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IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:

CANADA



HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

## CHRISTOPHER GILBERT THRASHER

Reasons for Decision (Voir Dire) held before the Honourable Mr. Justice J.E. Richard, sitting in Inuvik, in the Northwest Territories, on Tuesday, June 27, 1995.

## APPEARANCES:

R.G. Kilpatrick, Esq., Counsel for the Crown.

J. Lillegran, Ms., Counsel for the Defense.

S.J. Lea Dormer, Ms., Court Reporter.

(Charged under section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada)

THE COURT: On this voir dire, I am asked by the Crown to make a ruling on the admissibility of a written statement obtained by the police from the accused, Christopher Thrasher, at the RCMP detachment office here in Inuvik at approximately 2 p.m. on the day he was arrested and while he was being detained in custody.

The issue on the voir dire is whether the accused gave this written statement freely and voluntarily to the police. That is, whether the Crown has shown that it was not extracted from him by any improper threat or inducement.

The accused's testimony on the voir dire is that there was indeed an inducement held out to him, and that is the basis on which he objects to this written statement being ruled as admissible evidence to be heard by the jury. The law is clear that an involuntary statement made by an accused person outside the courtroom should not be repeated to the jury because an involuntary statement is not likely to be reliable.

The factual circumstances surrounding the giving of this written statement, Exhibit A, commence with the arrest of the accused at 7 a.m. on September 28th, 1994. He was advised that he was being charged with sexually assaulting a male person, Albert Brodhurst, earlier that morning.

He was taken to the RCMP detachment and placed in cells. During the morning Constable McCarthy of the RCMP was doing other investigative work in connection with this charge.

At 1:40 p.m., Constable McCarthy took the accused from his cell to an interview room in the detachment office and said he wanted to speak to him about the charge. The accused agreed to this. The accused was advised of his right to counsel, and he indicated he did not want to contact a lawyer.

The officer testified that he told the accused he could remain silent if he wished. The accused told him that he had no problem discussing the matter for which he had been arrested. No record was kept of this initial 20-minute segment of the interview between police officer and accused person either by handwritten notes or tape recording. The officer took a formal written statement, Exhibit A, commencing at 1:59 p.m.

By the officer's version of the conversation between the two in this 20 minutes, the accused initially denied any sexual involvement with the male complainant, and then the officer cross-examined the accused, in a sense, including a reference to the accused's prior criminal conviction for a sexual offense. In due course,

the officer testified the accused conceded that there was some truth to the allegation being made by the male complainant.

The officer then proceeded to take the formal warned statement from the accused, Exhibit A, after again advising the accused of his right to counsel and right to remain silent. The officer testified under oath that he did not hold out any promises or inducements to the accused or make any threats to the accused in order to get him to give his written statement.

Specifically on cross-examination he denied that there was any discussion about the accused being released from custody a lot sooner if he gave a statement. The accused testified on the voir dire, under oath, and confirmed that he agreed to go to the interview room from the cells for the purpose of speaking to Constable

McCarthy. He also confirmed that he was advised of his right to counsel and that he waived that right.

The accused's version of what transpired in the initial part of the first 20-minute segment of the interview follows the testimony of Constable McCarthy almost to the letter. However, there is then a serious divergence on an essential matter.

The accused says that prior to agreeing to

giving a written statement, he asked Constable

McCarthy how long he was going to be detained at

the detachment and when he was going to be

released, and he said Constable McCarthy told him,

"If you give a statement, you will be released

sooner. If you don't give a statement, you will

be here longer than you expect."

The accused says he then gave a written statement and answered the officer's questions because he wanted to get out of there, to get out of that detachment.

There is, thus, an allegation of an improper inducement and a denial of any such inducement by the only two persons who were present in that interview room. The officer is testifying from memory, as is the accused. There is nothing in the evidence on the voir dire to corroborate the evidence of either one of them on the essential point in issue.

No recording was made of that initial 20 minutes and no explanation is offered as to why a tape recording was not made. The accused's statement to the police was not made spontaneously. On the contrary, it was made at a time and place very much controlled by the police.

It is curious that today in 1995, 30 or 40

years after the technology is available, that the police take an accused person into an interview room for the express purpose of obtaining evidence against him to be used at his trial and do not make an audio or video recording of it.

The court is asked to make a factual finding on the voluntariness of a statement made by the accused to the police in a controlled environment yet the court is not provided with the best evidence that it is readily available.

There is indeed a credibility issue here on the evidence presented on this voir dire. I do have some real doubts about the truthfulness of the accused on the key point of his allegation of an inducement being held out to him, especially in view of clear inconsistencies and discrepancies throughout his testimony.

His blunt assertion that the timing of his release by the police was made conditional on his giving of a statement is probably pure hogwash, but I can not be certain of that. It is for the Crown to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt if it wishes to adduce evidence of an accused's out-of-court statement to police.

If this was a serious criminal charge, as indicated by the police officer to the accused at the time of the interview, and also as indicated

by the Crown's decision to proceed by indictment rather than by summary conviction, then the court is entitled to receive the best evidence that is readily available with the use of commonplace technology to assist the court in its determination of the issue of proof of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

For this reason, as presiding judge, I exercise my residual discretion to exclude this evidence of the accused's out-of-court statement. I am not satisfied that the state has met the onus on it, and I rule that Mr. Thrasher's statements to the police officer in the interview room are not admissible evidence at his trial before the jury.

(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED)

I, S. J. Lea Dormer, C.S.R.(A), Court
Reporter, hereby certify that I attended the above
Proceedings and took faithful and accurate
shorthand notes and the foregoing is a true and
accurate transcript of my shorthand notes to the
best of my skill and ability.

Dated at the City of Calgary, Province of Alberta, this 14th day of June, A.D. 1995.

Sandy dea Dormer per 1944. S. J. Lea Dormer, Ms.,

Certified Shorthand Reporter.