AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• A police officer responded to a 911 call reporting an unknown individual had driven onto a property, caused damage, and entered a residence without permission before leaving. The individual was later identified as the Defendant, who was found at a different address and exhibited signs of extreme intoxication. The police entered the residence without a warrant, leading to the Defendant's arrest for aggravated driving while intoxicated. The Defendant's trial counsel did not move to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry, resulting in a conviction (paras 2-9).

Procedural History

• Appeal from the District Court of Sandoval County, Louis P. McDonald, District Judge.
• Certiorari Granted, March 1, 2013, No. 33,938.
• Released for Publication March 19, 2013.

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant: Argued that the police made an unconstitutional warrantless entry into the residence and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained as a result (para 1).
• Appellee: [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

• Whether the police made an unconstitutional warrantless entry into the residence.
• Whether the Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry.

Disposition

• The court held that the Defendant made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence gained from the warrantless entry. The Defendant’s conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial (para 12).

Reasons

• Per Jonathan B. Sutin, with Michael D. Bustamante and Timothy L. Garcia concurring:
  The court found that the record supported a motion to suppress based on the warrantless police entry, as such entries are presumptively unreasonable barring a few exceptions. The emergency assistance doctrine, which might justify such an entry, was not applicable here due to the lack of an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property. The court concluded that the Defendant's trial counsel's performance was deficient for not moving to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry and that this deficiency prejudiced the Defendant's defense. The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, determining that the Defendant met both requirements for showing ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the court reversed the Defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, based on the ineffective assistance of counsel (paras 13-31).