AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was convicted for second-degree criminal sexual penetration of a minor (CSPM), based on an incident involving the Victim (JL), who testified that the Defendant had sex with her against her will, resulting in transient vaginal pain. The Victim also experienced psychological and emotional distress, but there was no testimony linking these conditions directly to the Defendant's actions. A nurse testified about the Victim's emotional state and attempted to testify about physical injuries, but this testimony was excluded by the court (paras 2-4).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the evidence was only sufficient to establish third-degree CSPM, not second-degree CSPM, because there was insufficient evidence to show that the Victim suffered personal injury as required by the statute (para 1).
• Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Agreed with the Defendant's assertion that the evidence did not support a conviction for second-degree CSPM due to the lack of evidence of personal injury to the Victim (para 1).

Legal Issues

• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree CSPM, given the lack of evidence of personal injury to the Victim (para 1).
• Whether the Defendant's conviction for second-degree CSPM should be reversed and remanded for resentencing on the alternative offense of fourth-degree CSPM (para 1).

Disposition

• The court reversed the Defendant's conviction for second-degree CSPM and remanded the case for resentencing on the alternative offense of fourth-degree CSPM (para 16).

Reasons

• The court, consisting of Judges Timothy L. Garcia, James J. Wechsler, and M. Monica J. Zamora, unanimously agreed that the evidence did not support a conviction for second-degree CSPM. The court found that the jury was not asked to determine if the Victim suffered personal injury as a result of the Defendant's actions, and there was insufficient evidence to show that the Victim suffered personal injury as defined by statute. The court applied the canon of ejusdem generis and the rule of lenity in interpreting the relevant statutes, concluding that transient vaginal pain did not meet the statutory definition of personal injury. The court also referenced a recent opinion, State v. Trujillo, to support its decision. As a result, the court reversed the Defendant's conviction for second-degree CSPM and remanded for resentencing on the alternative offense of fourth-degree CSPM, without considering the Defendant's other arguments for review (paras 9-17).