on the basis of the burden of proof, not on the basis of speculation or suspicion.

In this case the accused, Marvin Eugene Murdick, stands charged that he did commit "a series of sexual assaults" between 1983 and 1987. The "series" alleged by the Crown consist of three specific incidents recalled by the complainant. The Crown is not alleging that these three incidents are merely three in a series. They, or any one or two of them, are the series alleged in the indictment.

The complainant is now 18 years old. She was from 4 to 7 years old during the relevant time frame. The accused is her uncle. At the time both the complainant's family and the accused's family were living in Pine Point. They had constant interaction. The accused's family consisted of himself, his wife, and their four daughters. The accused worked a regular work shift from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Often the complainant would be baby-sat by the accused's wife or one of his daughters. The complainant, as she got older, would go to the accused's home after school presumably to play with his daughters. It is in these circumstances that the

complainant recalled the three alleged incidents occurring.

One incident, the one that appears to be the first in time, took place in the basement of the accused's home. The complainant recalls that the accused forced her to perform oral sex on him. She thinks she was 4 or 5 years old at the time.

Another incident allegedly occurred in a shed behind the accused's home. The complainant alleges that the accused penetrated her with his penis. She thinks she was "older," that is to say in the latter part of the 4 to 7 year old stage when this occurred.

The third allegation is an incident of digital penetration by the accused. This was said to have occurred in one of the bedrooms of the accused's home.

Again the complainant thinks she was "older" when this accurred.

The accused denied the allegations saying that he never abused the complainant and that he never touched her in a sexual way. He testified that on most occasions when the complainant was at the house his wife or some of his children would be there. He said he never had a shed behind his house. He said that the basement of his house was used as a bedroom by two of his daughters. While the defence did not deny that the accused may have had the opportunity to commit these crimes, the clear implication is that it is highly

improbable that he could have done so in these circumstances.

There was other evidence led. In an effort to date these incidents, both the complainant and her mother testified to a time, when the complainant was 6 years old and starting school, that her long hair was cut short. The complainant recalls the shed and bedroom incidents happening after her hair was cut with the basement incident occurring before.

Evidence was also submitted, by way of agreed statements of fact, of a hospital admission of the complainant when she was 6 years old. In November, 1985, the complainant was admitted to hospital in Edmonton for an examination as a result of a persistent vaginal discharge. She was given an extensive examination. The complainant recalls it as a very stressful time for her. The examination revealed a number of things, including that the hymen was intact and no lesions were visible. The complainant was diagnosed as having an immune deficiency which made her less resistant to vaginal infections and irritations from any source.

The Crown had a specialist in childhood sexual abuse review these medical records. The doctor's opinion was that the physical observations were "nonspecific," that is to say they are not conclusive of penetration nor do they rule out that possibility.

The doctor further gave the opinion that, while it is not improbable that penetration could have occurred, it is more than likely that if penetration had occurred one would have observed tearing or other injury to the hymen.

Related to this point, counsel for the accused pointed out an apparent inconsistency in the complainant's recollection. On cross-examination the complainant acknowledged that in an early statement to investigators she said that the incident in the shed, the one alleging intercourse, occurred early in the time frame prior to her hospital admission. She later revised that to say that it happened later in the time frame.

There was a great deal of exploration into the circumstances of the disclosure of these allegations. The complainant testified that at the time these things were happening she did not tell anyone because she was scared and she did not want to be the one to break up the family. She then apparently lost her memory of these events. I use the term lost cautiously since what the complainant described was a process of memory retrieval that she went through from ages 12 to 17.

The complainant testified that she started getting flashbacks when she was 12 years old. These were flashes of emotions, of feelings of anxiety and fear. Then over the next two years she started seeing

and recalling indistinct images. And it was when she was 15 she started to get a clear picture of these incidents.

The complainant was in counselling since the age of 13. She testified that she was very rebellious, acting out, with feelings of anxiety and depression at that time. The actual disclosure came when the complainant attempted suicide at age 15.

On cross-examination defence counsel elicited from the complainant evidence that at one time she recollected ongoing and repetitive incidents of intercourse perpetrated by the accused. She thought it could have been 3 or 4 times per month. Now the three incidents she described are the only ones she feels she truly recollects. Defence counsel argued that this change in her recollection, as well as the area inconsistency in dating of one incident, reveals perhaps a subconscious effort by the complainant to accommodate her recollections with external evidence.

The complainant's mother testified that after they left Pine Point in 1986 the family lived in Alberta for a year and then lived in Dryden, Ontario, for a few years. The accused had moved to Dryden by then and there was frequent contact between the two families during that period. This was the time in which the complainant says she had no memory of these incidents. This may be significant to some extent

since I also heard evidence that it is unusual for someone to have no memory if there are occasions when such a memory may be triggered, such as contact with the alleged perpetrator.

I also heard evidence from two expert witnesses. Dr. John Read, called by the defence, is a professor of psychology who has done extensive research into the question of memory function and memory recovery. Dr. Michael Stambrook, called in rebuttal by the Crown, is a clinical psychologist who specializes in the treatment of adolescents who suffer memory impairment due to trauma. The sum and substance of their evidence as I gleaned it is this:

- 1. The one thing we know positively about human memory function is that we do not know very much.
- 2. Some victims of trauma suffer memory loss as a result but many others do not.
- 3. The difficulty with extrapolating backwards from a subjective report of no memory to recovered memory of an event is the lack of an external validation that the event occurred.
- 4. Recollections of past events are influenced and can be distorted by a host of factors, consciously and unconsciously.
- 5. The correlation between one's confidence in a memory and the accuracy of that memory is not as great as may commonly be thought, similar in many ways

to the known dangers of eyewitness identification evidence.

Where the two experts differed was in their analysis of research data, not so much on the analysis itself as on the result of that analysis. I think it is fair to say that Dr. Read takes a more conservative approach than Dr. Stambrook does to the frequency of memory loss and recovery as well as to the dangers of the unreliability or inaccuracy of such memories. There is no point in delving into that debate in this judgement. Criminal cases are not resolved by applying a statistical analysis or a probability factor. There is either proof beyond a reasonable doubt or there is not. Every case has to be decided on the basis of the evidence presented in that case.

This type of expert evidence can be helpful, however, in explaining certain aspects of human psychology. The area of memory recovery is not something necessarily within the everyday knowledge of nonprofessionals. This evidence could provide valuable assistance so as to assess the reliability of the complainant's testimony. And that is what this case comes down to.

The defence is not accusing the complainant of fabricating these allegations for some malicious purpose. The defence argues that the complainant has an honestly held but nonetheless mistaken belief that

the accused assaulted her. The defence does not say that the complainant did not at some point suffer a traumatic event; it was just not the events she described. These descriptions arose, in defence counsel's submission, as a way of resolving in her own mind the many difficult and conflicting emotions the complainant was trying to cope with as a teenager.

Many times in these types of cases, courts must make a distinction between the complainant's credibility as a witness and the reliability of that evidence. The central issue is not whether a complainant sincerely believes her testimony to be true but whether that evidence is sufficiently reliable to warrant a conviction. Secondary to this issue is, as Crown counsel urged me to do in this case, the assessment of evidence on the basis of the demeanor of the witnesses.

We all know from our experience in trials that honest witnesses, whether they are adults or children, may convince themselves that inaccurate versions of a given event are correct and they can be very persuasive. The question, however, is not the sincerity of the witness but the reliability of the witness's testimony. Demeanor alone should not suffice to found a conviction.

In this case I have a number of concerns about the reliability of the complainant's testimony. First,

there are the inconsistencies in the complainant's 1 2 recollections as to the frequency of the assaults and the timing of the incident alleging intercourse. is the opinion of the Crown's expert witness that the fact that the initial disclosure was made at a time of 5 high stress for the complainant, that being the suicide attempt, leads to a possibility of serious error in the sorting out of the many influences on the complainant at the time. There is the medical evidence from 1985 9 which, while not conclusive either way, would seem to 10 11 make more plausible the lack of assaults as recollected by the complainant. All of these factors leave me to 12 13 have a doubt as to the reliability of the complainant's 14 evidence, that is to say I have a doubt as to a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the totality of the 15 16 evidence in this case. 17 For these reasons the charge is dismissed. 18 19 20 Certified Pursuant to Practice Direction #20 dated December 28, 1987 21 22 23 24 25 26 27