Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Decision Information
Rule Set 12 - Rules of Appellate Procedure - cited by 9,502 documents
Citations - New Mexico Appellate Reports
Dickens v. Laurel Healthcare, LLC - cited by 60 documents
Grygorwicz v. Trujillo - cited by 98 documents
Decision Content
CEDRINS V. SHRESTHA
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
INARA CEDRINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAMESH KUMAR SHRESTHA,
Defendant-Appellee.
NO. 30,750
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
February 18, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY,
Valerie Mackie Huling, District Judge
COUNSEL
Inara Cedrins, Chicago, IL, Pro Se Appellant
Ramesh Kumar Shrestha, Albuquerque, NM, Pro Se Appellee
JUDGES
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge. WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge, JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge.
AUTHOR:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge.
Appellant (Plaintiff) appeals pro se from the district court’s August 27, 2010, order of dismissal with prejudice. [RP 63, 71] Our notice proposed to dismiss, and in response Plaintiff filed a timely “objection to notice of proposed summary disposition.” We are not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments, and therefore dismiss for lack of finality.
As set forth in our notice, Plaintiff below filed an “objection to order of dismissal” [RP 66], which was filed subsequent to the order of dismissal and which we view as comparable to a motion for reconsideration. As we explained in our notice, because the district court has not yet entered a written order ruling on Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion, dismissal is appropriate. See generally Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-009, ¶ 8, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865 (explaining that, if a party makes a post-judgment motion directed at the final judgment pursuant to . . . Section 39-1-1 . . . the time for filing an appeal does not begin to run until the district court enters an express disposition of that motion).
In response to our notice, Plaintiff expresses her frustration regarding delay in this case [objection 1] and urges this Court to note highlighted matters on her original list of evidence. [objection 1] However, until entry of a written order ruling on Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion, any appeal is premature. See Dickens v. Laurel Healthcare, LLC, 2009-NMCA-122, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 303, 222 P.3d 675 (holding that because resolution of the post-judgment motion could alter, amend, or moot the order that is being challenged, the order is not final and the appeal is premature).
Accordingly, for reasons set forth herein and in our notice, we dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge