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## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

## IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

VS

e m k



Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Mr. Justice J. Z. Vertes, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on Thursday, April 13th A.D., 1995.

## APPEARANCES:

MS. L. MINISH-COOPER:

Counsel for the Crown

MR. C. REHN:

Counsel for the Defence

1 THE COURT: C M: K has entered 2 pleas of guilty to three charges. The first is a 3. charge of sexual assault on E M occurring sometime in late 1991 or early 1992. B family friend of the accused, indeed a relative of his wife, and was at the time 12 or 13 years old. This offence consists of the accused placing his hand over the victim's breast.

The second charge also concerns a sexual assault on B in the same time frame. In this offence the accused took B 's hand and placed it on his penis. This lasted only momentarily.

Some time after these two incidents, the accused was confronted by B 's family and apparently the two families reached some sort of reconciliation.

The third charge, however, arose in February of 1994. This involves an assault, a common assault, on T S . This offence consisted of unwanted touching and tickling of the victim by the accused. T was 14 years old at the time. It was this charge that led to the disclosure of the earlier offences. From all that I have heard, I think it is fair to say that it is likely that the earlier offences would not have come forward without this later offence having been disclosed to the police.

The accused was arrested in June of 1994 and admitted his actions in a statement to the police. In

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that statement he expressed regret for his actions. He said he did not know why he acted that way and he indicated a desire to get help. Shortly after he was charged he voluntarily entered into psychotherapy treatment.

The accused has no previous criminal record. He is 30 years old. He has been in a commonlaw relationship for the past nine years and has three young children. He is by all accounts a good worker, a good family man, and people who know him are shocked by these charges and say it is out of character for him. The presentence report describes him as a suitable candidate for probation.

I heard from the accused's psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Clemmey, who also provided a written report. Dr. Clemmey's opinion was that the offences arose due to the accused's immature personality and undeveloped sense of personal boundaries. The accused, according to his doctor, allowed himself to entertain sexual fantasies toward B , even though she was a child, and then acted on them through insufficient personal control. When asked if the accused possessed any general tendency towards sexual fantasies involving children, Dr. Clemmey replied in the negative and said that the incidents with B were isolated events arising out of the accused's personal circumstances at the time.

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With respect to the offence involving T , Dr. Clemmey did not detect any sexual aspect to that incident. I place some emphasis on these opinions because if there had been any indications of a general tendency towards this type of behavior, my sentence would be radically different. In Dr. Clemmey's opinion, the accused is genuinely remorseful, accepts responsibility for his actions, and poses a very low risk of reoffending.

It is now my responsibility to impose a sentence that will maintain society's confidence in the administration of the criminal law, but yet at the same time recognize the unique features of this case.

The primary and fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society - to preserve the well-being and order of society. This involves a blending of the principles of deterrence, rehabilitation, and denunciation. The paramount considerations are the circumstances of the particular offence, and the particular offender. Accountability, not punishment for punishment's sake, is the primary focus of sentencing.

Crown counsel quite properly points out that society and the courts condemn the sexual violation of children. This is due to a number of factors including, as we know, the often devastating and long-standing psychological trauma suffered by victims

of childhood sexual abuse. In such circumstances, appellate courts have said that only in exceptional cases can incarceration be avoided.

In this case there are a number of aggravating features. There is the repetition of the sexual conduct with B . All three offences were committed in similar circumstances, and most significantly, the accused was an adult who was in somewhat of a position of trust, certainly towards B , who was related to his family.

But there are also significant mitigating factors.

All incidents were very brief. None of the incidents was accompanied by elements of overt force or coercion. He has pleaded guilty. The incidents with B were addressed within the family. And he has taken major steps in his rehabilitation.

Judges often say that rehabilitation remains the only certain way of permanently protecting society. A court should not hesitate to impose a rehabilitative non-custodial sentence if the requirements of accountability can be met by conditions and restrictions on future behavior.

Crown counsel submits that I must at least consider the possibility of incarceration in this case (although I did not detect in all frankness a strong representation in favour of it). The Criminal Code provides a wide spectrum of potential penalties for

these offences, anything from a complete discharge to 10 years imprisonment.

In this case, due to the significant mitigating factors noted above, I have concluded that this is an exceptional case that justifies not sending the accused to prison. In my view incarceration would be completely counter-productive.

Defence counsel has argued for a discharge of some sort. In support of this he cites the accused's efforts at rehabilitation, the low prospects of his reoffending, and the adverse impact of a criminal conviction on the accused's employment. My initial inclination in all honesty was that a discharge would be inappropriate in cases of sexual violence.

The Criminal Code provides that the court may either absolutely or conditionally grant a discharge to an offender. A conviction is still recorded, but by having been discharged, the offender has no criminal record unless, of course, he reoffends. The criteria for granting a discharge are that a discharge must be in the best interests of the accused, and must be not contrary to the public interest.

Is a discharge in the best interests of the accused? This presupposes that the accused is a person of good character without previous convictions, that it is not necessary to enter a conviction against him in order to deter him from future offences or to

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rehabilitate him, and that the entry of a conviction against him may have significant adverse repercussions. From all that I have heard in this case, I am satisfied that this criterion is met in this case.

Is a discharge not contrary to the public interest? This relates to the necessity of a sentence which will be a deterrent to others who may be likely to commit a similar offence. This factor, however, does not preclude the judicious use of the discharge provisions (especially since there is the ability to attach conditions) and I note that the Criminal Code does not preclude the availability of a discharge for these offences.

In my opinion, the general principles of sentencing with respect to sexual crimes should be sufficiently established so as to constitute a general deterrence. The specific circumstances of this case and this offender are sufficiently different so that no one could, or should, mistake this case as a precedent for future cases. The sentence I am about to impose is structured on the exceptional circumstances of this case only. For that reason, I find that the second criterion is met.

Is there any reason to impose a suspended sentence as opposed to a conditional discharge? In both cases probation terms can be imposed. In both cases if the

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accused reoffends, he can be brought back before me and resentenced for these offences. The only difference is that if he has been discharged, then there is no record. It seems to me that if the presence of a record jeopardizes his employment, thereby jeopardizing his family's security and well-being, then that could easily jeopardize the efforts at rehabilitation. I see no reason, therefore, not to allow the chance at least for the accused to maintain his livelihood through the absence of a record.

Mr. K , will you stand up. Mr. K , I took seriously your expressions of remorse, your apologies to B and T . I took seriously what has been said on your behalf. It is sometimes said that the road to redemption starts with the step of self-awareness. It seems to me that you are on that road, and I fervently hope, sir, that you will be able to put your life and the life of your family back together again. By this sentence I am giving you an opportunity to do that.

The guilty pleas and convictions have already been recorded with respect to all three offences. However, with respect to all three offences, I hereby grant you a conditional discharge. The condition of your discharge is that you be on probation for a period of two years, and subject to a probation order with the

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following terms. First, you are to keep the peace and be of good behavior. Second, you are to report forthwith to a probation officer and continue to report as and when directed by the probation officer. Third, you are to participate in such counselling or therapy programs as may be directed by your probation officer. Fourth, you are to continue psychotherapy until such time as your doctor determines it is no longer necessary.

Now, sir, I am going to direct that you stay behind after we close court. The clerk will prepare the probation order. You will have an opportunity to review it. I am sure your lawyer will review the terms with you, and you will have an opportunity to sign it. But I want you to be under no misapprehension. It is a conditional discharge. you abide by the terms, if you are free of any further offences, then you will have no criminal record. is your chance, sir, to maintain your employment, and as I said, to maintain some financial security for your family. I don't know whether your employer will or will not deal with a conditional discharge the same way they would with an ordinary criminal conviction, but that's something at least you have the opportunity to pursue. So it is all up to you, sir.

But if you do commit another offence, any type of offence, I want you to understand very clearly that

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1 you can be brought back before me and you can be sentenced, tried and sentenced not just for whatever new offence you commit, but you can be resentenced for these offences. Do you understand that? THE ACCUSED: Yes, I do. THE COURT: I also want you to understand that if you do not abide by any of the conditions of your probation order, if you commit any other type of offence, then you can be charged for that. You can be 10 sentenced for that. The terms of your probation can 11 be changed. The probation order can be extended. 12 you understand that, sir? 13 THE ACCUSED: Yes, I do. 14 THE COURT: In addition, Mr. K , I direct that 15 you pay a victim fine surcharge of \$500. I want to 16 explain that to you. Those fine surcharges go into a 17 fund to help victims of crime. They go into a fund to 18 help all victims of crime with various programs and 19 services provided for them. So that's going to be 20 your direct contribution to the aid and assistance of 21 not only past but future victims of crime. You will 22 have three months within which to pay that. And if 23 you do not pay that, you will serve one month in jail. 24 Do you understand that. 25 THE ACCUSED: Yes, I do. 26 THE COURT: You may have a seat. Under the 27 circumstances, counsel, considering all that I heard,

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           I decline to make any order under Section 100 of the
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           Criminal Code. Now, is there anything else we need to
           address?
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      MR. REHN:
                           My Lord, Dr. Clemmey stopped me on the
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           way out with respect to how he should deal with--or
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           whether the court would just order the normal fees
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           with respect to his attendance, or whether he should
           submit a bill. Should I just take that up with the
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           clerk?
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      THE COURT:
                           He is your witness, Counsel.
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           suggest you discuss it with him and discuss it with
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           the clerk.
                       There is a tariff of experts fees that the
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           court pays. General policy is that anything over and
           above that is the responsibility of he who hires the
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           expert.
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      MR. REHN:
                          That's understood.
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      THE COURT:
                          Anything else?
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      MR. REHN:
                          No, sir.
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      MS. MINISH-COOPER:
                          No, My Lord.
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      THE COURT:
                          Before we close, Counsel, I want to
           extend my appreciation to both of you for your
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           submissions in this case and for the manner in which
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           you both handled it. We will close court.
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           (AT WHICH TIME THESE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED)
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