
CR 02721

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -



TIMOTHY NORBERT VORNBROCK

Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence of The Honourable Mr. Justice J. Z. Vertes, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on Thursday, January 12th A.D., 1995.

APPEARANCES:

MS. L. CHARBONNEAU:

Counsel for the Crown

MR. T. BOYD:

Counsel for the Accused

(CHARGED UNDER s. 145(3) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA)

THE COURT:

jury on a charge of breach of undertaking. This charge proceeded by way of indictment so the potential maximum penalty is two years' imprisonment. Also, the accused has been acquitted of two other offences which I will refer to so as to put this conviction in context.

On October 1, 1993, the accused was charged with sexual assault. The complainant was then 14 years old. He was released on an undertaking which contained, as a condition, that he have no contact direct or indirect with the complainant. In July of 1994, the accused was charged with an attempt to obstruct justice by trying to bribe the complainant. These two charges are the ones on which the jury acquitted the accused.

The complainant at trial said, in reference to the obstruction charge, that she and the accused had contact on February 9th, 1994, at which time he offered a bribe for her to change her story. The accused testified that he did have contact with her on that date but denied attempting to bribe her. He also said that he continued to have contact with her for an extended period in February and also in December of 1994. The complainant testified that there was no further contact.

Having regard to the acquittals on the other two

charges, the clear implication of the jury's verdict is that the complainant's evidence failed to convince them. If her evidence of the bribe was doubted and her evidence of further contact doubted yet the jury convicted the accused on the breach charge, it seems to me that the clear implication of that verdict is that the jury accepted the accused's evidence of ongoing contact. I raise this only because defence counsel seemed to suggest that I consider as the underlying facts to this conviction that version of the evidence most favourable to the accused, that being evidence of only one contact. Yet that would be tantamount to repudiating the evidence given by his client under oath. That cannot be.

Accordingly, my sentence is based on what I take to be facts implicitly accepted by the jury: there was contact on February 9th, 1994; there were periods of extended contact of several days each in February and December; and there were sporadic contacts at other times. I accept that these contacts were initiated by the complainant. Yet that does not excuse the accused. He is 20 years older than the complainant; he knew and understood the condition in his undertaking; and he realized that his undertaking was the price that he paid for his continued release until trial.

He tells me that he did not know what to do. That

is no excuse. I find it extremely aggravating that he continued these contacts when he should have acted as a more mature and responsible adult.

The Crown alleges no record of previous criminal convictions. So I must keep in mind that I must treat the accused as a first-time offender. It is my fervent hope that the accused will never find himself in Court again so that the question of personal deterrence is not the over-riding factor.

As Crown counsel noted, this is an offence against the administration of justice. Our system, in order to give meaning to the presumption of innocence, favours bail for people awaiting trial. As a condition of bail, this type of no-contact clause is often used so as to protect complainants and to prevent interference with evidence. Disregard for the conditions of one's undertaking usually results in the accused being held in jail until trial since it shows that he cannot be trusted. Hence sentencing for a breach such as this must be viewed seriously as an interference with the administration of justice. As such, general deterrence becomes the prime factor.

The Crown in this case seeks a custodial sentence in excess of three months as a reflection of how seriously this breach is viewed.

The accused is 35 years old. He has his own business. His business cannot go on without his

active participation. I take that into account. 1 I have concluded that a custodial sentence is 2

required but not to the extent sought by the Crown. This man comes before me as a one-time offender. He has been acquitted of the substantive charges. That is not a mitigating factor but it is a factor. Any custodial sentence under these circumstances would ordinarily be considered unusual. But my sentence, I hope, reflects the seriousness of my view of the

Please stand, Mr. Vornbrock.

accused's behaviour.

Mr. Vornbrock, my sentence is that you serve a term of 60 days' imprisonment. Now, I have taken into account what your counsel has said and what you have said about the impact that incarceration would have on your business so I direct that you serve that term on an intermittent basis. I am going to direct that you serve it on that basis from Friday nights to Monday mornings. What is -- can you assist me, Ms. Charbonneau? What is the usual time? I know that

this Friday, January 13th at 5 p.m., and every weekend

17 18 19 20 there is an officer here. 21 I am advised, My Lord, suitable times 22 MS. CHARBONNEAU: would be 5 p.m. on Fridays until 7 a.m. on Mondays. 23 You will serve your sentences from 5 THE COURT: 24 p.m. Fridays until 7 a.m. Mondays. And you are to 25 report to the Yellowknife Correctional Center starting 26

until your sentence is served. You will be, in addition, on probation for a period of one year. And as a term of that probation, you are required to report every weekend. THE ACCUSED: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand? And this probation will continue after your intermittent sentence is over, for one year from today's date. The conditions of that probation are simply that you are to keep the 10 peace and be of good behaviour. And if required to do 11 so, to report to the probation officer. 12 THE ACCUSED: Yes, sir. 13 THE COURT: Now, if there are further directions 14 required with respect to the intermittent sentence, I 15 don't believe so, but if there are counsel can see me 16 and I can have them incorporated into the terms of the 17 probation order. You can have a seat. 18 In addition, there will be a Victim Fine 19 surcharge of \$150. That is to be payable within 30 20 days. In default, seven days in jail. 21 That surcharge, Mr. Vornbrock, will go into a 22 fund, a general fund, to help victims of crime. It 23 will be your small contribution to the broader 24 community. That's to be paid within 30 days otherwise 25 you will serve an additional seven days in jail. 26 Anything else required, counsel? 27

MS. CHARBONNEAU:

No, My Lord.

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1	MR.	BOYD:	Nothing by defence, sir.
2	THE	COURT:	Thank you, counsel.
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