AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Plaintiff, Perry A. Kesler, initiated an action against U.S. Bank, National Association, alleging violations of the New Mexico Home Loan Protection Act (HLPA) by failing to accept partial payments from him. This action followed a prior foreclosure action where U.S. Bank, as assignee of a promissory note and mortgage executed by Kesler, sought to foreclose on Kesler’s residential property. In the foreclosure action, Kesler counterclaimed, asserting U.S. Bank’s failure to properly post mortgage payments and clarified that his claim was based on the HLPA. The district court granted U.S. Bank summary judgment on both its claims and Kesler’s counterclaims in the foreclosure action (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• U.S. Bank, National Ass’n v. Kesler, D-412-CV-2012-00254 (Fourth Judicial District Court): The district court granted U.S. Bank summary judgment on its claims and Kesler’s counterclaims in the foreclosure action.
• U.S. Bank v. Kesler, No. 35,165, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. July 18, 2017) (non-precedential): The Court of Appeals determined that the foreclosure court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to Kesler’s HLPA and related Unfair Practices Act claim and remanded for the foreclosure court to address those claims (para 4).

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellant: Argued that there was a violation of the HLPA, the complaint in the HLPA action did not state the same cause of action as the counterclaim in the foreclosure action for res judicata purposes, the foreclosure court’s rulings were not on the merits and not final, he did not have the full and fair opportunity to litigate the HLPA claims in the foreclosure action, the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for leave to supplement his response to the motion to dismiss, his HLPA claim was not a compulsory counterclaim in the foreclosure action, and the Legislature intended that homeowners have the right to bring a separate civil action for a HLPA violation (para 5).
• Defendant-Appellee: Successfully moved to dismiss Kesler’s complaint on the basis of res judicata, arguing that Kesler’s claims were barred due to the prior adjudication in the foreclosure action (para 1).

Legal Issues

• Whether the doctrine of res judicata barred Kesler’s HLPA complaint based on the prior foreclosure action.
• Whether Kesler’s HLPA claim constituted the same cause of action as his counterclaim in the foreclosure action for res judicata purposes.
• Whether the foreclosure court’s rulings were final and on the merits, thus precluding further litigation on the HLPA claims.
• Whether Kesler had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his HLPA claims in the foreclosure action.
• Whether the district court erred in denying Kesler’s motion for leave to supplement his response to the motion to dismiss.
• Whether Kesler’s HLPA claim was a compulsory counterclaim in the foreclosure action.
• Whether the Legislature intended for homeowners to have the right to bring a separate civil action for a HLPA violation.

Disposition

• The appeal was dismissed as moot because the Court of Appeals had already remanded the HLPA claims to the foreclosure court to be addressed, leaving no actual controversy to be resolved in this appeal that would grant Kesler any actual relief (para 6).

Reasons

• JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge (LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge, JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge concurring): The Court found the appeal to be moot based on the fact that the HLPA claims, which were the subject of Kesler’s appeal, had already been remanded to the foreclosure court for further proceedings. Since the merits of Kesler’s HLPA claims were yet to be addressed and would not be addressed in this appeal, and because the Court of Appeals had already decided on the remand of these claims, there was no longer an actual controversy that could provide Kesler with relief through this appeal. The Court emphasized that its decision was based on the principle that an appeal must be dismissed if it cannot grant any actual relief to the appellant (paras 5-7).