AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• During a traffic stop, the defendant was found to be a passenger without a seatbelt. A records check revealed an outstanding warrant for her arrest. A search incident to arrest found heroin in her purse and methamphetamine in the vehicle, both admitted by the defendant as hers. She was charged with two counts of possession of controlled substances: heroin and methamphetamine (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• District Court of Bernalillo County: The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the second count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, before trial (para 1).

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellant (State): Argued that the district court erred by dismissing the charge as Section 30-31-23 defines a unit of prosecution for each controlled substance possessed, and the evidence at trial would show distinct acts of possession (para 4).
• Defendant-Appellee: Contended that the statute does not allow for multiple charges from one act of possession and that the evidence would not show two distinct acts of possession. Also argued that the statute is ambiguously written, warranting the application of the rule of lenity (paras 3-4, 8).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in dismissing the second count of possession of a controlled substance based on its interpretation of Section 30-31-23 and the rule of lenity (para 4).
• Whether the statute defines the unit of prosecution as each controlled substance a defendant possesses (para 4).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order dismissing one count of the indictment and remanded for further proceedings (para 11).

Reasons

• Per MEDINA, J., with HENDERSON, J., and BACA, J., concurring:
  The court held that the plain language of Section 30-31-23(A) defines the unit of prosecution as each distinct controlled substance a person possesses. This interpretation is supported by the singular reference to a controlled substance in the statute and by precedent interpreting similar language in other statutes (paras 5-7).
  The court disagreed with the defendant's argument that the statute's language is ambiguous and that policy concerns should guide the analysis. It concluded that the statute clearly spells out the unit of prosecution, rendering further analysis unnecessary (para 8).
  The court found that the Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act does not apply to the Controlled Substances Act, as the latter was adopted before the former. Therefore, the singular reference in Section 30-31-23(A) is significant for determining the unit of prosecution (para 9).
  The court concluded that the defendant's simultaneous possession of heroin and methamphetamine constituted separate offenses under Section 30-31-23(A), and thus, the district court erred in dismissing the second count of possession (para 10).