AI Generated Opinion Summaries

Decision Information

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This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

  • The Defendant, Crystal Ortiz, was convicted of great bodily harm by vehicle (driving while intoxicated (DWI)), aggravated battery (deadly weapon-vehicle), and aggravated DWI. The events leading to these charges involved the Defendant attempting to flee from Mr. Hughes (Victim) due to fear of great bodily harm. During her attempt to escape, the Defendant, while intoxicated, drove her vehicle and accidentally struck the Victim. The Defendant did not appeal her conviction for leaving the scene of an accident (great bodily harm) (paras 1, 7-10).

Procedural History

  • Certiorari Granted, February 19, 2018, No. S-1-SC-36865: [Not applicable or not found]
  • APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY, Stan Whitaker, District Judge: The Defendant appealed her convictions to the Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico.

Parties' Submissions

  • Defendant-Appellant: Argued that her convictions violate her right to be free from double jeopardy and that the district court erred in refusing to grant her duress defense instructions. She presented a prima facie case for the giving of the duress instructions based on her fear of immediate and great bodily harm from the Victim and contended that a reasonable view of the evidence supported her defense (paras 1, 3).
  • Plaintiff-Appellee (State of New Mexico): Contended that the Defendant failed to present sufficient evidence on the "immediacy" requirement and the "reasonableness" requirement of the duress instructions, thereby arguing that the Defendant was not entitled to the duress instruction (para 13).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the Defendant was entitled to a duress instruction on great bodily harm by vehicle, aggravated battery, and the strict liability crime of aggravated DWI (para 1).
  • Whether the Defendant’s convictions violate her right to be free from double jeopardy (para 1).

Disposition

  • The Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for the strict liability crime of aggravated DWI.
  • The Court reversed the Defendant’s appealed convictions for aggravated battery (deadly weapon-vehicle) and great bodily harm by vehicle (DWI) based on instructional error and remanded these charges to the district court for further proceedings and a new trial (para 27).

Reasons

  • The Court, led by Judge French with Judges Garcia and Sutin concurring, found that the Defendant made a prima facie showing of duress by presenting evidence that she fled from the Victim’s home in reasonable fear of immediate bodily harm and that her fear of immediate bodily harm remained even after the Victim jumped out of her vehicle. The Court concluded that a jury could find that an objectively reasonable person would have continued to try to get away from the Victim’s assaultive behavior and would have attempted to drive away from the scene to escape further assaults. Thus, the Court held that the Defendant established both the subjective "immediacy" prong and the objective "reasonableness" prong for a prima facie defense of duress, and the district court should have instructed the jury accordingly for the charges of great bodily harm by vehicle and aggravated battery. However, for the strict liability crime of aggravated DWI, the Court concluded that the Defendant did not satisfy the objective third element of the Rios instruction—no reasonable legal alternative—for receiving a duress instruction to a strict liability crime, affirming the district court's decision not to give the modified duress instruction for aggravated DWI (paras 14-26). Judge Sutin, in a special concurrence, expressed concerns about the complexity and conceptual difficulty of duress instruction cases and hoped for further clarity from the Supreme Court (paras 29-37).
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