AI Generated Opinion Summaries

Decision Information

Citations - New Mexico Laws and Court Rules
Chapter 66 - Motor Vehicles - cited by 2,960 documents

Decision Content

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

  • Charles Noriega, doing business as Bumper to Bumper Auto Repair, was found to have crushed entire vehicles on his property and offered them for sale to recycling entities without possessing an auto recycler license. This activity led to legal action against him for operating an auto recycling business without the necessary license.

Procedural History

  • [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

  • Appellant (Charles Noriega): Argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove he operated an auto recycling business as defined by statute and contended that his conduct did not fall under the statutory definition of operating such a business ([MIO 1-3]).
  • Appellee (N.M. Taxation and Revenue Department): [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

  • Whether the appellant operated an auto recycling business without a license in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-4-1.1(A) (2005).
  • Whether the appellant's conduct constituted a violation of court orders in effect since 2004, justifying the district court's order of contempt and the appointment of a receiver to abate nuisance.

Disposition

  • The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order of contempt and order appointing a receiver to abate nuisance.

Reasons

  • Per Michael E. Vigil, J. (Roderick T. Kennedy, J., and Linda M. Vanzi, J., concurring): The Court concluded that the appellant's possession and sale of crushed vehicles satisfied the statutory definition of operating an auto recycling business. The evidence presented to the district court demonstrated that the appellant was involved in activities that required an auto recycler license, which he did not possess. The Court also found that the appellant's actions violated existing court orders since 2004. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the appellant in contempt and appointing a receiver to address the nuisance created by the appellant's unlicensed operations.
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