AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The case involves the Defendant, Abel Aceves Rodriguez, who restrained a twelve-year-old boy in an alley and attempted to engage in unlawful sexual contact with the minor. The incident led to charges against the Defendant for first-degree kidnapping and attempted second-degree criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSCM).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the restraint of the child was incidental to the attempted CSCM and therefore not sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. Also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempted CSCM.
• Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Agreed with the Defendant that the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of second-degree CSCM (CSCM II) and that the Defendant’s conviction for attempted CSCM II should be vacated and replaced with a conviction for CSCM in the third degree (CSCM III).

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant's restraint of the child supports a conviction for kidnapping.
• Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of CSCM III, given the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of CSCM II.

Disposition

• The Court reversed the Defendant’s conviction for kidnapping and remanded to the district court for entry of judgment of guilt for attempted CSCM III and resentencing.

Reasons

• CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge (with RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge, and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge concurring):
  The Court found that the Defendant's restraint of the child was incidental to the attempted CSCM and did not constitute kidnapping as a matter of law. This conclusion was based on the precedent set in State v. Trujillo, where it was determined that restraints incidental to the commission of another offense do not qualify as kidnapping. The restraint in this case did not increase the Defendant's culpability beyond that inherent to the commission of attempted CSCM, nor did it subject the child to a substantially greater risk of harm.
  Regarding the conviction for attempted CSCM II, the Court agreed with both parties that the jury was improperly instructed because the instruction omitted the word "unclothed." This omission necessitated vacating the Defendant's conviction for CSCM II and remanding for entry of judgment for CSCM III, as the evidence supported a conviction for the lesser included offense.
  Finally, despite reducing the Defendant's conviction to attempted CSCM III, the Court addressed the sufficiency of the evidence for any degree of attempted CSCM. The Court concluded that, based on the testimony of the child and a neighbor, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of attempted CSCM III beyond a reasonable doubt. The testimonies indicated that the Defendant restrained the child and attempted to engage in unlawful sexual contact, meeting the criteria for attempted CSCM III.