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Facts

  • The Defendant was involved in a vehicle accident while driving a truck in Curry County, New Mexico. At the scene, law enforcement found a pack of beer in the Defendant's truck, and the Defendant admitted to having consumed beer earlier that day. After being transported to a hospital for injuries sustained in the accident, the Defendant consented to a blood test for alcohol content following a law enforcement officer's request and advisement under the Implied Consent Act. The Defendant initially refused the blood test, requesting a breath test instead, but consented after being informed by the officer that a blood test was the only available option and being threatened with enhanced criminal penalties for refusal. The blood test showed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 grams per 100 milliliters of blood (paras 3-5).

Procedural History

  • [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

  • Appellant (Defendant): Argued that the consent to the blood test was not voluntary under the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, which held that motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense. The Defendant also contended that the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of testimony regarding the blood draw, violated his right to confrontation, and failed to establish a nexus between BAC and time of driving. Additionally, the Defendant asserted that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds (paras 7-8, 21-31).
  • Appellee (State of New Mexico): Responded that the penalty portion of the implied consent advisory was not read to the Defendant, and regardless of whether Birchfield applies, exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. The State also maintained that even if the blood test results were admitted in error, such error was harmless because ample evidence supported the finding that the Defendant drove impaired (paras 7, 9).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the Defendant's consent to the blood test was voluntary in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota.
  • Whether the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of testimony regarding the blood draw.
  • Whether the State violated the Defendant's right to confrontation.
  • Whether the State failed to establish a nexus between BAC and time of driving.
  • Whether the district court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.

Disposition

  • The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order denying the Defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for the district court to redetermine its ruling in light of Birchfield and for any further proceedings consistent therewith (para 32).

Reasons

  • The Court of Appeals, per Judge Jennifer L. Attrep, with Judges Megan P. Duffy and Briana H. Zamora concurring, found that the district court failed to properly consider and apply the Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his blood evidence. The Court held that when a defendant raises Birchfield, asserting his or her consent to a blood test was involuntary due to a partially inaccurate advisory, the district court must assess the voluntariness of the consent in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the improper implied consent advisory. The Court also addressed the Defendant's remaining arguments concerning the blood test but concluded that these issues would only be relevant if, on remand, the district court determines that the Defendant's consent to the blood test was valid or there existed probable cause and exigent circumstances otherwise justifying the blood draw (paras 11-31).
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