AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• On July 27, 2019, a Public Service Officer (PSO) employed by the Gallup Police Department approached the Defendant, who was asleep in his vehicle near an interstate exit, to place him into protective custody. During the process, the Defendant hit the PSO's forearm. The PSO then called for a police officer, who investigated the allegation of battery against the Defendant (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• District Court of McKinley County, Louis E. DePauli, Jr., District Judge: Reduced Defendant's criminal charge from felony battery upon a peace officer to petty misdemeanor battery.

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellant (State of New Mexico): Argued that the PSO is a "peace officer" under Section 30-22-24 because she is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crimes, thus qualifying for the heightened protection from battery afforded to peace officers (para 4).
• Defendant-Appellee (Denson Becenti): Contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge of felony battery upon a peace officer because the PSO is not a "peace officer" as a matter of law, asserting that PSOs, whose duties are limited to those under the Detoxification Reform Act (DRA), do not have the duty to make arrests or maintain public order (paras 3, 8).

Legal Issues

• Whether a Public Service Officer (PSO) performing duties under the Detoxification Reform Act (DRA) is considered a "peace officer" for the purposes of Section 30-22-24, which prohibits battery upon a peace officer (para 1).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order reducing the Defendant’s criminal charge from battery upon a peace officer to petty misdemeanor battery (para 17).

Reasons

• Per HANISEE, Chief Judge (IVES and YOHALEM, Judges concurring):
  The Court held that PSOs, whose duties are limited to those under the DRA and who are not vested with a duty to make arrests or maintain public order, are not "peace officers" for the purposes of Section 30-22-24. This conclusion was based on the interpretation of statutory provisions and the examination of the DRA's purpose, which aims to afford protection to intoxicated and incapacitated persons rather than subject them to criminal prosecution. The Court found that the principal duty of PSOs is to protect intoxicated persons by transporting them to a treatment facility or detention center, which does not encompass activities traditionally associated with law enforcement such as preserving public peace, preventing disturbances, or making arrests. The Court also noted that the authority of PSOs to request that an intoxicated or incapacitated person be admitted into protective custody does not equate to the authority to make arrests or maintain public order (paras 5-16).