This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
- The Defendant was stopped by an officer for driving a vehicle with a significant crack in the windshield. Following the stop, the Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine but reserved the right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop.
Procedural History
- [Not applicable or not found]
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for driving in an unsafe condition due to the windshield crack.
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Maintained that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle based on the significant crack in the windshield, which could impair the driver's ability to operate the vehicle safely.
Legal Issues
- Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle for driving in an unsafe condition under NMSA 1978, § 66-3-801(A) (1991), due to a significant crack in the windshield.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress.
Reasons
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The Court, consisting of Judges Michael D. Bustamante, Jonathan B. Sutin, and Timothy L. Garcia, unanimously affirmed the district court's decision. The Court found that the officer's testimony, which described seeing amber light from a street light coming through the crack within the driver's immediate view and stating that it could impair the driver's ability to operate the vehicle safely, constituted reasonable suspicion of a violation of Section 66-3-801(A). The Court held that whether the crack in the windshield made the vehicle unsafe to drive was a question for the finder of fact, not an appellate court, thereby supporting the district court's ruling (paras 1-2).
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