ORDER PO-4389

Appeal PA20-00815

Ministry of Northern Development, Mines, Natural Resources and Forestry

May 9, 2023

Summary: The Ministry of Northern Development, Mines, Natural Resources and Forestry (the ministry) received an access request for communications related to a work permit for a specific property (the property). The ministry issued a decision granting partial access to email chains withholding information pursuant to section 21(1) of the Act (personal privacy). A consultant (the appellant), working on behalf of the owners of the property, appealed the ministry’s decision, claiming that the email chains are exempt from disclosure in full pursuant to section 17(1) (third party information), as well as the fact that the request is frivolous or vexatious (section 10(1)(b)) and the records are beyond the scope of the request (section 24). In this order, the adjudicator finds that the appellant is not permitted to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious and finds that the record is responsive to the request. She also finds that the record is not exempt under the mandatory third party information exemption and that it does not contain personal information beyond that already identified and redacted by the ministry. She dismisses the appeal and upholds the ministry’s decision to disclose the record to the requester.

Statutes Considered: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,  R.S.O. 1990. C. F.31 , as amended, sections 2(1) (definition of “personal information”), 2(3), 10(1)(b), 10(2), 17(1), 21(1) and 24; sections 5.1(a) and (b) of Regulation 460.

Orders Considered: PO-2050, PO-2490, PO-2688, PO-3738-I, PO-4242, PO-4290 and PO- 4331.

OVERVIEW:

[1] This order resolves an appeal from a decision of the Ministry of Northern Development, Mines, Natural Resources and Forestry (the ministry), which amalgamated the Ministry of National Resources and Forestry (MNRF) and most portfolios of the Ministry of Energy, Northern Development and Mines (EDNM) in 2021.[1]

[2] By way of background, the owners of a property (the property owners), acting with a consultant (the appellant), applied to the ministry for a work permit (the work permit) to construct a dock, boathouse, walkway and path to the docket and parking area on a specific property (the property). The ministry issued the work permit for all structures except the proposed boathouse, and the property owners and the appellant continued to communicate with the ministry after this issuance related to the construction of the approved structures and ongoing issues about the proposed boathouse.

[3] An individual (the requester) made eight access requests to the ministry for access to records related to the work permit.[2] The appeal that is the subject of this order arises out of one of these requests for “All communication between ENDM and MNRF regarding a work permit…to construct a commercial marina dock….”

[4] Following notification, the ministry issued a decision to the requester and the appellant granting partial access to the responsive records with severances pursuant to section 21(1) of the Act.

[5] The appellant filed an appeal of the ministry’s decision to the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (the IPC).

[6] During mediation, the appellant confirmed that they are appealing the ministry’s decision to disclose to the requester the records at issue in this appeal on the basis that they should be withheld in full pursuant to section 17(1) of the Act. They also believe the information being disclosed goes beyond the information requested and raised the issue of scope at section 24 of the Act. In addition, the appellant takes the position that the request is frivolous and vexatious pursuant to section 10(1)(b) of the Act.

[7] While the requester did not file an appeal of the ministry’s decision, they continue to seek access to the records at issue in this appeal. The ministry advised that it was maintaining its decision to grant partial access to the records.

[8] No further mediation was possible and this appeal was transferred to the adjudication stage of the appeals process, in which an adjudicator may conduct an inquiry under the Act.

[9] I decided to conduct an inquiry and to add additional issues to the scope of this appeal because my review of the records showed that they may contain additional information that qualifies as personal information and therefore, may be subject to section 21(1) of the Act.

[10] I sought and received representations from the appellant, which were shared with the ministry and the requester. I then received representations from the ministry and the requester. In addition, I sought and received additional representations from the parties.[3] The representations of the parties were shared in accordance with the IPC’s Code of Procedure and Practice Direction 7.

[11] In this order, I find that the appellant is not permitted to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious. I also find that the record is within the scope of the request. I further find that the record is not exempt under the mandatory third party information exemption and that it does not contain personal information beyond that already identified and redacted by the ministry. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal and uphold the ministry’s decision to disclose the record to the requester.

RECORD:[4]

[12] The record remaining at issue in this appeal is an email chain in its entirety, which the appellant claims should not be disclosed to the requester (the record).[5] It is described as A0357332 pages 381-382.

ISSUES:

1. Should the appellant be permitted to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious pursuant to section 10(1)(b)? If so, is the access request frivolous or vexatious?
2. What is the scope of the request for records? Which records are responsive to the request?
3. Does the mandatory exemption at section 17(1) for third party information apply to the record?
4. Does the record contain “personal information” as defined in section 2(1) and, if so, whose personal information is it?

DISCUSSION:

Issue A: Should the appellant be permitted to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious pursuant to section 10(1)(b)? If so, is the access request frivolous or vexatious?

[13] Section 10(1)(b) of the Act provides institutions with a straightforward way of dealing with frivolous or vexatious requests. It reads:

Every person has a right of access to a record or a part of a record in the custody or under the control of an institution unless,

the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request for access is frivolous or vexatious.

[14] Section 5.1 of Regulation 460 under the Act elaborates on the meaning of the phrase “frivolous or vexatious”:

A head of an institution that receives a request for access to a record or personal information shall conclude that the request is frivolous or vexatious if,

(a) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request is part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access or would interfere with the operations of the institution; or

(b) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request is made in bad faith or for a purpose other than to obtain access.

[15] There are four grounds for claiming that a request is frivolous or vexatious:

• the request is part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access,
• the request is part of a part of a pattern of conduct that would interfere with the operations of the institution,
• the request is made in bad faith, and/or
• the request is made for a purpose other than to obtain access.

Representations

[16] The appellant submit that the request is not a bona fide request but rather a frivolous and vexatious request that forms part of a larger campaign of harassment by the requester[6] against the property owners (and indirectly the appellant) for constructing a dock in the vicinity of the cottages of the requester and others. They reference ongoing litigation proceedings, which have been referred to by a court as being “frivolous and vexatious” and as not involving “a serious issue to be tried”, and involves trespassing on the property, drilling holes in ice and taking aerial photos of the property and sharing them.

[17] They submit that the request is not being made for any proper purpose. With reference to ongoing legal proceedings, the appellant submits that the information being sought has no relevance to the facts and matters that remain at issue in the ongoing legal proceedings mentioned above.

[18] In its representations, the ministry raises the issue of whether the appellant should be permitted to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious. It submits that “it is clear…that the discretion to determine that a request is frivolous or vexatious is granted to the institution.” It points out that “[t[he IPC rarely permits affected parties, such as the [appellant], to claim that an access to information request is frivolous or vexatious” and that “[p]revious orders suggest that…third party claims under [section] 10(1)(b) of the Act may be considered in rare cases such as where the alleged harm of disclosure rises to the level of danger to life, health, or safety.”[7]

[19] The ministry indicates that the possible harm alleged by the appellant relates to property damage, trespass, nuisance and invasion of privacy, submitting that such allegations do not fall within the exceptional circumstances, in which the affected parties have been permitted to rely on section 10(1)(b) of the Act. It submits that the appellant has neither stated nor demonstrated that they have a reasonable fear of damage to themselves or other persons.

[20] The ministry also submits that the appellant has failed to satisfy the relevant requirements to demonstrate that the request is frivolous or vexatious because:

• After considering the cumulative nature and effect of the current request together with other requests by the same requester, the request does not form a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access;
• Based on the number and nature of the requests, the request is unremarkable and does not interfere with its operations; and
• It is not aware of any evidence of bad faith on the part of the requester in making their access request.

[21] The ministry disagrees that the request was not made for an improper purpose. It submits that, even if the appellant is correct that the information sought would be irrelevant and/or inadmissible for litigation purposes, it does not necessarily follow that the request for such information is made for an improper purpose. It explains that the Act provides a general right of access to records and does not limit that right to a specific purpose, nor does it require a requester to justify or even identify the reason for making a request.[8]

[22] In reply, the appellant submits that the ministry has drawn an entirely arbitrary distinction between harm that rises to the level of a danger to life, health and safety, as opposed to harm that rises to the level of trespass, nuisance and invasion of privacy. It states: “Those two categories are not mutually exclusive. It should go without saying that trespass, nuisance and invasion of privacy can give rise to a danger to life, health and safety.” It provides an example of this in its representations.

[23] Also, in reply to the ministry’s representations that the appellant has not demonstrated “bad faith” or a reasonable fear of danger to themselves or other persons, they draw my attention to their representations on “a larger campaign of harassment”. While indicating that it was unaware that it was insufficient to simply raise these concerns in their representations and requesting that “the ministry advise them on exactly what evidence is required so they may submit further evidence”, it states that if affidavit evidence is required, it can arrange this or “the requisite inference can be drawn from [its] written submissions…”.

Analysis and findings

Should the appellant be permitted to claim that the request is frivolous or vexatious pursuant to section 10(1)(b)?

[24] As raised by the ministry in its representations, I will first address the issue of whether the appellant should be permitted to claim the frivolous and vexatious provisions, when the ministry has not done so. I note that the appellant did not directly address this issue, despite being given the opportunity to respond to the ministry’s representations.

[25] I have considered the circumstances of the request and the record, and I see no basis upon which I should allow the appellant to raise the issue of whether the requester’s request is frivolous or vexatious.

[26] The frivolous and vexatious provisions in the Act make it clear that the decision about whether to raise these provisions lies with the institution. Previous IPC orders have determined that, to the extent that a third party may have the ability to raise these provisions (if at all), it would only be done in rare or unusual circumstances.[9] These orders have also confirmed that the frivolous and vexatious provisions of the Act are not intended to be used by parties resisting disclosure of records that would be otherwise subject to the Act because these parties do not like the request or are suspicious of the requester.[10]

[27] I have not been provided with sufficient evidence to satisfy me that the circumstances of this appeal give rise to one of those rare occasions when the IPC considers the application of a section of the Act, not raised by the institution and not one of the mandatory exemptions. Like the appellant in Order PO-2050, the appellant in this appeal raises concerns about the request being part of “a larger campaign of harassment”; however, it has not made direct representations about why I should depart from this reasoning.

[28] In making my decision, I adopt and agree with the reasoning in Orders PO-2050 and PO-2490. In particular, I share the view that the frivolous and vexatious provisions of the Act are not intended to be used by parties resisting disclosure of records that would be otherwise subject to the Act because these parties do not like the nature of the request or are suspicious of the requester. Accordingly, I find that the representations of the appellant do not support a finding that it is necessary to consider the frivolous and vexatious provisions of the Act in the circumstances of this appeal.

Is the request an abuse of process at common law?

[29] Nevertheless, although the appellant may not avail themselves of the frivolous or vexatious provisions of the Act, they do, as parties to an IPC appeal, have the right to argue that a request constitutes an abuse of process at common law. It is well established that I have the authority to permit a request to proceed or dismiss it based on a finding that allowing it to proceed would be an abuse of process.[11]

[30] The grounds considered in determining whether a request constitutes an abuse of process at common law are found in the wording of sections 5.1(a) and 5.1(b) of the Regulation 460: a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access, bad faith and purpose other than to obtain access.[12]

Pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access

[31] The following factors may be relevant in determining whether a pattern of conduct amounts to an “abuse of the right of access” process:

• Number of requests: Is the number excessive by reasonable standards?
• Nature and scope of the requests: Are the requests overly broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed? Are they identical or similar to previous requests?
• Purpose of the requests: Are the requests intended to accomplish some objective other than to gain access to the requested information? For example, are they made for “nuisance” value, or is the requester’s aim to harass the institution or to break or burden the system?
• Timing of the requests: Is the timing of the requests connected to the occurrence of some other related event, such as court proceedings?[13]

[32] Other factors specific to the case can also be relevant in deciding whether a pattern of conduct amounts to an abuse of the right of access.[14]

[33] The IPC has found that the focus should be on the cumulative nature and effect of a requester’s behaviour. In many cases, ascertaining a requester’s purpose requires the drawing of inferences from their behaviour because a requester seldom admits to a purpose other than access.[15]

Bad faith

[34] The IPC has defined “bad faith” as:

The opposite of “good faith”, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfil some duty or other contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights, but by some interested or sinister motive “bad faith” is not simply bad judgement or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.[16]

Purpose other than to obtain access

[35] A request is made for a purpose other than to obtain access if the requester is motivated not by a desire to obtain access, but by some other objective.[17]

[36] The IPC has previously found that an intention by the requester to take issue with a decision made by an institution, or to take action against an institution, is not enough to support a finding that the request is “frivolous or vexatious.”[18] In order to qualify as a “purpose other than to obtain access,” the requester would need to have an improper objective above and beyond an intention to use the information in some legitimate manner.[19]

[37] Overall, the representations of the appellant refer to the request as being part of “a larger campaign of harassment” against the property owners (and indirectly the appellant) as a consequence for constructing a dock in the vicinity of their cottages, which includes litigation proceedings that have been referred to by a court as being “frivolous and vexatious” and as not involving “a serious issue to be tried”. They also refer to incidents involving trespassing on the property, drilling holes in ice and taking aerial photos of the property and sharing them. They further submit that the information being sought has no relevance to the facts and matters that remain at issue in those proceedings, and would be inadmissible.

[38] It is my view that the appellant’s statements related to “a larger campaign of harassment” are insufficient to conclude that the request is an abuse of process. Their representations fail to demonstrate that the request is part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access. I am also not satisfied that the requester is making the request for a purpose other than to obtain access to the requested records or that submitting this access request constitutes bad faith on the requester’s part such that the request ought to be deemed an abuse of process.

[39] Accordingly, I dismiss this aspect of the appellant’s appeal.

Issue B: What is the scope of the request for records? Which records are responsive to the request?

[40] Section 24 of the Act imposes certain obligations on requesters and institutions when submitting and responding to requests for access to records. This section states, in part:

(1) A person seeking access to a record shall,

(a) make a request in writing to the institution that the person believes has custody or control of the record;

(b) provide sufficient detail to enable an experienced employee of the institution, upon a reasonable effort, to identify the record;

. . .

(2) If the request does not sufficiently describe the record sought, the institution shall inform the applicant of the defect and shall offer assistance in reformulating the request so as to comply with subsection (1).

[41] To be considered responsive to the request, records must “reasonably relate” to the request.[20] Institutions should interpret requests generously, in order to best serve the purpose and spirit of the Act. Generally, if a request is unclear, the institution should interpret it broadly rather than restrictively.[21]

Representations

[42] The appellant submits that the information in the record goes beyond the scope of the request because, while the request is for internal communications between ministry staff regarding the work permit, the record includes communications involving parties other than ministry staff, namely, the appellant and the property owners.

[43] It is the ministry’s position that the record is responsive to the request. Before processing the request, the ministry explains that its analyst contacted the requester to seek clarification and understand the scope of the request and the requester confirmed the accuracy of revised wording.

Analysis and findings

[44] Based on the circumstances of this appeal and my review of the record, I find that the record is within the scope of the request, as stated by the ministry.

[45] Having reviewed the correspondence between the ministry and the requester at the request stage, I find that the scope of the request is for communication between the ENDM and the MNRF regarding the work permit. As noted above, these ministries were separate at the time of the request but the majority of the portfolios in these ministries were subsequently amalgamated into the ministry.

[46] Based on this scope, I also find that the record is within the scope of the request. The record is an email chain between staff for ENDM and MNRF, which starts with an email exchange between ENDM staff and the appellant and the property owners, where the emails’ subject matter is the work permit.

[47] As noted above, the request at issue in this appeal is one of eight requests made to the ministry for communications between various combinations of individuals/ministry staff all related to the work permit. Presumably, the request could have been treated as a single request for all communications related to the work permit; however, for various reasons, the requests were maintained as eight separate yet related requests. As a result, the ministry identified records as responsive for each request, where some records could have been responsive to more than one request based on the sender and recipient of the various emails in the email chains. In addition, the individual emails also provide context to understand the email chains as a whole.

[48] I therefore considered whether individual emails in the email chain would be responsive to any of the other requests made by the requester to the ministry.[22] Based on my review of the record, I determine that there are two emails in the email chain that are directly responsive to the request, while the other two emails in the email chain would be responsive to other related requests made by the requester to the ministry.

[49] Given the context of this request, as well as the requester’s other related requests to the ministry, I find that the record reasonably relates to the request based on a liberal interpretation. As a result, I find that the record is responsive to the request.

[50] Below, I consider whether the record is exempt under the third party information exemption.

Issue C: Does the mandatory exemption at section 17(1) for third party information apply to the record?

[51] Although the appellant did not provide me with representations on the application of the third party information exemption to the record, I nevertheless consider its application to the record given that section 17(1) is a mandatory exemption.

[52] The purpose of section 17(1) is to protect certain confidential information that businesses or other organizations provide to government institutions,[23] where specific harms can reasonably be expected to result from its disclosure.[24]

[53] Section 17(1) states:

A head shall refuse to disclose a record that reveals a trade secret or scientific, technical, commercial, financial or labour relations information, supplied in confidence implicitly or explicitly, if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to,

(a) prejudice significantly the competitive position or interfere significantly with the contractual or other negotiations of a person, group of persons, or organization;

(b) result in similar information no longer being supplied to the institution where it is in the public interest that similar information continue to be so supplied;

(c) result in undue loss or gain to any person, group, committee or financial institution or agency; or

(d) reveal information supplied to or the report of a conciliation officer, mediator, labour relations officer or other person appointed to resolve a labour relations dispute.

[54] For section 17(1) to apply, the party arguing against disclosure must satisfy each part of the following three-part test:

1. the record must reveal information that is a trade secret or scientific, technical, commercial, financial or labour relations information;
2. the information must have been supplied to the institution in confidence, either implicitly or explicitly; and
3. the prospect of disclosure of the record must give rise to a reasonable expectation that one of the harms specified in paragraph (a), (b), (c) and/or (d) of section 17(1) will occur.

Representations

[55] The ministry notes that the appellant did not explain why it claimed that the third party information exemption ought to apply to the record at the request stage and during mediation. It also notes that, during my inquiry, they did not provide any analysis or evidence to support this claim, nor have they otherwise answered the questions posed by me in the Notice of Inquiry. It further notes that the burden of proving this claim is with the appellant, who are required, inter alia, to provide “detailed” evidence that disclosure of the record could reasonably be expected to result in probable harm of the types set out in section 17(1).

Analysis and findings

[56] I agree with the ministry. I have considered the application of the mandatory third party information and, based on the record and the circumstances of this appeal, I find that the mandatory third party information does not apply to the record. Assuming that part one of the test is met, I turn my attention to part two of the test.

Part two of the section 17(1) test: supplied in confidence

Supplied

[57] The requirement that the information have been “supplied” to the institution reflects the purpose in section 17(1) of protecting the informational assets of third parties.[25] Information may qualify as “supplied” if it was directly supplied to an institution by a third party, or where its disclosure would reveal or permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to information supplied by a third party.[26]

In confidence

[58] The party arguing against disclosure must show that both the individual supplying the information and the recipient expected the information to be treated confidentially, and that their expectation is reasonable in the circumstances. This expectation must have an objective basis.[27]

[59] Relevant considerations in deciding whether an expectation of confidentiality is based on reasonable and objective grounds include whether the information:

• was communicated to the institution on the basis that it was confidential and that it was to be kept confidential,
• was treated consistently by the third party in a manner that indicates a concern for confidentiality,
• was not otherwise disclosed or available from sources to which the public has access, and
• was prepared for a purpose that would not entail disclosure.[28]

[60] In their representations on the issue of “personal information”, the appellant submits that their emails were communicated to the ministry with the implicit or explicit expectation of privacy and were in the nature of confidential communications. I have considered this argument in my analysis for part two of the section 17(1) test.

[61] In contrast, the ministry submits that there is no evidence to demonstrate that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of confidence when providing the information in the record to the ministry. It submits that there is no indication that the ministry gave the appellant any explicit assurance of confidentiality, nor is there any indication that they requested such assurance. It also submits that there is no implicit assurance of confidentiality. It explains that the record was created in the context of an application subject to the ministry’s regulatory authority, which is not a process which an applicant typically would expect confidentiality.[29]

[62] Based on my review of the record and the circumstances of this appeal, I find that the appellant did not supply the information in the record to the ministry in confidence for the purposes of part two of the test under section 17(1). I agree with the ministry and adopt the reasoning in Order PO-4242. The record at issue in this appeal consists of communications related to the processing of the work permit subject to the ministry’s authority, which is a process in which an applicant ordinarily would not expect confidentiality. The appellant, on behalf of the property owners, provided the information to the ministry in order to obtain the work permit and there is no evidence before me that the appellant sought or received assurances of confidentiality from the ministry.

[63] It is my view that the appellant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of confidentiality at the time the information was provided to the ministry, even if I accept that the appellant had a subjective expectation of confidentiality, and I find that the information was not supplied to the ministry in confidence. Accordingly, based on my review of the record and the circumstances of this appeal, part two of the section 17(1) test is not met.

[64] All parts of the three-part test must be met for the mandatory exemption at section 17(1) to apply. Since the appellant has not established part two of the test, I find that the record is not exempt under section 17(1). It is not necessary for me to consider the application of part three of the three-part test to the record. Below, I consider whether the record contains personal information and if so, whether any additional personal information in the record (not already identified and redacted by the ministry) can be withheld under the Act’s personal privacy exemptions.

Issue D: Does the record contain “personal information” as defined in section 2(1) and, if so, whose personal information is it?

[65] In order to decide which sections of the Act may apply to a specific case, the IPC must first decide whether records contain “personal information,” and if so, to whom the personal information relates.

[66] Section 2(1) of the Act defines “personal information” as “recorded information about an identifiable individual.” “Recorded information” is information recorded in any format, such as paper records, electronic records, digital photographs, videos, or maps.[30] Information is “about” the individual when it refers to them in their personal capacity, which means that it reveals something of a personal nature about the individual.

[67] Generally, information about an individual in their professional, official or business capacity is not considered to be “about” the individual.[31] Sections 2(3) and 2(4) state:

(3) Personal information does not include the name, title, contact information or designation of an individual that identifies the individual in a business, professional or official capacity.

(4) For greater certainty, subsection (3) applies even if an individual carries out business, professional or official responsibilities from their dwelling and the contact information for the individual relates to that dwelling.

[68] In some situations, even if information relates to an individual in a professional, official or business capacity, it may still be “personal information” if it reveals something of a personal nature about the individual.[32]

[69] Information is about an “identifiable individual” if it is reasonable to expect that an individual can be identified from the information either by itself or if combined with other information.[33]

[70] Section 2(1) of the Act gives a list of examples of personal information:

“personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including,

(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual,

(b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,

(c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,

(d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,

(e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except if they relate to another individual,

(f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence,

(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and

(h) the individual’s name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual.

[71] The list of examples of personal information under section 2(1) is not a complete list. This means that other kinds of information could also be “personal information.”[34]

[72] It is important to know whose personal information is in the records. If the records contain the requester’s own personal information, their access rights are greater than if it does not.[35] Also, if the records contain the personal information of other individuals, one of the personal privacy exemptions might apply.[36]

Representations

[73] The appellant submits that because their emails were communicated to the ministry with the implicit or explicit expectation of privacy and were in the nature of confidential communications, the record falls under the ambit of “personal information” as defined at paragraph (f) of section 2(1) of the Act and should not be disclosed. They also appear to submit that the record ought to be redacted in full because they contain the appellant’s personal opinion and views under paragraph (e) of the definition of “personal information” at section 2(1) of the Act.

[74] The ministry submits that the appellant’s name and email address are used in their business capacity as performing a service for the property owners, and that the information does not reveal anything of a personal nature because it consists of only the name and email address, which they use for business purposes.

[75] With respect to the names and email addresses of the property owners, the ministry submits that this information appears in a personal capacity. With respect to information about the employees of the ministry, the ministry submits that this is information in their professional capacity.

Analysis and findings

[76] Based on my review of the record and the representations of the parties, I find that the record does not contain the personal information of the requester. I also find that the information, including the name, email address and opinions of ministry staff and the appellant, would not qualify as “personal information” pursuant to the definition of that term in section 2(1), in light of section 2(2) of the Act. One exception to this in the record is reference to the personal plans of a ministry staff, which I find falls with the definition of “personal information” in section 2(1) of the Act. Despite this information being in a professional capacity, I find that it still reveals something of a personal nature about the individual.[37]

[77] The appellant submits that the record ought to be redacted in full because it contains their personal opinions and views. I do not agree that their statements in the record qualifies as “personal opinions and views”; in the record, they request an update on the work permit from the ministry, which is expressed in their professional capacity that does not reveal anything of a personal nature about them. In addition, their statements are not of a private or confidential nature, contemplated by paragraph (f) of the definition of “personal information”, given that the record was created in the context of processing an application for a work permit under the ministry’s authority, in which an applicant would not ordinarily expect confidentiality.[38] Accordingly, I find that the appellant’s statements in the record do not qualify as “personal information”.

[78] The ministry has decided to redact the “personal information” in the record, including the personal plans of a ministry staff mentioned above, and the requester has not appealed the ministry’s decision in this regard. As the remaining information is not personal information, it follows that such information does not qualify for exemption under the mandatory personal privacy exemption at section 21(1).[39] I am satisfied that disclosure of the remaining portions of the record would not contain personal information and that the ministry has reasonably severed personal information from the portions of the record to be disclosed to the requester, pursuant to section 10(2) of the Act.

[79] As a result, I dismiss the appellant’s appeal and uphold the ministry’s decision to disclose to the requester the redacted record.

ORDER:

1. I dismiss the appeal and uphold the ministry’s decision.
2. I order the ministry to disclose to the requester the record except for the information withheld pursuant to section 21(1), as per its decision, by June 13, 2023, but not before June 8, 2023.
3. In order to verify compliance with this order, I reserve the right to require the city to provide me with a copy of the record disclosed pursuant to provision 2.

Original signed by:		May 9, 2023
Valerie Silva
Adjudicator