AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• In 2017, the Appellee, a licensed racehorse jockey, was scheduled to participate in a race at Sunland Park Racetrack. During a compliance inspection, Appellants Luna and Bustillos, security personnel at the racetrack, claimed to have observed a prohibited electrical device in a trash can, which they associated with the Appellee. Based on their reports, the New Mexico Racing Commission (NMRC) initiated disciplinary proceedings against the Appellee, resulting in a five-year suspension of his license and a $5,000 fine. The Appellee appealed this decision, and an administrative hearing officer later reversed the board of stewards' decision, citing inconsistencies in testimony and a lack of physical evidence. Despite the reversal, the Appellee remained banned from the racetrack property. The Appellee then sued the Appellants for various claims, including negligent misrepresentation and fraud (paras 3-6).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Appellants: Argued that their participation and testimony in the disciplinary hearings were protected under two theories of immunity—absolute immunity for testimony and qualified immunity for reporting—and under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because they exercised their right to petition a government agency. They also argued, in the alternative, that the Appellee’s complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) or was barred by the statute of limitations (para 6).
• Appellee: Alleged negligent misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with contract, prima facie tort, spoliation, and malicious abuse of process against the Appellants. The Appellee also claimed that despite the dismissal of the disciplinary action, the Appellants continued to ban him from the Sunland Park property (para 6).

Legal Issues

• Whether the expedited appeal under Section 38-2-9.1(C) applies only to the special motion raising speech-based affirmative defenses under the Anti-SLAPP statute and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, excluding Appellants’ alternative Rule 1-012(B)(6) arguments (para 2).
• Whether the district court erred in denying Appellants’ special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP statute, Section 38-2-9.1 (para 25).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP statute, Section 38-2-9.1 (para 48).

Reasons

• The Court held that the expedited appeal under Section 38-2-9.1(C) applies only to speech-based defenses raised in a special motion under the Anti-SLAPP statute, not to all possible defenses raised by a defendant. Therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ alternative Rule 1-012(B)(6) arguments on expedited appeal (paras 9-23). Upon reviewing the merits of Appellants’ special motion to dismiss, the Court found that the Anti-SLAPP statute applied to Appellants’ conduct as it was in connection with a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the Court concluded that Appellee pleaded sufficient facts to establish that Appellants’ actions were a sham and not protected by the First Amendment under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, affirming the district court’s denial of the special motion to dismiss (paras 24-47).