AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Worker was injured during employment in 2004 and engaged in litigation over various related issues for five years. Before trial, the Worker's attorney sent a letter to the Employer's attorneys proposing a settlement with specific terms. The Employer did not accept this offer. At trial, the Worker was awarded benefits exceeding those proposed in the settlement offer. The Worker then sought to have the Employer cover all attorney fees, citing a statute that allows for such an arrangement under certain conditions.

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Worker: Argued that the Employer should cover all attorney fees because the trial award exceeded the settlement offer, invoking NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(F) (2003).
• Employer: Contended that the Worker's settlement offer did not comply with the statutory requirements to trigger the fee-shifting provision, as it lacked specificity and did not clearly invoke the relevant statute.

Legal Issues

• Whether the Worker's pre-trial settlement offer complied with NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(F) (2003) sufficiently to require the Employer to pay 100% of the Worker's attorney fees.

Disposition

• The court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Judge's decision to apportion the attorney fees equally between the Worker and the Employer.

Reasons

• Per BUSTAMANTE, J. (SUTIN, J., and HANISEE, J., concurring):
  The court reviewed the Workers’ Compensation Judge's interpretation of the statute de novo, focusing on whether the Worker's settlement offer met the statutory requirements for the Employer to bear full attorney fees (paras 4-5).
  The court found that the Worker's settlement offer did not comply with Section 52-1-54(F) as it did not reference the statute, nor did it indicate that the offer was to allow a compensation order to be taken against the Employer. The offer's lack of specificity and failure to clearly invoke the fee-shifting provision rendered it ineffective for the intended purpose (paras 6-10).
  The court highlighted the importance of clear communication in settlement offers intended to trigger fee-shifting provisions, suggesting that such offers must explicitly refer to the relevant statute or address its material requirements (para 13).
  The decision to affirm the apportionment of attorney fees was based on the settlement offer's failure to meet the statutory criteria for fee-shifting, emphasizing the need for explicit reference to or compliance with the statute's requirements in such offers (para 14).