AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, speeding, and not having a driver's license in possession. The last charge was voluntarily dismissed by the State. The case experienced a forty-four-month delay from the Defendant's arrest to the dismissal with prejudice, during which the COVID-19 pandemic occurred, affecting the court's ability to conduct trials.

Procedural History

• Metropolitan Court of Bernalillo County: The court granted Defendant's speedy trial motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellant (State of New Mexico): Argued that the delay was attributable to the Defendant and the COVID-19 health crisis, and that the Defendant failed to demonstrate particularized prejudice from the delay.
• Defendant-Appellee (Diandra Smith): Contended that the delay violated her right to a speedy trial, arguing that the entire eighteen-month period during the COVID-19 pandemic should weigh heavily in her favor as administrative delay.

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated due to the forty-four-month delay from arrest to dismissal.
• Whether the reasons for delay, including those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, should weigh against the State or the Defendant.
• Whether the Defendant demonstrated particularized prejudice as a result of the delay.

Disposition

• The appellate court reversed the metropolitan court's order granting the Defendant's speedy trial motion and dismissing the case with prejudice, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Reasons

• The appellate court, consisting of Judges Kristina Bogardus, Shammara H. Henderson, and Katherine A. Wray, conducted a de novo review of the Barker factors to determine if the Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. The court found that the forty-four-month delay was presumptively prejudicial but noted that the reasons for delay did not weigh heavily in the Defendant's favor. Specifically, the court found that twenty months of delay weighed against the Defendant, primarily due to her requests for continuances and refusal to participate in telephonic or audio-video connection trials as required by the Supreme Court Order during the COVID-19 pandemic. Fourteen months of delay weighed against the State, including delays caused by the State's request for continuances and the court's busy docket. The court also found that the Defendant's assertion of her right to a speedy trial was not timely or vigorous, and she failed to demonstrate particularized prejudice resulting from the delay. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, reversing the lower court's decision (paras 1-21).