CR 02953

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

GILBERT BOUVIER

WY 28 1996

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Transcript of Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Mr. Justice J.Z. Vertes, sitting at Fort Providence, in the Northwest Territories, on Friday, October 13, A.D. 1995

## **APPEARANCES:**

Mr. J.A. MacDonald:

For the Crown

Mr. S.M. Shabala:

For the Defence

(Charges under Section 249(3) of the Criminal Code)

THE COURT: The accused, Gilbert Bouvier, has been convicted by a jury on a charge of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, contrary to Section 249(3) of the Criminal Code. The possible maximum penalty for this offense is 10 years imprisonment.

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The offense arose after a drinking party outside of Fort Providence. The accused was driving his truck back to town in the early morning hours of August 13th, There were a large number of intoxicated persons riding in his truck, including in the open back of the truck. He stopped on the road to pick up the victim who had been walking along the road. He backed up his truck as the victim stood in the middle of the road. As he did so, he struck the victim, who fell beneath the back of the truck. He then moved the truck forward causing the victim to be again struck by the rear axle of the truck. As a result, the victim suffered fractures to his leg and ribs. He was medevaced to Edmonton and hospitalized for his injuries. After the incident, the accused asked others to take the blame for the incident since he did not have insurance for his vehicle.

The jury also acquitted the accused on a charge of impaired driving causing bodily harm. I can only conclude, therefore, that while there was some evidence that the accused may have been drinking, there was insufficient evidence or proof of impairment. From my

recollection of the evidence, I think this was a reasonable conclusion. Nevertheless, the jury was obviously convinced that the accused drove in a manner that was dangerous to the safety of others.

While I cannot place undue emphasis on the consequences of the accused's driving, I recognize that the Criminal Code mandates more severe sentences where the consequences are more severe. Hence the maximum penalty of ten years. This is also reflected by the policy of the courts in imposing terms of imprisonment for this type of offense so as to deter others from similar dangerous conduct.

Counsel have referred me to a number of other cases which reflect a wide range of sentences. They are of doubtful value since each case stands on its own particular facts. In many of those cases, sentences for dangerous driving were combined with those for other offenses, so it is somewhat inaccurate to simply look at one aspect in isolation. The variation in sentences is also not surprising since they depend on the particular case's mix of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The general principle, however, is the same: deterrence is to be emphasized.

Here the accused's driving is far from the worst example of dangerous driving. There is no evidence of an ongoing pattern of dangerous driving - no weaving or excessive speed (although there was some evidence that

the vehicle was moving fast). The incident occurred on a narrow dirt road in the dark with no other vehicles around. The element of dangerousness, it seems to me, rests on the accused's failure to keep careful watch as he was backing up his vehicle, his failure to stop in time, and his action in moving the vehicle forward again.

Defence counsel suggested that I should take into account in sentencing evidence of what may be regarded as contributory negligence on the part of the victim. By his own admission, the victim was standing in the middle of the road while the truck was backing up. His vision was blocked because he was trying to take off a backpack.

Contributory negligence may be a factor in a civil case, but I know of no authority that makes it a factor in sentencing on a criminal case. This was no accident. By the jury's verdict, they found that the accused's dangerous driving was a cause of the bodily harm. This makes it a criminal act. He must be sentenced accordingly.

The victim's injuries, while severe, have not resulted in permanent disability. His healing is not yet complete, however, since he still suffers from numbness in one leg periodically. This has detrimentally affected his lifestyle and his employability.

The accused is 26 years old. He is married and has two young children. He works off and on as a labourer and has future employment prospects at a pulp mill. He also has a record of five criminal convictions between 1987 and 1993. They are, however, unrelated and appear to be relatively minor, although he has previously served time in jail.

Outside of his personal circumstances, there are few mitigating factors here. The most that can be said in his favour is the relatively short-lived circumstances of the offense itself. He has apologized here in court to the victim, and I take that at face value even though it comes at such a late date.

Having considered all of these factors, I have concluded that I must impose a term of imprisonment. That term can be kept relatively modest. In addition, however, I will impose a driving prohibition since the Criminal Code recognizes that as an aspect of sentencing in driving-related offenses. The ability to drive, as Crown counsel noted, is a privilege, not a right. When one abuses that privilege, there is no reason why one should not lose it.

Stand up, Mr. Bouvier.

On the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, Count 2 of the Indictment, I sentence you to serve a term of imprisonment of six months. In addition, I will make an order pursuant to Section

| 1  | 259(2) of the Criminal Code prohibiting you from                      |
|----|---|
| 2  | operating a motor vehicle for a period of two years.                  |
| 3  | You may have a seat. You may sit down.                                |
| 4  | Under the circumstances, Counsel, I will not impose                   |
| 5  | a victim of crime fine surcharge.                                     |
| 6  | (REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED)                                      |
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| 9  | Certified Pursuant to Practice Direction #20 dated December 28, 1987. |
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| 11 | Dech.   |
| 12 | Jane Romanowich<br>Court Reporter                                     |
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