
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CR 02560

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:



HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

Transcript of the Proceedings held before the Honourable Mr. Justice J. E. Richard, sitting in Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on Friday, September 16th, A.D., 1994.

APPEARANCES:

MR. S. SABINE:

On Behalf of the Applicant

MR. A. REGEL:

MR. J. MACDONALD:

On Behalf of the Respondent

THE COURT: This is an application by the accused for an order compelling the Crown to make disclosure of certain requested information. The accused is charged with using a knife while committing a sexual assault on the complainant contrary to Section 272 of the Criminal Code.

This jury trial is scheduled to commence in Fort Good Hope on September 26th. His counsel seeks disclosure of any prior allegations of sexual assault made by the complainant to the police or to the Crown.

The Crown's position, as I understand it, is that the Crown Attorneys' Office is not itself aware of any such prior allegations. Further, the Crown exercises its discretion not to request this information, if it indeed exists, from the police on the grounds of non-relevance.

On the hearing of this application this morning,
Defence counsel indicated that what he is looking for
specifically is any prior incidents where the
complainant made false allegations of sexual assault.
He submits that this information may well be essential
to the defence, as the credibility of the complainant
will be in issue at trial.

Having heard the submissions of counsel, I am not satisfied that there has been a sufficient foundation established by the applicant accused to order disclosure of any prior allegations of sexual assault

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made by the complainant.

Defence counsel says that he is really only interested in prior <u>false</u> allegations of sexual assault, so that if such exists, that could be put to the jury on the issue of whether she is making a false allegation on this occasion. The problem with that, of course, is how are the Crown or the police or anyone else for that matter to know if a prior allegation was a false allegation.

Hypothetically, let's say 12 months earlier the complainant made a complaint of sexual assault against X and no charge was laid by the police. With no other information it would be an improper inference to say that this was a false allegation. Another example, let's say the complainant made a complaint of sexual assault against Y, and that he was charged and he was acquitted at trial. Again with that information alone, it would be an improper inference to say that she had made a false allegation which bears on her present credibility as a witness.

I should state at this point that I understand that the Defence has already been provided with a copy of the complainant's criminal record so that any convictions for such things as mischief or perjury would already be disclosed to Defence counsel.

In my respectful view, there is an onus on the applicant in a situation like this to show that the

information that is sought is likely to be relevant to an issue at trial, or at a minimum, it has to be shown that there is a reasonable possibility that the information sought could assist the accused in making full answer and defence. Whichever one of these tests is used, the onus has not been met on this application.

I am also of the view that a bare assertion that the sought after information may be relevant to the credibility of the complainant is insufficient.

Invoking credibility at large is simply not enough.

In taking this view, I find that I am on common ground with the recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, that is, their second decision in the O'Conner case issued on May 16th of 1994, which decision was admittedly on the subject matter of the disclosure of medical records.

A court should not compel production of documents simply because the Defence hopes that those documents might disclose something that will impact on the credibility of the complainant, without any basis for suggesting that such evidence might be found there.

Defence counsel submits that he is not simply on a fishing expedition. I must respectfully disagree.

This particular request as it is presented today is no more than a request to go fishing in police files in the hope that something useful might turn up or be

discovered.

For these reasons, the application is denied at this time. I should state that I am not presently scheduled to be the presiding trial judge in Fort Good Hope on September 26th. I heard this application today, as a pre-trial matter, simply due to the unavailability of the assigned trial judge. My ruling on this application does not, of course, bind the trial judge. It will be open to the trial judge to consider any renewed application in the context of the evidence as it unfolds during the jury trial. For the time being, however, there is simply no basis for ordering the disclosure that is sought.

On the 90 day review under Section 525 of the Criminal Code, I do not find that there has been any material change in circumstances since the court's decision at the time of the last review. The accused's trial is only nine days from now, and I am satisfied that his continued detention in custody is justified on the secondary ground set out in subsection 515(10) of the Criminal Code, as amended by the Supreme Court of Canada.

So unless there is any clarification required,
Counsel, we will now adjourn and Mr. Turo's trial will
proceed on the 26th.

MR. SABINE: Nothing further.

1	(AT WHICH TIME THESE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.)
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4	Certified Pursuant to Practice Direction #20 dated December 28, 1987.
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7	Laurie Ann Young Court Reporter
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