AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The case involves the appeal by Maisie Y. (Mother) against the second judgment terminating her parental rights to her children, following a reversal of the first judgment due to a denial of her statutory right to counsel. The appeal challenges the adequacy of notice provided for the second termination of parental rights (TPR) trial and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights.

Procedural History

• State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep’t v. Masie Y., 2021-NMCA-023, 489 P.3d 964: The first judgment against Mother was reversed because she was denied her statutory right to counsel.

Parties' Submissions

• Petitioner-Appellee (CYFD): Argued that Mother was afforded sufficient notice of the TPR trial and that the evidence was substantial enough to support the termination of her parental rights.
• Respondent-Appellant (Mother): Contended that she did not receive proper notice of the second TPR trial, violating her procedural due process rights, and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights.

Legal Issues

• Whether the Children, Youth & Families Department’s (CYFD) failure to give proper notice of the second TPR trial deprived Mother of her procedural due process rights.
• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Reasons

• MEDINA, Judge, ATTREP, Chief Judge, and IVES, Judge, concurring:
  Due Process Rights: The court found that Mother’s due process rights were not violated as CYFD provided sufficient notice of the TPR trial through service to Mother’s attorney and other means of communication. The court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, focusing on the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights against the burden of additional procedures on the state. The court concluded that Mother had reasonable notice of the TPR trial (paras 2-10).
  Substantial Evidence: The court held that the district court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. It reviewed the evidence under the standard that requires findings supporting termination in Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) cases to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court determined that the evidence presented at the TPR trial, including Mother’s failure to comply with her treatment plan and to address underlying issues, was sufficiently compelling to meet this standard. The court declined to reweigh evidence or assess credibility, which are within the purview of the district court (paras 11-17).