AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Plaintiff, Marlina Romero, filed a complaint against Lovelace Health System, Inc. (Lovelace), Women’s Specialists of New Mexico, and Dr. Kristina Chongsiriwatana for medical negligence and vicarious liability. The complaint stemmed from an incident where Dr. Chongsiriwatana, an employee of Women’s Specialists, administered Methotrexate to the Plaintiff following diagnostic surgery at Lovelace, which was intended to determine the presence of an ectopic pregnancy and to drain an ovarian cyst. The surgery revealed no signs of an ectopic pregnancy, but due to the administration of Methotrexate, which carries a high risk of birth defects, the Plaintiff was forced to abort her planned pregnancy on June 23, 2011 (paras 3-4).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff: Argued that her application under the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) with the New Mexico Medical Review Commission, filed within the statute of limitations, effectively tolled the statute of limitations as to Lovelace, despite Lovelace not being a qualified provider under the MMA (para 5).
• Defendant (Lovelace Health System, Inc.): Contended that the Plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations and that the tolling provision did not apply as Lovelace was not "named" in the application submitted to the Commission (para 5).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred by converting Lovelace’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, thus limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to make a record and preserve issues for review (para 2).
• Whether the Plaintiff’s MMA application had the effect of tolling the statute of limitations as to Lovelace (para 2).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Lovelace, holding that the statute of limitations applicable to Lovelace was not tolled by Plaintiff’s MMA application and that the claims were filed after the relevant statute of limitations period had run (para 2).

Reasons

• The Court of Appeals, with Judge Jonathan B. Sutin authoring the opinion, and Chief Judge Linda M. Vanzi and Judge Julie J. Vargas concurring, held that the district court did not err in converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court found that Plaintiff was given a reasonable opportunity to respond and preserve any issues for review, despite the motion not including a numbered statement of facts as required by Rule 1-056. The absence of numbered facts did not deprive the Plaintiff of a fair opportunity to respond or show how she was prejudiced by the conversion (paras 11-12).
  Regarding the tolling issue, the Court analyzed the requirements under the MMA for an application to toll the statute of limitations. It concluded that for a plaintiff to utilize the tolling provision against particular providers, the application must identify the alleged act or acts of malpractice against those providers in a manner that would put those providers on notice. The Court found that Plaintiff’s application did not clearly state that she believed Lovelace was negligent or that Dr. Chongsiriwatana was an employee or agent of Lovelace, thus failing to put Lovelace on notice of potential negligence or vicarious liability claims against it. Consequently, the MMA’s tolling provision did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims against Lovelace, and the application of the three-year statute of limitations remained unaltered (paras 22-30).