This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
- The settlor created a revocable trust agreement, naming himself and his wife as trustees, with Stephen E. Barlow as the successor trustee. Upon the wife's death before the settlor, the trust's remainder was to be distributed to Barlow. The settlor executed a will two days before his death, revoking the trust and bequeathing all his estate to Rodney Olguin, who had been a caretaker for the settlor and his wife. The will was admitted to informal probate, and Olguin filed a motion to be appointed successor trustee of the trust, claiming the will revoked the trust (paras 2-5).
Procedural History
- [Not applicable or not found]
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiff-Appellant (Barlow): Argued that a trust requiring revocation by a written instrument executed during the settlor's lifetime cannot be revoked by the settlor's will. Contended that if the court enforces the revocation as stated in the will, the revocation was incomplete, and Barlow remains entitled to distribution of trust property (para 8).
- Defendant-Appellee (Olguin): Contended that the settlor's intent was critical and that the terms of the trust and subsequent amendments indicated the settlor's intent to revoke the trust and leave the trust assets to the heirs of his estate. Argued that the will, which specifically mentioned and revoked the trust, substantially conformed to both the express method of revocation contained in the trust document and the permitted method under the Uniform Trust Code (paras 13-14).
Legal Issues
- Whether a trust that requires revocation by a written instrument executed during the settlor's lifetime can be revoked by the settlor's will.
- If the court enforces the revocation as stated in the will, whether the revocation was incomplete, allowing Barlow to claim trust property (para 8).
Disposition
- The district court's decision to appoint Olguin as successor trustee of the trust, effectively revoking the trust by the will, was affirmed (para 22).
Reasons
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The Court of Appeals, with Judge Jonathan B. Sutin authoring the opinion, concurred by Judges James J. Wechsler and Linda M. Vanzi, held that the district court did not err in its decision. The court found that the terms of the trust provided a method to revoke the trust's provisions, but this method was not expressly stated to be the exclusive method of revocation. Thus, the settlor appropriately revoked the trust by substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the trust, through the later will that expressly referred to the trust. The court also concluded that the will executed during the settlor's lifetime constituted substantial compliance with the terms of the trust, manifesting a clear intent on the settlor's part that the trust was revoked by the will and that Olguin take the property formerly held in the trust. The court disagreed with Barlow's argument that the revocation was incomplete, holding that all provisions relating to any of Verlea’s remaining interests were revoked, including Barlow's interest as a beneficiary (paras 9-21).
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