AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• A thirty-three-year-old man, appearing intoxicated, entered a candy shop where a sixteen-year-old female, K.B., was working alone. Following her employers' instructions, K.B. served the man water. The man made lewd comments, requested K.B.'s tip money and contact information, and after being refused, forcibly pulled K.B. into a hug during which he touched and squeezed her breast without her consent (paras 2-4).

Procedural History

• District Court of San Juan County, Karen L. Townsend, District Judge: Defendant Leighton Begaye was convicted of one count of criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSCM) for forcibly touching the breast of K.B., a sixteen-year-old female.

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that fundamental error occurred due to the failure to instruct the jury on lack of consent, claiming it to be an element of the offense (para 1).
• Plaintiff-Appellee: [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

• Whether lack of consent is an element of the offense of criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSCM) under Section 30-9-13 (para 1).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that lack of consent is not an element of CSCM under Section 30-9-13, and thus no fundamental error occurred (para 1).

Reasons

• Per HENDERSON, Judge (with KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge and GERALD E. BACA, Judge concurring):
  The Court determined that lack of consent is not an element of CSCM under Section 30-9-13 by examining the statutory language, which does not include lack of consent as an element for CSCM involving a minor aged thirteen to eighteen years old when force or coercion is used (paras 7-8).
  The Court referenced the uniform jury instruction for CSCM (force), which aligns with the statutory language by not including lack of consent as an essential element, further supported by committee commentary (para 9).
  The Court distinguished the case from State v. Samora and State v. Stevens, noting that those cases involved different statutory provisions where consent was relevant, and emphasized that the Legislature has made distinctions in sex crimes based on the age of the victim and the theory of prosecution (paras 10-14).
  The Court rejected the defendant's argument that excluding lack of consent would lead to absurd results, noting that the requirement for the State to prove force addresses these concerns and that the age disparity between the defendant and K.B. would subject similarly situated defendants to the same degree of felony punishment under the applicable CSP statute (para 16).
  The Court concluded that consent of a child between the ages of thirteen and sixteen to engage in sexual contact is irrelevant where force occurred, affirming the conviction without needing to consider the defendant's argument that the omission of this instruction amounted to fundamental error because the issue of consent was in dispute (para 17).