AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The case involves the Petitioner's attempt to reopen divorce proceedings three years after the final decree was entered. The Petitioner sought to set aside the September 2009 divorce decree and the property division from two prior divorces between the parties, alleging fraud by the Respondent (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Petitioner: Argued that the district court erred in refusing to reopen the parties’ divorce proceedings under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA or NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-20 (1993), citing fraud by the Respondent as a basis for setting aside the divorce decree and property division (paras 2-3).
• Respondent: [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in refusing to reopen the parties’ divorce proceedings under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA or NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-20 (1993) (para 2).
• Whether the district court erred in denying the Petitioner's motion to reconsider and attempt to amend her motion (para 5).
• Whether the district court should have recused at the motion to reconsider stage due to alleged improper impeding by the court (para 6).
• Whether the district court erred in refusing to disqualify Respondent’s counsel, who was alleged to be a witness to the fraudulent conduct during the divorce proceedings (para 7).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order denying the Petitioner's motion to reconsider an order dismissing her attempt to reopen divorce proceedings (para 8).

Reasons

• JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge (RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge, CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge concurring):
  The Court found that the Petitioner's motion to set aside the divorce decree and property division was filed beyond the one-year time limit for invoking Rule 1-060(B)(3), which addresses relief from a final judgment for reasons including fraud. The Court noted that Rule 1-060(B)(6) could not be used to circumvent this time limit (para 3).
  Regarding Section 40-4-20, the Court supported the district court's determination that there was no undivided community property to warrant reopening the divorce case. The Court agreed with the district court's interpretation of the marital settlement agreement and its conclusion that the Petitioner was seeking a re-division due to dissatisfaction with the original deal (para 4).
  The Court rejected the Petitioner's claim for reconsideration, interpreting her arguments as a restatement of the initial claims of fraud and lack of execution, which were already addressed (para 5).
  The Court found no basis for recusal of the district court judge, stating that the Petitioner's dissatisfaction with the court's rulings did not constitute grounds for recusal (para 6).
  The Court dismissed the argument for disqualifying Respondent’s counsel, noting that since the Rule 1-060(B)(3) claim was not timely, it was unnecessary to consider counsel as a witness to alleged fraud (para 7).