AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was convicted following a bench trial on one count of trafficking controlled substances, specifically possession with intent to distribute (para 1).

Procedural History

• Appeal from the District Court of Chaves County, Kea W. Riggs, District Judge, February 11, 2016: Convicted of trafficking controlled substances (possession with intent to distribute).

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant (Defendant): Argued that the district court erred by not requiring the disclosure of the confidential informant's identity and by denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights (para 2).
• Appellee (State): Opposed the Defendant's arguments, supporting the district court's decisions regarding the non-disclosure of the confidential informant and the denial of the motion to dismiss based on the speedy trial rights.

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in not requiring disclosure of the confidential informant's identity.
• Whether the district court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence, convicting the Defendant of trafficking controlled substances (possession with intent to distribute) (para 4).

Reasons

• Per J. MILES HANISEE, with LINDA M. VANZI and M. MONICA ZAMORA concurring:
  The Court proposed to affirm the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in not requiring the disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity and no violation of the Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court analyzed the four speedy trial factors from Barker v. Wingo, concluding that the length of delay weighed moderately in the Defendant's favor, while the reasons for delay and the assertion of speedy trial rights weighed slightly in his favor. However, due to the lack of demonstrated actual prejudice by the Defendant, the Court was not convinced that the Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated (paras 2-3).
  The Defendant's memorandum in opposition did not point out any specific errors in fact or law regarding the Court's proposed disposition. Instead, it reiterated previously presented facts and arguments, which the Court found insufficient to meet the burden on appeal (para 3).
  The Court concluded that the Defendant had not met his burden on appeal and affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence for the reasons stated in the calendar notice and the additional reasons provided in the memorandum opinion (para 4).