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
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
IN THE MATTER OF:



HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

ABKIKAKIM ABDULLE YALAHOW



Transcript of the Proceedings held before Justice J. Z. Vertes, in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 23rd day of April, A.D. 1998.

APPEARANCES:

MR. D. McWHINNIE:

On behalf of the Crown

MR. S. TARRABAIN:

On behalf of the Defence

Charges under ss. 326(1)(b) C.C. and 145(3) C.C.

THE COURT:

I do not think it is necessary for me to issue some broad statement that a judge who issues a search warrant can never or should never sit on a trial where those warrants are attacked. That is unnecessary in the circumstances of this case and that would be too sweeping a generalization. Everything depends on the circumstances of a particular case.

The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is what would an objective, informed observer perceive as to the fairness of the proceedings. It does not call into question any actual bias on the part of the decision maker. It is a matter of perception. And it is, as quoted in the famous National Energy Board case from the Supreme Court of Canada, "...a matter of the probability or reasoned suspicion of bias, appraisal and judgment unintended though it be...", and I emphasize that latter phrase, "unintended though it be".

In this situation I am told that the accused intends to attack the sufficiency of the warrant; and by that I understand to be both the legal sufficiency for the initial issuance of the warrant based on what was before the issuing judge, as well as some other factors. In my view, such an attack on those grounds puts the trial judge in a very difficult position because even though he or she may be able to fully divorce themselves from their intellectual or

proprietary interest in their previous decision, it is the unintended and subconscious influences that are, of course, of concern and could lead to a reasonable apprehension on the part of a reasonable observer.

We have here as well indications or evidence that this concern was raised by counsel to the Chief Judge a week ago, that counsel certainly anticipated that Judge Bourassa would not be the judge assigned to the trial, and that, I think it's fair to say, both counsel were taken somewhat by surprise when indeed Judge Bourassa was the trial judge.

I can appreciate, from having read the excerpts of the proceedings before Judge Bourassa yesterday and earlier this morning, the judge's concerns about proceeding with the matter. He is obviously concerned about delays in bringing this matter to trial, as I am told he set this matter peremptorily on the Crown to proceed this week, and I think it is fair to say that his concerns are legitimate concerns in the public interest. He also expresses a concern about these types of applications derailing proceedings on a regular basis, having regard to the small number of judges in this jurisdiction - that, too, is a legitimate concern - although I may say that that is a concern that can be balanced and addressed on a case-by-case basis. So I want to emphasize, as I said at the beginning, that my ruling here should not be

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seen as some general proposition applicable in all situations. But I share his concerns.

But in this instance, having regard to the basis and the nature of the applications that the accused intends to make, I think there is a reasonable concern as to the perception of justice should Judge Bourassa continue in this matter as the Trial Judge.

Therefore, an order will be issued prohibiting the continuation of these proceedings before Judge Bourassa as the Trial Judge. Needless to say, the usual protective orders will issue in favour of the Trial Judge.

I will leave it to counsel to address the question of the recommencement of these proceedings, before whom and at what time. Counsel should address that with the Chief Judge at the earliest opportunity, the Chief Judge of the Territorial Court.

Do you require any further direction, counsel?

MR. McWHINNIE: I'm thinking, Sir, to avoid a loss of jurisdiction that you may want to direct that the matter be put on the next -- or on a date certain to fix a date for a new trial because we're currently set to appear before Judge Bourassa at 1:30 to speak to this matter.

THE COURT: Well, my suggestion is that, and if you wish I can give a direction to this effect, that the accused is to appear before Judge Bourassa at 1:30

1		today so that c	ounsel can speak to the issue of	
2		continuation of	these proceedings.	
3	MR.	McWHINNIE:	Thank you, Sir, that solves the	
4		problem.		
5	MR.	TARRABAIN:	Thank you, Your Honour.	
6	THE	COURT:	Madam Reporter, perhaps you can	
7		prepare a trans	script of my comments and provide it to	
8		counsel and to	Judge Bourassa for his information so	
9		that he is appr	rised of the reasons for this	
10		extraordinary s	step.	
11	MR.	TARRABAIN:	Thank you, My Lord.	
12	THE	COURT:	Thank you, gentlemen. We'll	
13		adjourn.		
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16			Certified pursuant to Practice Direction #20 dated December 28,	
17			1987.	
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19			Annette Wright	
20			Court Reporter	
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