CR 02924

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

CLINTON WESTGARD

Transcript of Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Mr. Justice J.Z. Vertes, sitting at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on Thursday, July 27, A.D. 1995

APPEARANCES:

Mr. S. Couper:

Mr. R. Gorin:

WG 2 1995

For the Crown

For the Defence

(Charges under Sections 279(2) and 266(a) of the Criminal Code)

THE COURT: Clinton Westgard has entered pleas of guilty to three charges: one of unlawful confinement and two of common assault.

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The guilty pleas came on the eve of the commencement of his trial before a jury. He had been facing trial on a six-count Indictment. The guilty pleas were entered, with the Crown's agreement, to lesser and included offenses on three of those counts. The other three counts were stayed by the Crown.

The crime of unlawful confinement, contrary to Section 279(2) of the Criminal Code, is punishable by a potential maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment. The indictable offense of assault, contrary to Section 266(a) of the Criminal Code, is punishable by up to five years imprisonment. The Criminal Code, of course, does not set down any mandatory minimum punishment for these crimes. So there is a wide discretion given to trial judges to impose sentences based on the appropriate circumstances and particular facts of each case.

Considering the fact that the guilty pleas were entered with the Crown's consent to significantly reduced charges from those set out in the Indictment, I think it is fair to say that they must be the result of extensive discussion, investigation, and negotiation. I commend counsel for their efforts. However, much more effort was obviously required since, after entry

of the guilty pleas, counsel embarked on a day-long sentencing hearing. There was so much disagreement over the facts and circumstances of each offense, and over the context in which those offenses occurred, that I wonder how counsel were able to agree at all on the pleas.

In respect of the facts, I heard from seven witnesses, including the complainant and the accused plus a teenage son of each of them. Many of the facts addressed seemed to me to be only marginally relevant to the question of sentence. I also heard from four character witnesses called on behalf of the accused.

I think it is worth repeating what was said at the hearing.

It is not every disputed fact that must be proven at a sentencing hearing. In this case, I can assume, by the entry of the guilty pleas, that the accused admits all of the essential elements of the offense. So in this case convictions have been entered. It is only when the Crown seeks to rely on facts of aggravating circumstances so as to impose a harsher sentence on the accused, and the accused challenges those facts, the Crown must then establish those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, if representations as to the facts made by the defence are challenged by the Crown, then there is an obligation on the part of the defence to present evidence.

Mitigating factors are not to be simply assumed in the absence of evidence establishing those facts. But, of course, any doubt should still be resolved in favour of the accused with respect to any aggravating factors that the Crown attempts to prove.

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On a sentencing hearing, I have much more latitude than in a trial as to the sources and types of evidence upon which to base the sentence. Any evidence, so long as it is relevant and reliable, can be considered.

I find the following uncontroverted facts.

The charges arise from a four-year-long domestic relationship between the accused and the complainant. They cover a time frame from mid-January 1995, the time when the complainant says they separated, to March 10th, 1995, when the complainant made the first report to the police. The specific date for two of these charges has not been established, while only the third charge has a specific date. There was, from the date of separation on, continued contact between the complainant and the accused. The complainant admitted as much. She said they tried to be friends, so their contact was fairly frequent early on in the separation, but became less so when she realized that their inter-personal problems would not change. This is consistent with the fact that the complainant finally decided to go to the police. It is also consistent with what I conclude was a continuing pattern of

conduct whereby the accused would persist in pursuing the possibility of reconciliation. I do not go so far as to label it harassment in a criminal sense, but the conclusion I draw is that it became harassing over time on a personal level. I did not hear any evidence to suggest that the complainant wanted to reconcile. It is also consistent with the accused's failure to abide by a non-contact condition in his recognizance of bail after his arrest.

There is also no doubt that the relationship was a volatile one. I heard evidence of assaultive behaviour by both of them toward each other at other times outside of these charges.

With respect to the unlawful confinement charge, this took place in the complainant's home. The accused blocked the complainant's freedom of movement for a brief time -- five to ten minutes -- by standing in the doorway of her bedroom. According to the Crown, she told him she had to leave and he finally let her do so. According to the defence, she finally pushed her way out. To my mind, nothing turns of significance on this difference.

The complainant said this happened a few weeks after the accused move out of the house. She testified that he moved out on January 13th. The accused said this happened on January 29th or thereabouts, but that he was still living in the house at the time. There

was evidence that he lived in the house up until
February 2nd, 1995, when he signed a lease on an
apartment. There was no evidence to rebut this. Hence
I cannot conclude beyond a doubt that the accused was
not living there at the time. Hence I cannot find, as
an aggravating factor, that the accused was in the
house unlawfully or without permission. In any event,
the Crown chose to withdraw an allegation of a break
and enter. So I do not see how it can suggest
otherwise than that the accused was in the house
lawfully.

The first charge of assault, resulting from Count 3 of the Indictment, drew the most controversy. Again, the facts are highly disputed.

The Crown says that the accused came into the house sometime in early February in the early morning hours. The complainant said, and I quote, "He broke into the house." Again, considering the fact that the Crown dropped a break and enter charge in relation to this offense, I find it incongruous that they would still advance this allegation.

The Crown alleges that the accused confronted the complainant while she was still in bed. He asked her to take him back. She told him no. He allegedly pinned her to the bed, threatened to beat her, and then choked her with his hands. He ceased after a short while and left.

The defence alleges that the accused had spent the night there at the complainant's invitation. The accused testified that they argued and that she hit and scratched at him. He said that a struggle ensued in which he used excessive force by pulling her hair. He denied choking her.

What is not disputed is that, as a result of this altercation, the complainant suffered an anxiety attack and her breathing became laboured. Even the accused acknowledged that he became worried, and the complainant's son confirmed that the accused asked him to keep an eye on the complainant as he left the house. There was also some evidence that the complainant may have struck the accused after the incident was over as he was leaving the house.

How is one to choose one story over another? There are no rational external criteria by which to judge the discrepancies. I find I cannot do so in this case. The burden being on the Crown, I find that the Crown has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt those aggravating factors Crown counsel asks me to find: those being an unexplained presence in the home, the instigation of the assault, and the choking. On the other hand, I am equally unpersuaded that I should find there were those mitigating circumstances that defence counsel wants me to find: the accused's presence in the home by consent and his being struck first. The

assault is serious enough in and of itself even without the alleged choking and even without consideration of any specific aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

On the third charge, that being the charge of an assault in Count 6, the facts are admitted. On March 10th, 1995, at approximately 10 a.m., the accused came to the complainant's home. He asked her to take him back. He persisted by following her throughout the house. She told him to leave. He would not. He thus became a trespasser in her home. She tried to push him out. He pushed back. By his plea of guilty, the accused acknowledges he used excessive force. That is the extent of Count 6.

In their submissions on sentence, Crown counsel argued that I should impose a further sentence of imprisonment. Defence counsel suggested time served. The accused has been in custody since March 24th, of which 15 days was a sentence for breach of his undertaking. The approximately three and a half months of pre-trial custody must, of course, be taken into account. It is usually credited at a ratio higher than one to one, but, as counsel knows, there is no strict formula.

The accused is a mature man. He has been steadily employed for the past eight years. His employer and friends speak highly of him. He has three children that he supports as well. The accused does have a

previous criminal conviction. There is one conviction from 1987 for sexual assault for which he received 60 days. Obviously it was not a major offense, so I attach little weight to it.

The aggravating circumstance present in all of these offences is that they arise from a continuous pattern of domestic violence. That is obviously very serious and must be denounced. The accused and others must be deterred.

The mitigating circumstance is that all offenses were of brief duration, more spontaneous than premeditated.

I give credit to the guilty plea. It has saved time and expense and the need at least for the complainant to testify before a jury (although this factor is not as great as it ordinarily would be since the complainant had to testify at the sentencing hearing where she was cross-examined and her credibility was attacked). But I do not think the guilty plea can be disregarded simply because it came at the last moment. This is not a case of the accused realizing he was in a hopeless situation with an overwhelming case against him. On the contrary, it was the Crown that gave significant ground at the last minute. I am sure that the Crown had good reasons to do so, reasons that accord with the Crown's responsibility to the pursuit of justice. But the

result is that the guilty plea should be given some mitigating effect.

In my opinion, appropriate sentences on these charges, leaving aside the pre-trial custody time, would be gaol terms of two, three, and four months, respectively, increasing with each occurring offense, and all consecutive to each other since they are separate offenses. That is a total of nine months. To that, I must apply a reduction for time already spent in custody. In this case, I credit the accused with the equivalent of six months so as to reduce the total to one of three months.

Is there any reason not to order intermittent time? The accused has steady employment. He has children to support. It seems to me society would be better served by having him working as opposed to sitting behind bars.

I accept, however, Crown counsel's recommendation that the accused's future conduct be controlled by some type of ongoing protective order. This would help protect the complainant.

Stand up Mr. Westgard.

Mr. Westgard, I am sure you realize by now that if there is any repetition of this type of behaviour, you are going to go to gaol for a long time. Do you understand that?

27 THE ACCUSED: Yes, sir.

1 THE COURT: On Count 2, that is the charge of 2 unlawful confinement, I sentence you to serve a term of 3 imprisonment of 30 days. On Count 3, the charge of 4 assault, I sentence you to serve 30 days consecutive. On Count 6, the charge of assault, I sentence you to 5 6 serve a further term of 30 days consecutive. That is a 7 total of 90 days. That sentence is to be served 8 intermittently on weekends. You are to report to the 9 Yellowknife Correctional Centre on Friday, July 28th, 10 1995, at 6 p.m. You are to be incarcerated there until Monday, July 31st, 1995, at 7 a.m., and you are to 11 12 continue to report each and every weekend thereafter 13 until your sentence is served. 14 Do you understand that, sir? 15 THE ACCUSED: Yes, sir. 16 THE COURT: You will be on probation for a period 17 of two years from today's date, and the terms and conditions of that probation will be as follows. 18 19 are to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

of two years from today's date, and the terms and conditions of that probation will be as follows. You are to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You are to report to this Court if and when required to do so. You are to serve the intermittent sentence in accordance with my instructions. You are to report within the next 48 hours to the probation officer here in Yellowknife, and you are to continue to report as and when required by the probation officer. You are to engage and participate in any counseling programs that the probation officer may direct you to do or recommend

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1 for you. You are to have no contact, directly or 2 indirectly, with the complainant, and you are not to be 3 within a space of 100 yards of her residence at any time. 5 Do you understand that, sir?' 6 THE ACCUSED: Yes sir. 7 THE COURT: Now, the Clerk of the Court will 8 prepare the probation order. Your counsel will have an 9 opportunity to review it with you. But I want to make 10 it very clear to you, sir, that if you breach any of the conditions of the probation order, that is an 11 12 offense. You can be charged for that. You can be 13 brought back before me. I can change the terms and 14 conditions for your probation order. I can extend 15 them. Do you understand that? 16 THE ACCUSED: Yes, sir. 17 THE COURT: You may have a seat. 18 In addition, there are will be a victim of crime 19 surcharge. I understand, Counsel, that there is some 20 regulation in place that limits me to imposing a fine 21 surcharge of \$35 in the absence of any fine. 22 23 So, Mr. Westgard, I direct that you pay the sum of \$35 to the Clerk of the Court within the next seven 24 25 That money is to go into a fund to help develop 26 support programs for victims of crime. 27 Do you understand that?

1	THE ACCUSED:	Yes, sir.
2	THE COURT:	If you do not pay that, you will serve
3	an additional two days in gaol.	
4	Now are t	here any questions, Counsel?
5	MR. COUPER:	No, My Lord.
6	MR. GORIN:	No, sir.
7	THE COURT:	Thank you very much. We will adjourn.
8	(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED)	
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11	Certified Pursuant to Practice Direction #20	
12	dated December 28, 1987.	
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14	Jane Romanowich Court Reporter	
15	Cour	c Reporter
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