AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• In May 1996, D.B. Lieb appointed his sons as his attorneys-in-fact. In June 2011, D.B. Lieb executed a revocable transfer on death deed, conveying his interest in real estate to his caretaker, Petitioner, upon his death. In March 2014, D.B. Lieb's attorneys-in-fact revoked the deed. D.B. Lieb passed away about five months after the revocation. The Petitioner then made a claim against D.B. Lieb's estate for the real property, which was denied based on the revocation of the transfer on death deed (paras 2-4).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Petitioner: Argued that the revocation of the transfer on death deed was null and void because it was contrary to D.B. Lieb’s express wishes and a breach of the fiduciary duties owed by his attorneys-in-fact (para 4).
• Respondent: Contended that the Uniform Transfer on Death Act and the Uniform Power of Attorney Act authorized the attorneys-in-fact to revoke the transfer on death deed, and that the revocation was properly executed in the best interest of D.B. Lieb (para 4).

Legal Issues

• Whether the revocation of the transfer on death deed by D.B. Lieb's attorneys-in-fact was valid and in the best interest of D.B. Lieb.

Disposition

• The district court's order dismissing the Petitioner's petition for a declaratory judgment and the imposition of a constructive trust on the property was affirmed (para 1).

Reasons

• Per Stephen G. French, J. (Julie J. Vargas, J., and Henry M. Bohnhoff, J., concurring), the court found that D.B. Lieb's attorneys-in-fact had the authority under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act to revoke the transfer on death deed if it was in his best interest. The court held that the Petitioner failed to present evidence that the revocation was not in D.B. Lieb's best interest. The court also noted that an attorney-in-fact acting in the principal's best interest is not liable solely because they also benefit from the act. The decision to revoke the deed was based on the need to preserve D.B. Lieb’s estate for his foreseeable obligations and maintenance, which fell within the scope of authority granted in the power of attorney. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal was rationally based on the evidence presented (paras 3-17).