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Facts

  • Lenard E. Noice, a conductor for BNSF Railway Company, died after falling from a moving train. The train, under the operation of Noice's assistant, was traveling at approximately 55 mph, the maximum speed allowed for its track class, when Noice fell. The Estate of Lenard E. Noice filed a wrongful death action under the Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA), alleging, among other claims, that BNSF negligently allowed the train to operate at an excessive speed (paras 1-4).

Procedural History

  • District Court: Granted summary judgment to BNSF, dismissing the Estate’s FELA claim on the grounds that it was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and its regulations (para 7).
  • Court of Appeals: Reversed the District Court's decision, concluding that FRSA does not preclude a FELA excessive-speed claim (para 8).

Parties' Submissions

  • Estate: Argued that BNSF negligently permitted the train to operate at an excessive speed, contributing to Noice's fall and death. The Estate maintained that this claim was actionable under FELA and not precluded by FRSA or its regulations (paras 1, 5-6).
  • BNSF: Contended that the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim was precluded by FRSA and the track-speed regulations promulgated under it, arguing that the train never exceeded the speed limit for its track class (paras 1, 7).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) precludes a Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA) excessive-speed claim when the train involved did not exceed the speed limit for its track class (para 9).

Disposition

  • The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that FRSA does not preclude the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim (para 39).

Reasons

  • Per NAKAMURA, Justice, with CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice, EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice, and BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice concurring:
    The Court found that FRSA does not expressly preclude FELA excessive-speed claims and that the absence of any express statement in FRSA barring FELA claims is significant evidence that Congress did not intend for FRSA to preclude FELA claims (paras 22-23).
    The Court reasoned that FELA and FRSA are complementary statutes, both aiming to enhance railroad safety but through different means. FELA provides a private right of action for railroad employees injured due to employer negligence, while FRSA aims to promote safety through regulatory standards (paras 37-38).
    The Court concluded that allowing FELA claims to proceed does not undermine the uniformity sought by FRSA, as FELA is a federal statute applied uniformly across the country. Moreover, FELA claims could enhance railroad safety by identifying potentially dangerous circumstances not covered by FRSA regulations (paras 35-38).
    The Court rejected the reasoning of federal appellate decisions that had found FELA excessive-speed claims to be precluded by FRSA, stating that these decisions improperly conflated pre-emption and preclusion doctrines and overemphasized FRSA's goal of national uniformity at the expense of FELA's remedial purposes (paras 27-34).
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