CR 02518

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

## HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- V -

#### ROGER WALLACE WARREN

Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence of The Honourable Mr. Justice M.M. de Weerdt, in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 26th day of January, A.D., 1995.

#### APPEARANCES:

Mr. P. Martin, Q.C.:

IN THE MATTER OF:

Mr. G. Orris, Q.C./:

Ms. G. Boothroyd

For the Crown

For the Accused



THE COURT: There is just one point on which I

should ask counsel if they wish to make any submission

and that is Section 100 of the Criminal Code which I

understand obliges me to make an order.

5 MR. ORRIS: I have no submission, My Lord, on it.

THE COURT: Very good then.

Roger Wallace Warren is before the Court so that the sentence provided by law may be pronounced in reference to his conviction on Friday, January 20th last, on nine counts of second degree murder.

The sentence to be pronounced on each count in the indictment is one of life imprisonment. It follows that these sentences shall all be served concurrently. The sentence is one fixed by law, and it is a minimum sentence pursuant to Section 235 of the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, Paragraph 742(b) of the Criminal Code requires me to fix the period of that sentence which is to be served without eligibility for parole at a minimum of not less than ten years or up to a maximum of not more than 25 years as provided by Section 744 of the Criminal Code. And I am required to state the length of that period when pronouncing the sentence.

The period of ineligibility for parole in the case of a person convicted of first degree murder is fixed by the Criminal Code at a minimum of 25 years. That difference in the length of the period of parole

ineligibility is, today, the only distinction made in law in sentencing as between first and second degree murder.

Since it is unfortunately not unusual to see or hear misleadingly inaccurate reports of sentences in murder cases, it deserves to be emphasized that the sentence for murder is not one of just so many years, that is to say the years of ineligibility for parole, the sentence is one of life imprisonment; in other words, for so long as the offender shall live. The period of parole ineligibility does not alter that. It merely limits the time when parole may, not must, be granted.

My task, therefore, today is not one of fixing the length of Roger Warren's sentence of imprisonment.

The Criminal Code, enacted by Parliament, has fixed it at the length of his natural life, and no less.

My task is, instead, to pronounce that sentence and, in doing so, to pronounce the period during which his sentence shall be served without eligibility for parole. In doing that, I'm required to apply the criteria set out in Section 744 of the Code which reads as follows and I quote,

"Subject to Section 744.1, at the time of the sentencing under paragraph

742(b) of an offender who is convicted of second degree murder, the judge who presided at the trial of the offender, or if that judge is unable to do so, any

judge of the same court may, having

regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and to the recommendation, if any, made pursuant to Section 743, by order substitute for ten years a number of years of imprisonment being more than ten, but not more than 25, without eligibility for parole as the judge deems fit in the circumstances."

No matter how long the period of parole ineligibility may be, if it should be greater than 15 years, that greater period may be cut short pursuant to Section 745 of the Code after 15 years have passed, reckoning from the date of the prisoner's arrest on the murder charges. In other words, after October 15, 2008 in the case of Roger Warren.

I mention that since I'm asked by the Crown to fix a period of parole ineligibility in excess of 15 years. It will also be remembered that the jury's recommendation is that the period be fixed at not less than 20 years.

I pause to mention that the number of murder convictions which have been entered against Roger Warren does not alter the legal requirements which apply when fixing the length of the period of parole ineligibility.

That is because each of the nine convictions is in respect of an offence committed when Roger Warren had no previous conviction for murder on his record. If, on the contrary, he had a previous murder conviction

on his record when the present offences were committed by him, then the period of ineligibility for parole would be fixed by law at no less than 25 years even though, as is the case, he has been convicted only of second degree murder.

The number of Roger Warren's convictions, therefore, does not alter the law which governs how his period of parole ineligibility is to be calculated. But that number will, nevertheless, have to be considered as part of the circumstances referred to in Section 744 of the Criminal Code.

There are three criteria then which I must take into consideration under Section 744 of the Criminal Code:

- 1) The character of the offender;
- 2) The nature and surrounding circumstances of the offence;
- 3) The jury's recommendation.
- Roger Warren's Character.

I understand that he is now somewhat over 50 years old. He seems to be in reasonably good health, notwithstanding what he must have been through over the past two to three years. His medical history shows that he had an operation to correct a spinal problem back in 1982 and that this appears to have been successful to the point that he continued to engage in the heavy labour of an underground hardrock

development miner for ten years.

He has been diagnosed as suffering to some extent from a "white hand" condition, although this did not prevent him from working as a miner and he has a hearing deficit and wears eyeglasses, neither of which is unusual in a person of his age.

I accept that he did suffer from post-traumatic stress in 1987 and may have lingering effects of that still, but that there is nothing of that sort which still materially affects his health as described to the Court in this case. I do not accept that he suffered a severe clinical depression in October 1993 or during that year or since.

Roger Warren is married and has two grown-up daughters. The marriage is of long duration and he has not been previously married. According to the evidence, the relationship between all four members of the immediate family is a close one.

The Warrens have lived at Yellowknife more or less continuously since 1978 or so. During that time Roger Warren was active in local sports activities. He earned a comfortable living on his earnings as a highly competent and generally respected miner.

Roger Warren's formal schooling stopped short of completion of Grade 12 in Ontario. He left school to enter employment. Over the years he has read a great deal. He enjoys working out crossword puzzles and, as

a result of these pursuits it seems that he has developed an impressive vocabulary. He is generally regarded as intelligent. I accept that his general intelligence is above average.

Roger Warren's criminal record is not significant, except perhaps in so far as it reveals a tendency, at times, to abuse alcohol, resulting then in loss of his usual self control and good judgment. When sober, Roger Warren appears to be capable of very considerable efforts of control over his natural emotional expression.

Roger Warren gives the impression of a man who has long bottled up his feelings, with the result that he may, under pressure, act impulsively and in a manner which he has cause to later regret. He showed signs of a mostly well-concealed but potentially violent aggressive streak in the course of his cross-examination at trial. And there are other indications in the overall evidence that he harbours strong feelings of hostility to which he is unable to give appropriate expression in words or action.

On the whole Roger Warren, as a person, does not fit the pattern of the usual violent criminal offender. He does not seem to present any obvious or immediate danger to others. Now that he has been found guilty by a jury of his peers, who refused to accept that his confession was false, he must surely

realize that his attempts to deceive them, as he managed for so long to deceive the police, were in the end of no avail. The jury's verdicts, with the resulting convictions, must have a strongly deterrent effect, if I judge correctly, upon him. It therefore seems unlikely, to me, that he will readily re-offend. All the more so since he is sufficiently intelligent to appreciate that the risks of doing so are not worth taking.

## 2) The Circumstances of the Offence.

The jury rejected the Crown's theory that the murders themselves were planned and deliberate, and they accepted at least the essence of the confession in finding Roger Warren guilty of second degree murder. Exactly which of the two available routes they may have followed to reach that result is unimportant in my respectful view. It's plain that they were satisfied that Roger Warren set the bomb even though he knew of the lethal danger which he had thereby created.

Roger Warren could not have clearly foreseen that his device would take as many lives as it did, but he was evidently at least fully aware of the danger to life as he walked away from the mine at 6 a.m. in the morning, even if he, in the end, decided not to give any warning.

That decision was no different, in its effects,

than a deliberate decision to create an explosion which could have those effects. The victims of the blast were condemned to death by that decision.

No doubt, as the evidence of Robert Carroll shows, Roger Warren was very fatigued after he came out of the mine. And we can deduce from Mr. Carroll's evidence that Roger Warren knew all too well what a deadly device he had created. Roger Warren not only knew the charteristics of the explosives which he had used, but he knew from close personal experience how deadly they can be.

This offence was no mere bungling attempt by an amateur. It may well have been, as Roger Warren described it, a second choice or fall-back option after he came to the conclusion that he could not be sure of damaging the shaft and escape detection. Even so, it was done with some calculation and sophistication in an effort to derail an ore train and thus create havoc and destroy the morale of those working in the mine. And it was done with knowledge that the ore train operator, the trammer, was bound to suffer at least some injury and quite likely death from the force of the blast. It was nothing less than an act of terrorism.

That the blast occurred during a labour dispute in which feelings ran high, and the fact that other attempts at sabotage had occurred, the fact that

contempt had been shown for established law in what has been described as a riot at the main gate to the mine after a mass rally in defiance of a court order, and the fact that intransigence had been shown by both sides in the labour dispute, all these are part of the surrounding circumstances, and perhaps they help to explain why this tragic offence came to be committed, but none of these things can justify or excuse it; none of these things mitigate the horrendous nature of the offence.

The tragedy of this terrible crime has had devastating effects upon the lives of the surviving relatives of the deceased miners, even as it has upon the accused and his immediate family, not to do more than mention the Community of the Yellowknife, the mining community in Canada, the Canadian Labour Movement, the people of the Northwest Territories and the public across Canada.

Unless a higher court otherwise decides, Roger
Warren will carry the guilt of this stupid and
despicable crime with him for the rest of his days.
Yes, but the pain which he has inflicted will be borne
mostly by others; the families of the immediate
victims, his own family, and all who have been touched
by the events of September 18, 1992 at Giant Mine.

There is only one mitigating circumstance in the case and that is Roger Warren's confession. However,

he having recanted his confession, it is not to be taken as having the same mitigating effect as if he had stood by it. Had he done that, I should not have had the same difficulty that I now have in giving his confession due credit as a mitigating feature for purposes of sentencing.

The fact that death was instantaneous for seven of the deceased victims, and nearly so for the two others, is perhaps a small consolation to their relatives. But this fact does not mitigate the offence or operate to reduce the impact of the sentence. The most that can be said is that it removes what otherwise could have been an aggravating factor.

## 3) The Jury's Recommendation.

As required by Section 743 of the Criminal Code, I put the question set out in that section to the jury following the reception of their verdict and before releasing them from their duties.

The jury's recommendation was that Roger Warren should be required to serve 20 years of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Given his age at the time of his arrest, that recommendation would require Roger Warren to remain in a penitentiary until he is close to 70 years of age.

On the whole of the evidence, and having regard to the jury's verdict, it's my assessment that they

realized that if Roger Warren has to serve a minimum of 10 years before becoming eligible for parole, and if his convictions stand, then he is unlikely ever again to be employed as a miner so as to be again in a position to put the lives of other miners at risk.

Although the jury were not told of the requirements of Section 100 of the Criminal Code, I must, of course, take that into account. Noting, as I do, that it requires me to make an order prohibiting Roger Warren from possessing any firearm, or ammunition, and any explosive substance for a minimum of ten years following his release from imprisonment on parole, should that take place.

In the circumstances of this case, I make that order for the period of Roger Warren's life. Unless set aside or varied by a higher court, that order will, of course, operate to prohibit Roger Warren from ever again handling explosives whether as a miner or otherwise.

### 4) Counsels' Submissions.

Prior to adjourning last week to allow counsel to make representations on sentencing today, Crown counsel gave an indication that the Crown would, in all likelihood, at least support the jury's recommendation. Counsel for the accused, on the other hand, made a submission to the effect that this was an appropriate case for maintaining the period of parole

ineligibility at the minimum of ten years.

Given the late hour at the time and this clear difference of position between counsel, I adjourned the matter until this morning, and in the meantime I've had the advantage of reading the victim impact statements filed with the clerk, as I understand counsel have agreed that I should do, and I have, as well, been able to refresh my memory as to the law which I must apply in a case coming under Section 742 of the Criminal Code such as this.

In addition, I have provided counsel with a record of the most recent case, to my knowledge, in the Northwest Territories, in which Section 742 was applied. Although unreported, it refers to a number of earlier cases of this kind in the Northwest Territories, in addition to reported decisions of courts elsewhere in Canada. The case to which I refer is Regina v. Norman Joseph Desjardins decided on November 1, 1991 at Yellowknife.

In that case, the period of ineligibility for parole was fixed at 14 years, unchanged on appeal. That was a case involving a single count of second degree murder arising from circumstances very different from those of the case now before me.

In my decision in the Desjardins case, I referred to the case of <u>Regina v. Magna</u> in which a period of parole ineligibility for 25 years was pronounced in

this court on conviction of two counts of second degree murder. That period was upheld by the Court of Appeal notwithstanding that the result was to put the offender in the same position as if he had been convicted of first degree murder.

The reasons delivered in the Desjardins case refer also to a number of other murder sentencing cases which have come before this court in the past decade. Suffice it to say that all of these appear to have been decided on the basis of the same principles as had been applied in the reported cases from elsewhere in Canada.

In particular, there is the recent case of <u>Regina</u>

<u>v. Shropshire</u> (1994) 90 C.C.C. (3d) 234, a decision of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal to which counsel
referred me last Friday. As I read the reasons for
judgment on appeal against the trial judge's decision
to set the period of parole ineligibility at 12 years
in that case, the Courts today recognize two salient
principles in such cases.

First of all, there is the principle of protection of the public by incapacitation of the offender.

Second, there is the principle of denunciation and deterrence by which the public may be given assurance of its protection by the Courts.

Bearing in mind what I have said as to Roger Warren's character, not least his age and the absence

of any but a minor previous criminal record, and considering all the thankfully unique and unusual circumstances of the offences for which he is now to be sentenced, I see no need for the incapacitation of Roger Warren for more than ten years only in order to prevent him from a repetition of any such offence. In other words, the first of these two principles, taken alone, would, in my judgment, be satisfied if the period under consideration were to be left at the statutory ten-year minimum.

It is altogether a different situation, however, when the second principle is also applied. This is a case in which the circumstances call out for a stern denunciation which will leave no mistaken impressions in the public mind. And while I see no need for specific deterrence of Roger Warren beyond what he must expect as a minimum under the law, I do see the clear need for general deterrence of others who might, in future, be tempted to follow his example.

It is in that light that I understand the jury to have made its recommendation.

Would you please stand, Mr. Warren? Have you anything to say before the Court pronounces sentence upon you?

- 25 THE ACCUSED: No, I have nothing to say.
- 26 THE COURT: As required by law, you are sentenced
- to imprisonment for life on each count in the

1 indictment.

2

3

7

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Furthermore, you are prohibited for life from possessing any firearm, ammunition, or explosive substance. I direct Crown Counsel to prepare and enter the formal order in those terms requiring you. Roger Warren, to have any such items which may be in your constructive possession disposed of forthwith. Copies of the order, once entered, shall be delivered to you and to your counsel and I'll ask you, Mr.

10 Martin, to please see that is done.

11 MR. MARTIN: Yes, Sir.

Please be seated.

12 THE COURT: No other order under the Criminal Code 13 has been requested except under Section 742. Pursuant 14 to Section 744, I therefore order that you, Roger Warren, shall not be eligible for parole for 20 years 15 16 from the date of your arrest on October 15, 1993.

> With regard to the exhibits, counsel may seek an order in due course and I take it nothing need be said now.

> As for the various restrictive orders on publication and broadcasting, media people will be aware that the restriction contained in Section 648 of the Criminal Code expired upon the sequestration of the jury. The orders which I made before the trial with respect to the pre-trial conferences and the pre-trial voir dire, remain in effect subject to any

further order I may now make. Do counsel wish to 1 speak to that? 2 MR. ORRIS: My Lord, can I speak to one other 3 matter before we deal with that, and it is simply this -and it deals with where Mr. Warren will serve his His family, as you know, is in Yellowknife. The corrections people usually like to have the person serve time close to his family. The difficulty here 8 is that there is not a Federal Institution in 9 Yellowknife. Having talked to the corrections people, 10 they have made it plain that they will classify Mr. 11 Warren wherever they think they should and nothing 12 this Court can say obviously will affect that. 13 That's my understanding. 14 THE COURT: But they have said that if Your 15 MR. ORRIS: Lordship was inclined to make a recommendation that he 16 serve his time in Yellowknife, they would take that 17 into account. And so in that sense I simply ask Your 18 Honour to consider making such a recommendation and 19 they will do with that as they see fit. It's not 20 binding upon them, nobody would suggest it is, but it 21 simply is something that they would take into account 22 and I don't think my friend has any position with 23 24 respect to that. As far as the publication orders are concerned, My 25 Lord, my friend and I have discussed those, and I 26 believe our position can be stated that as far as the 27

1 voir dire bans are concerned or matters that took 2 place in court, in effect in the presence of the accused prior to trial, those bans would be terminated upon the -- upon Your Lordship's ruling today and 5 would not survive past today. 6 Your Lordship made a comment with respect to 7 pre-trial discussions between counsel and Your Lordship. And my understanding of those, My Lord, was that they were discussions that were, in effect, 9 10 informal discussions between the Court and counsel. 11 don't believe --12 THE COURT: Purely of a management nature. 13 MR. ORRIS: Exactly. And on that basis Mr. Warren 14 wasn't present because they were dealing with simply management procedures. My experience, and I stand to 15 16 be corrected by my friend, is that those would not be, 17 in effect, normally disclosed to the public, not 18 because there is anything necessarily to hide in 19 those, obviously there is nothing. But, as I 20 understand, there is no transcript kept. It's rough 21 notes as to what was discussed and, in effect, they're 22 not really part of the proceedings. THE COURT: 23 My concern is that no restriction 24 should continue without some limit upon it unless 25 there is very good reason for that. 26 MR. ORRIS: My position, My Lord, simply is that 27 discussions of a management nature between counsel and

1 the Court are matters that are really of no interest to the general public in any event. I don't want to 2 get into a position of being asked questions about 3 what was discussed, I can't remember quite frankly all of it now nor do I want to have to rely upon notes. THE COURT: There is not all that much in the 7 materials, it's just that it struck me I shouldn't 8 leave any loose ends unattended to. 9 MR. ORRIS: Sorry, My Lord, I didn't mean to interrupt. My position would be simply that any 10 matters in court that were, were banned previously, 11 obviously those bans would be lifted and wouldn't 12 13 survive today. 14 The voir dire bans, similarily, would not survive 15 today. As far as informal pre-trial discussions are 16 17 concerned, I don't consider those to be part of the proceedings and simply are not subject to disclosure 18 19 in any event. 20 I leave with Your Lordship the arguments as far as -that we addressed during the jury's deliberations with 21 respect to press access to the exhibits, Your Lordship 22 23 has those to deal with, but as far as those other matters are concerned, I think my friend and I are in 24 25 agreement on those points. 26 THE COURT: While you're on your feet, with respect to the order made by Justice Richard, is there 27

```
1
           anything you wish to say at this point?
  2
      MR. ORRIS:
                           I haven't examined that order in
  3
           detail lately, My Lord, but I don't --
  4
      THE COURT:
                           I'll confess I have not examined it
           either lately, but I understood that there was a
  5
           restriction on publication and broadcast in that
  6
 7
           connection.
      MR. ORRIS: That's correct, My Lord. I
 8
           understood, however, that -- and again, I don't know
 9
           the specific order but I believe all parties were of
10
11
           the view that that would be for the duration of the
           trial. I don't think there was anything suggested nor
12
13
           was there argument made that it would be a permanent
14
           ban.
15
      THE COURT:
                          It's simply that it is not expressed
           as having any termination and I thought I should
16
17
           attend to that.
18
      MR. ORRIS:
                          I appreciate that, My Lord.
19
           not before Your Lordship but I think in fairness to
           all concerned it was not discussed as a permanent ban
20
           and I thought -- and I believe that all parties were
21
          of the view that at the end of the trial that matter
22
23
          would become open to publication.
24
      THE COURT:
                          That would be the usual course.
          you wish to speak to that, Mr. Martin?
25
26
     MR. MARTIN:
                         Excuse me, the latter point?
27
     THE COURT:
                          Yes.
```

1 MR. MARTIN: I have no submission to make to that.

2 As my friend indicated, it was in open court, the

3 accused was present. It would seem to me that, that

4 the publication ban should now -- have run its course

and cease and the matter be open for review and

6 publication.

I have some very brief comments to make with regard to the other issues that you spoke to with regard to the housing of the accused from now on, pending or following an appeal, I am content to leave that in the hands of the corrections people who will be his keepers. If Your Lordship feels sufficiently informed of the situation to make a recommendation, I leave that to you. I have nothing to say on that point.

THE COURT: What occurred to me as Mr. Orris was

addressing the Court, was I could perhaps make a

recommendation, but that's all I can make, that Mr.

Warren be kept in Yellowknife until the expiry of any
appeal which presumably would be heard here.

MR. MARTIN:

I leave that matter entirely to you,

Sir. If you feel, as I say, sufficiently informed to

be able to make such a recommendation I have nothing

to say about it.

With regard to the publication bans on matters
which took place -- excuse me, in court in the absence
of the jury, it would seem, as my friend has indicated

now that -- I'm addressing particularly the voir dire dealing with the confession, that that matter may now be addressed, and that is to say the ban now has lapsed, that's my understanding of the law. I frankly cannot recall offhand all of the other matters we dealt with in the absence of the jury and if there are some particular matters that cause Your Lordship concern, I'd be happy to address them.

9 THE COURT: There are none.

MR. MARTIN: Then I think that that would take care of the matter. The only other concern I have, frankly, as I scan my memory to try to recall what matters we discussed in the absence of the jury were the matters relating to other people facing other charges. And we addressed that briefly in the course of this trial, that is to say their right to a fair trial, and it may be appropriate that there be an order directing that information which would have bearing on their trial not be publicized until the conclusion of the trial. That would seem to me to be consistent with the concerns raised at trial and Your Lordship's ruling.

THE COURT: Then to assist those who would be bound by my order, that would be any reference to Mr. Timothy Bettger or Mr. Alan Shearing by name should not be made with reference to the present proceedings until such time as all pending proceedings against

```
1
           them have been disposed of.
 2
      MR. MARTIN:
                          I think that's correct. The only
 3
           other chap whose name came up, as I recall now, was
           St. Amand and perhaps the same order should apply to
 5
           him, although I do not believe he is facing charges.
 6
      THE COURT:
                          I have no knowledge of that.
 7
      MR. MARTIN:
                          I don't either, but I could quickly
 8
           find out but I don't know now.
 9
      THE COURT:
                          Do you wish to do that?
10
      MR. MARTIN:
                          Or do you wish to err on the side of
11
           caution and say reference to him should also --
12
      THE COURT:
                          Well, if I say any charges pending
13
           against him and there are none, then presumably the
           media will be at liberty to use his name.
14
15
      MR. MARTIN:
                          I'm thinking actually that if there
16
           are no charges and the presumption of innocence
17
           applies to this man as it does, then we should
18
           consider even, in the absense of charges, whether he --
19
           there should be publication of any alleged involvement
20
           on his part. That is to say, if you were to direct
21
           there would be no reference to Mr. Bettger, Mr.
22
           Shearing, or Mr. St. Amand, that would seem to me to
23
           cover it.
24
      THE COURT:
                          All right, I have your submission on
```

that. What I will say then is that the orders made

restricting publication or broadcasting are now

with reference to and during the hearing of this case

25

26



#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

## Memo from the desk of Kim Schofield

Date: March 04, 2009

TO: Department of Justice Cell Phone Users

RE: Cell phone usage

It has come to our attention that a program called "Short Code" has been appearing on some Justice cell phones without the knowledge of the user. This is a subscription service however the user may not know they have subscribed to the service.

There are a variety of ways that a user ends up signed up – for example, texting into a contest on the radio or TV or being assigned on-line through internet programs or simply by providing your cell number on an on-line quiz (such as Facebook). Once subscribed you might receive for example a daily joke or your horoscope. Each time the user looks at the text message, there is a charge of \$1.00 per transaction.

Bell Mobility has advised that if you begin to receive text messages similar to those listed above the only way to get rid of them is to do the following:

## Reply to the text message once by simply typing in STOP (in capital letters)

While we are monitoring the monthly invoices before distributing them to individual users, Justice employees should be looking at their own monthly bills and contacting Sharon Chynoweth (873-7641) if there are any discrepancies.

As well, I would like to remind everyone that any personal long distance calls on either GNWT issued cell phones or the regular land line must be reimbursed to the government. Payment can be submitted by cash or cheque to Gwen Gould in Finance.

Thank you.

Kim Schofield Director, Finance

them have been disposed of. 1 I think that's correct. The only MR. MARTIN: 2 other chap whose name came up, as I recall now, was 3 St. Amand and perhaps the same order should apply to him, although I do not believe he is facing charges. 5 I have no knowledge of that. 6 THE COURT: I don't either, but I could quickly MR. MARTIN: 7 find out but I don't know now. 8 Do you wish to do that? THE COURT: 9 Or do you wish to err on the side of MR. MARTIN: 10 caution and say reference to him should also --11 Well, if I say any charges pending THE COURT: 12 against him and there are none, then presumably the 13 media will be at liberty to use his name. 14 I'm thinking actually that if there MR. MARTIN: 15 are no charges and the presumption of innocence 16 applies to this man as it does, then we should 17 consider even, in the absense of charges, whether he --18 there should be publication of any alleged involvement 19 on his part. That is to say, if you were to direct 20 there would be no reference to Mr. Bettger, Mr. 21 Shearing, or Mr. St. Amand, that would seem to me to 22 cover it. 23 All right, I have your submission on THE COURT: 24 that. What I will say then is that the orders made 25 with reference to and during the hearing of this case 26 restricting publication or broadcasting are now 27

terminated. I make one qualification to that 1 termination, and that is that there will be no 2 publication or broadcasting of any information which might identify Timothy Bettger, Alan Shearing, or I believe it's Arnold St. Amand? MR. MARTIN: I think it's Art St. Amand, Sir. THE COURT: Arthur? MR. MARTIN: Yes. During the pendency of any criminal THE COURT: proceedings against any of them. That will, of 10 course, come to an end with any such proceeding. 11 With regard to where Mr. Warren should be held, as 12 counsel know and have said, this Court does not 13 14 control that but I shall make a recommendation and I'll ask the clerk to transmit it to the Warden of the 15 Yellowknife Correctional Center and the recommendation 16 is simply that Mr. Warren be held at Yellowknife 17 18 pending the outcome of any appeal proceedings which may be launched in this case. Is there anything 19 20 further then? The only other matters are the ones 21 MR. MARTIN: 22 just raised by you and Mr. Orris with regard to the publication of the pre-trial conference notes or 23 references, and I join my friend in that. I would 24 25 submit that's not something which should be available 26 to the media to broadcast or publish. 27 THE COURT: What I will say then is that the clerk

will have those sealed, they'll remain on the file sealed until further order. I should not part with this case without expressing the appreciation of this bench to counsel in a most difficult and challenging case, and to the administrative authorities who have done everything they could to make the trial of this case possible with a minimum of difficulty. So on that note, we shall adjourn. Certified Pursuant to Practice Direction #20 dated December 28, 1987. Court Reporter