AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The case involves a dispute between Plaintiff Joel M. Young and Defendant H. Adam ‘Skip’ Fisher regarding the enforceability of a shared water well contract. The Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment on the contract's enforceability and alleged breach of the covenant of fair dealing and conversion against the Defendant. The Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the agreement governing rights to the residential water well shared by the parties (para 3).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff: Sought a declaratory judgment on the enforceability of a shared water well contract and alleged breach of the covenant of fair dealing and conversion (para 1).
• Defendant: Filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the agreement governing rights to the residential water well shared by the parties (para 3).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court's order partially granting Defendant's motion to compel arbitration is final and thus appealable.

Disposition

• The appeal by Plaintiff Joel M. Young is dismissed due to the non-final nature of the district court's order (para 7).

Reasons

• Per J. Miles Hanisee, Chief Judge (Megan P. Duffy, Judge and Zachary A. Ives, Judge concurring): The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as premature, determining that the district court's order was not final. The district court had partially granted the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration but retained jurisdiction over any remaining pending issues, indicating that it was not the last deliberative action of the court with respect to the controversy. The Court of Appeals noted that an order referring issues to arbitration is only final and appealable if it fully resolves all claims or if the district court certifies it under Rule 1-054(B)(1) NMRA by determining there is no just reason for delay and directing that judgment be entered. Since the district court's order did not meet these criteria, the appeal was dismissed as premature (paras 2-7).