Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada

Commissaire à l’information et à la protection de la vie privée, Ontario, Canada

ORDER MO-2931

Appeal MA12-40

Toronto Police Services Board

August 12, 2013

Summary: The requester sought access to transcripts or notes pertaining to a 911 emergency services phone call made by a named individual in relation to his encounter at his home with CBC’s This Hour Has 22 Minutes. The police identified an I/CAD Address History Report and an I/CAD Event Details Report as being responsive to the request for information in relation to a 911 phone call made by the named individual on the date of the encounter, and relying on the personal privacy exemption at section 14(1)  of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , denied access to these records. The police relied on section 14(5) of the Act to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any similarly responsive records for a period subsequent to the date of the encounter. The requester appealed the decision and further alleged that it was in the public interest that the requested information be disclosed. This order upholds the decision of the police.

Statutes Considered: Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56 , as amended, ss. 2(1), 2(2.1), 2(2.2), 14(1) (f), 14(3)(b), 16.

Orders Considered: M-969, MO-1994, MO-2699, MO-2923, MO-2928, P-613, PO-2225, PO-3025, PO-3093.

Cases Considered: John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767 (Div. Ct); Ontario Hydro v. Mitchinson, [1996] O.J. No. 4636 (Div. Ct.); R. v. R.L, [2007] O.J. No. 4095 (Sup. Crt.); Vancouver Police Department (Re), 2007 Canlii 9595 (BC IPC); Grant v. Torstar Corp. 2009 SCC 61.

BACKGROUND:

[1] The Toronto Police Services Board (the police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act or MFIPPA) for access to any transcripts or notes of the 911-phone call made by [a named individual] in relation to his encounter at his home with CBC’s This Hour Has 22 Minutes on October 24th, 2011. The requester asked that this information be provided for the time period from October 24th, 2011 to the present day (which, by virtue of the date when the request was made, the police considered to be November 7, 2011).

[2] The police identified an I/CAD Address History Report and an I/CAD Event Details Report as being responsive to the request for information in relation to a 911 phone call made by the named individual on October 24, 2011. After notifying an affected party and obtaining their position on disclosure, the police issued a decision letter. Relying on the mandatory personal privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Act  (invasion of privacy) the police denied access to the I/CAD Address History Report and the I/CAD Event Details Report.

[3] The police relied on section 14(5) of the Act  to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any similarly responsive records for the time period after October 24, 2011. The police set out their position in the decision letter as follows:

Beyond the publicly debated October 24, 2011 911 call, the existence of any transcripts or notes in relation to any additional dates i.e. October 25^th – November 7, 2011 (present day) cannot be confirmed or denied in accordance with subsection 14(5) of the Act .

[4] The requester (now the appellant) appealed the decision. The appellant indicated in the Appeal Form that it is in the public interest that this information be disclosed. Accordingly, the application of the public interest override at section 16 of the Act  was added as an issue in the appeal.

[5] Mediation did not resolve the matter and it was moved to the adjudication stage of the appeal process where an adjudicator conducts an inquiry under the Act .

[6] I commenced the inquiry by sending a Notice of Inquiry setting out the facts and issues in the appeal to the police and a party whose interests may be affected by disclosure of the record (the affected party). Both the police and the affected party provided responding representations. I then sent a Notice of Inquiry as well as the non-confidential representations of the police and the affected party to the appellant. The appellant provided responding representations. I determined that the appellant’s representations raised issues to which the police and the affected party should be given an opportunity to reply. Both the police and the affected party provided reply representations.

PRELIMINARY MATTER

[7] I note that the requester has made three separate requests for information relating to the encounter on October 24, 2011.¹ In addition, the requester made three other, related requests, which are not related to a specific incident and are broader in scope.² The police identified records responsive to the requests for information relating to the encounter on October 24, 2011, but consistently refused to confirm or deny the existence of any additional records in relation to 911 calls made on other dates. In Order MO-2928, I upheld the decision by the police to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records in those three appeals.

[8] As set out above, in this appeal the police identified I/CAD records responsive to the request for information in relation to the 911 call made by the named individual on October 24, 2011, and denied access to them under section 14(1). As set out above, with respect to the portion of the request that relates to other responsive records, the police decision letter states:

Beyond the publicly debated October 24, 2011 911 call, the existence of any transcripts or notes in relation to any additional dates i.e. October 25th - November 7, 2011 (present day) cannot be confirmed or denied in accordance with subsection 14(5) of the Act .

[9] The decision of the police in this appeal to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any transcripts or notes in relation to any additional dates (October 25 to November 7, 2011) is virtually identical to the decision of the police in Appeal MA12-42³ to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of all documents in relation to any 911 phone calls made by the named individual for that same overlapping time period.

[10] In Order MO-2928, I upheld the decision of the police to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of additional records relating to 911 phone calls. In the circumstances, I find that same considerations apply to the portion of the request at issue in this appeal that relates to other responsive records. Accordingly, for the reasons set out in Order MO-2928, I uphold the decision by the police in this appeal to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of additional records under section 14(5). I will not address this issue further in this order.

[11] I now turn to consider the records the police identified as responsive to the request at issue in this appeal.

ISSUES:

1. A. Do the records contain personal information?
2. B. Would disclosing the information in the records constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy pursuant to section 14(1) of the Act ?
3. C. Is there a compelling public interest in disclosure of the I/CAD Reports that outweighs the purpose of section 14(1)?

RECORDS:

[12] The records at issue in this appeal are an I/CAD Address History Report and an I/CAD Event Details Report.

DISCUSSION:

A. Do the records contain personal information?

[13] The police rely on the mandatory exemption in section 14(1) of the Act  to withhold the records at issue. Before I can determine whether the personal privacy exemption may apply to the records it is necessary to determine whether the records contain personal information and, if so, to whom it relates. That term is defined in section 2(1) as follows:

personal information means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including,

(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual,

(b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,

(c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,

(d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,

(e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they relate to another individual,

(f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence,

(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and

(h) the individual’s name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual;

[14] The list of examples of personal information under section 2(1) is not exhaustive. Therefore information that does not fall under paragraph (a) to (h) may still qualify as personal information.⁴

[15] To qualify as personal information, it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information is disclosed.⁵

[16] Sections 2(2.1) and 2(2.2) of the Act  also relate to the definition of personal information. These sections state:

(2.1) Personal information does not include the name, title, contact information or designation of an individual that identifies the individual in a business, professional or official capacity.

(2.2) For greater certainty, subsection (2.1) applies even if an individual carries out business, professional or official responsibilities from their dwelling and the contact information for the individual relates to that dwelling.

[17] In addition, previous IPC orders have found that to qualify as personal information, the information must be about the individual in a personal capacity. As a general rule, information associated with an individual in a professional, official or business capacity will not be considered to be about the individual.⁶

[18] However, previous orders have also found that even if information relates to an individual in a professional, official or business capacity, it may still qualify as personal information if the information reveals something of a personal nature about the individual.⁷

[19] The police submit that the named individual was in the company of his family at his personal residence when he was approached by a television crew. The police submit that after many attempts to have these individuals removed, [the named individual] contacted 911. The police submit that the initial 911 call was made on the named individual’s personal telephone while standing on his property and the content of the call was personal in nature. The police submit that at no time was the named individual acting in an official or governmental capacity and he made the call while attempting to leave his property with another individual. The police submit that the records contain information that falls within the scope of the definition of personal information in section 2(1) of the Act and furthermore, it would be reasonable to expect that the named individual would be identified if the information is disclosed.

[20] The affected party submits that information provided by the named individual is personal information because it includes this individual’s account of his involvement in the incident. Furthermore, finding the information in the records to qualify as personal information is consistent with prior Canadian court decisions, including R. v. R.L.⁸ where the court determined that the existence or contents of police reports fell within the definition of personal information. The affected party further submits that sections 2(2.1) and 2(2.2) do not apply, but even if I find that the information relates to the named individual in a professional, official or business capacity, in all the circumstances, the information would still qualify as that individual’s personal information.

[21] The appellant’s representations do not specifically address this issue, but focus instead on how disclosure of the information would be in the public interest.

[22] In Order PO-2225, former Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson, set out the following two-step process applicable to a determination of whether information is about an individual in a business, professional or official rather than a personal capacity, and therefore does not constitute personal information:

…the first question to ask in a case such as this is: in what context [does the information] of the individuals appear? Is it a context that is inherently personal, or is it one such as a business, professional or official government context that is removed from the personal sphere?

…

The analysis does not end here. I must go on to ask: is there something about the particular information at issue that, if disclosed, would reveal something of a personal nature about the individual? Even if the information appears in a business context, would its disclosure reveal something that is inherently personal in nature? [emphasis in original]

[23] In my view, while the contact with the police may have been made by an individual who occupied an official role at the time, the information in the identified responsive records appears in a personal context, namely that of the named individual using the 911 emergency service to contact the police. Furthermore, the encounter at issue took place at his personal residence, not at a venue where he regularly conducts official business. There is no evidence before me that the individuals were invited to his place of residence or that he anticipated their presence.

[24] Even if it were arguable that the information is about the individual in his official capacity, I find that disclosure of this information, essentially being the written recording of the contact with the 911 emergency service and related information, would reveal something of a personal nature about the named individual and that it qualifies, therefore, as his personal information within the meaning of that term in section 2(1) of the Act .⁹ It is the substance of the information and what would be revealed by disclosing the information that is germane. In that regard, this office has found that even if made while the individual is in a professional or official capacity, revealing the content of a 911 emergency service call could reveal something of a personal nature about the individual who made the call.¹⁰

[25] The records do not contain any personal information of the appellant.

B. Would disclosing the information in the records constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy pursuant to section 14(1) of the Act?

[26] Where the appellant seeks the personal information of another individual, section 14(1) of the Act  prohibits an institution from disclosing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 14(1) applies. In this appeal, the only available exception is 14(1)(f), which states:

A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,

if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. [Emphasis added]

[27] Sections 14(2), (3) and (4) help in determining whether disclosure would or would not be an unjustified invasion of privacy under section 14(1)(f). Section 14(2) provides some criteria for the police to consider in making this determination; section 14(3) lists the types of information the disclosure of which is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy; and section 14(4) refers to certain types of information the disclosure of which does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Divisional Court has stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established under section 14(3), it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in section 14(2).¹¹

[28] The police provide representations in support of the application of the presumption at section 14(3)(b) of the Act , which reads:

A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy if the personal information,

was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation

[29] Even if no criminal proceedings were commenced against any individuals, section 14(3)(b) may still apply. The presumption only requires that there be an investigation into a possible violation of law.¹² The presumption can also apply to records created as part of a law enforcement investigation where charges are subsequently withdrawn.¹³

[30] The police submit that the 911 call was a call like any other [to the police], a citizen requesting the assistance of police to remove unwanted [individuals]. The police submit that, as such, the record was generated for police to investigate the unknown trouble.

[31] The affected party submits that this office has found that the section 14(3)(b) presumption applies to police documents and transcripts of 911 calls generated as a result of an investigation into a possible trespass on private property.¹⁴

[32] The appellant disputes the application of section 14(3)(b) and submits that if it did apply, citing section 16 of the Act , it would be in the public interest that the information be disclosed.

[33] I have reviewed the records and it is clear from the circumstances that the personal information which they contain was compiled and is identifiable as part of the police’s investigation into a possible violation of law, namely the Criminal Code of Canada .

[34] Accordingly, I find that the personal information in the records was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, and falls within the presumption in section 14(3)(b).

[35] As a result, I find that disclosure of the personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy and is, therefore, exempt under section 14(1) of the Act .

C. Is there a compelling public interest in disclosure of the I/CAD Reports that outweighs the purpose of section 14(1)?

[36] The appellant takes the position that there is a compelling public interest in disclosure of the I/CAD Reports that outweighs the purpose of sections 14(1) and 14(5) of the Act .

[37] Section 16 states:

An exemption from disclosure of a record under sections 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 does not apply if a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the exemption.

[38] For section 16 to apply two requirements must be met. First, there must be a compelling public interest in disclosure of the records. Second, this interest must clearly outweigh the purpose of the exemption.

[39] In considering whether there is a public interest in disclosure of a record, the first question to ask is whether there is a relationship between the record and the Act ’s central purpose of shedding light on the operations of government.¹⁵ In order to find a compelling public interest in disclosure, the information in the record must serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the activities of their government, adding in some way to the information the public has to make effective use of the means of expressing public opinion or to make political choices.¹⁶

[40] A public interest is not automatically established where the requester is a member of the media.¹⁷

[41] A public interest does not exist where the interests being advanced are essentially private in nature.¹⁸ However, where a private interest in disclosure raises issues of a more general application, a public interest may be found to exist.¹⁹

[42] The word compelling has been defined in previous orders as rousing strong interest or attention.²⁰

[43] Any public interest in non-disclosure that may exist also must be considered.²¹ A public interest in the non-disclosure of the record may bring the public interest in disclosure below the threshold of compelling.²²

[44] In their initial representations, the police submit that there is no compelling public interest in disclosure. The police state that the appellant’s request is the only one the police received for this information. They submit that no other media source or member of the public made any attempt to obtain this information.

[45] The police submit that the disclosure of a 911 call to remove unwanted individuals from the named individual’s residence would not make the named individual more accountable to the public or serve the purpose of informing or enlightening the citizenry about the activities of their government or agencies. The police submit that the withheld information has:

… no bearing on the position held by the [named individual]. It is completely a personal matter. The already intense exposure/attention the situation has received surely has satisfied the Toronto community which is substantiated by the fact that no one has requested these records aside from the appellant.

[46] The police further submit that:

… in pursuit of access to the audio and written 911 call, the scale has been tipped overly when it comes to these records, and that the privacy interests of the [named individual] must therefore prevail.

[47] In the affected party’s non-confidential representations, the affected party submits that there is no compelling public interest in the disclosure of the information for several reasons, including:

• • although there has been public curiosity about the incident, there has already been sufficient disclosure to satisfy the public.²³ The affected party states that two public statements as well as an independent review and confirmation of one of the public statements sufficiently address any public concerns and any legitimate public interest.
• • there has also been wide public coverage of the incident, such that disclosure of the record will not shed any further light on the matter.²⁴
• • the interests advanced are essentially private in nature.

[48] The affected party also submits that any public interest that may exist would not clearly outweigh the purpose of the section 14(1) exemption. Relying on my Order MO-1994, the affected party submits that the purpose of section 14 is to ensure that the personal privacy of individuals is maintained except where infringements of this interest are justified. The affected party submits that in Order P-613 this office found that there did not exist a compelling interest in the disclosure of information compiled and identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law.

[49] The affected party further submits that there is a compelling public interest in the non-disclosure of the content of 911 calls. The affected party submits that previous orders of this office have discussed the importance of maintaining the confidential nature of 911 calls.²⁵ The affected party further submits that the importance of maintaining public confidence in the 911 system was also addressed in one of the public statements about the 911 calls. The affected party submits that:

… [if] members of the public become concerned that the sensitive information they supply to emergency operators might be released, they may be less inclined to dial 911. Protecting this information is an important public safety issue …

[50] The appellant submits that there has been a high level of public interest in regards to numerous reported 911 calls by the named individual and that there has been wide public discussion for the release of audiotapes of the [named individual’s] 911 calls in relation to his encounter at his home with CBC’s This Hour Has 22 Minutes. The appellant further submits that reaction to media reports has been extensive, with one CBC.ca article generating over 500 reader comments. The appellant submits:

Moreover, stating that I am the sole requestor is immaterial in this matter for a number of reasons. First, as a member of the media I am a representative of the public and act in the public’s interest. Second, the number of requests on a topic is not determinative as to whether or not the matter is in the public interest. Just because there are not a plethora of requests doesn’t mean what is being requested is not a significant matter to the public – the subject matter is the driving factor, not the quantity of requests.

[51] The appellant submits that there has been wide debate as to the events that surround 911-phone calls involving [the named individual]:

This debate has remained unresolved, as there has not been enough information accessible to the public to settle these issues one way or another. Release of all relevant records and audio would enable the public to assess factual, documented information about the events, as opposed to conflicting reports in the media.

The Toronto Star has highlighted this issue, as well as the importance of why the information needs to be made public. In regards to the This Hour Has 22 Minutes encounter with [the named individual], on October 27th, 2011 the Star wrote the following: The CBC also reported that after the alleged tirade, [the named individual’s] call was made a priority ahead of other calls. [The named individual] released a statement Thursday afternoon, denying the allegations. After being attacked in my driveway, I hope I can be excused for saying the F-word, reads the statement. I never called anyone any names, I apologize for expressing my frustration inappropriately.

Toronto City Council also feels the need to address the issue head on is of significant public interest. Quoted in the aforementioned Toronto Star article, Councilor Joe Mihevc thinks the tapes should be released it’s absolutely important for the tapes to be released to clear the air adding Torontonians should know how their elected officials treat city staff. "If the tapes are not released, the absence of them basically verifies CBC’s version of events. If it turns out he behaved in the way CBC says he did, an apology is in order and people can question the appropriateness of his actions and his ability to serve [in his official capacity].

Aside from conflicting versions of what was said in the phone call and how [the named individual] did or did not treat city staff, there are also some unanswered questions about what took place at [the named individual’s] home. From the same Toronto Star article [The named individual] said the CBC comedy troupe crossed the line by ambushing him in the presence of his [relation], whom he said ran back into the house crying. [Another individual] told the Star [the named individual’s] [relation] wasn’t there when she showed up in his driveway. This shows a clear dispute in relation to the encounter at [the named individual’s] home and the subsequent 911-phone calls. Releasing relevant records and audio could help clear up the dispute.

It is also worth noting that [the named individual] has spoken publicly about his involvement in regards to 911 phone calls. This fact itself puts the matter in the public domain and creates a certain level of compelling public interest. Additionally in discussing these matters, [the named individual] has given statements that present a different account of events than what has been reported by media outlets. It is not conducive to clarifying a dispute of events to make a statement and then withhold the documents that can resolve any variance of opinions surrounding the event. Releasing the relevant records can help show which account of events is more accurate.

[52] The appellant further submits that disclosure of the information would shed light on the operations of government, stating:

Such information would inform the public as to whether or not our elected officials are abusive towards city employees or if preferential treatment is being given to city officials, as has been alleged. While I pass no judgment as to whether or not the alleged abuse of 911 dispatchers and demands for preferential treatment occurred, relevant records and audio recordings would give insight into the question of whether or not the [named individual’s official title] is demanding and receiving special treatment from the Toronto Police Service due to his status as [his official title]. Records pertaining to the matter would enlighten Torontonians with regards to the activities of their municipal governments and police service and help answer the unanswered questions.

[53] In reply, the police submit that the appellant’s submissions do not meet the threshold set out in section 16 of the Act . The police submit that simple public interest or curiosity does not translate into a compelling public interest. The police reiterate that at the time the named individual was not acting in an official capacity. The police further submit it is not in the public interest to disclose any 911 call made by the named individual for personal reasons.

Analysis and Finding

[54] In my view, where the issue of public interest is raised, one must necessarily weigh the costs and benefits of disclosure to the public. As part of this balancing, I must determine whether a compelling public interest exists which outweighs the purpose of the exemption.²⁶ An important consideration in this balance is the extent to which denying access to the information is consistent with the purpose of the exemption.²⁷

[55] The appellant provides a number of reasons why, in his view, it is in the public interest that the information be disclosed. These include:

• • conflicting media reports;
• • a perceived divergence between the official statements and media reports;
• • the importance of knowing how elected officials treat city staff and whether the treatment is abusive;
• • whether an apology is in order;
• • the public’s ability to question the appropriateness of the named individual’s actions and his ability to serve;
• • resolving unanswered questions about what took place at the named individual’s home;
• • the named individual creating a compelling public interest himself by publicly addressing the 911 call;
• • whether preferential treatment is given by the police to public officials; and
• • whether the named individual is demanding and receiving special treatment from the police as a result of his official status.

[56] Section 14 is a mandatory exemption whose fundamental purpose is to ensure that the personal privacy of individuals is maintained except where infringements on this interest are justified. It must be borne in mind that this is a request for information pertaining to another individual’s contact with the 911 emergency telephone service, and not that of a requester seeking his own information pertaining to 911 emergency service telephone calls that he made. This office has previously commented on the importance of maintaining the confidential nature of 911 calls.²⁸ Although the contact with the police through the 911 emergency telephone system was made by the named individual while he held an official title, in my view, disclosing the information in the records identified as responsive to the request would reveal things of a personal and private nature. Although it has been stated that a public figure has a lessened expectation of privacy, public figures are still entitled to privacy with respect to their personal matters.

[57] While written in the context of a defamation case, the following comments of a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Grant v. Torstar Corp, ²⁹ bear repeating:

… First, and most fundamentally, the public interest is not synonymous with what interests the public. The public’s appetite for information on a given subject — say, the private lives of well-known people — is not on its own sufficient to render an essentially private matter public for the purposes of defamation law. An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy must be respected in this determination. Conversely, the fact that much of the public would be less than riveted by a given subject matter does not remove the subject from the public interest. It is enough that some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on the subject.

[58] Public figures therefore do not lose their privacy rights when they enter the political sphere. That being said, there may nevertheless be times when the private activities of public officials may warrant public scrutiny. In my view, this supports a conclusion that when the private activities of public officials affect their official sphere this may give rise to a public interest. An example is when it is alleged that a public official has misused their office for personal advantage, such as is alleged in the appeal before me.

[59] Without at all suggesting or accepting whether the appellant’s assertions in this regard have any merit (and the appellant himself does not say they do, but only that access to the calls would help in assessing whether that might have been the case), there is a public interest in that aspect of the events. To that extent, the appellant has satisfied me that there would be a public interest in obtaining such information.

[60] However, I also find, as I did in Order MO-2923, that there is a significant public interest in non-disclosure, related to the importance of preserving the privacy of 911 calls. In my view, in the circumstances of this appeal, that public interest in non-disclosure is sufficient to bring the public interest in disclosure below the threshold of compelling.

[61] Accordingly, I find that there does not exist a compelling public interest in disclosure of the records, which outweighs the purpose of the personal privacy exemption in section 14(1).

[62] As a result, I find that section 16 does not apply.

ORDER:

I uphold the decision of the police.

Original signed by: Steven Faughnan Adjudicator

August 12, 2013

---

¹ In addition to this appeal, see Orders MO-2923 and MO-2924-I, which also relate to requests for records concerning this encounter.

² See Order MO-2928.

³ Which was addressed in Order MO-2928.

⁴ Order 11.

⁵ Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.).

⁶ Orders P-257, P-427, P-1412, P-1621, R-980015 and PO-2225.

⁷ Orders P-1409, R-980015, PO-2225 and MO-2344.

⁸ [2007] O.J. No. 4095 (Sup. Crt.).

⁹ See in this regard Order M-969.

¹⁰ See Order PO-3093.

¹¹John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767 (Div. Ct).

¹² Orders P-242 and MO-2235.

¹³ Orders MO-2213, PO-1849 and PO-2608.

¹⁴ See Order MO-2446.

¹⁵ Order P-984 and PO-2607.

¹⁶ Order P-984 and PO-2556.

¹⁷ Orders M-773 and M-1074.

¹⁸ Orders P-12, P-347, and P-1439.

¹⁹ Order MO-1564.

²⁰ Order P-984.

²¹ Ontario Hydro v. Mitchinson, [1996] O.J. No. 4636 (Div. Ct.).

²² Orders PO-2072-F, PO-2098-R and PO-3197.

²³ In this regard the affected party relies on Orders P-532, PO-2626 and PO-2614.

²⁴ In this regard the affected party relies on Orders P-613 and PO-2626.

²⁵ The affected party refers in particular to Order MO-2699.

²⁶ Order PO-1705.

²⁷ Order P-1398.

²⁸ See Order MO-2699.

²⁹ 2009 SCC 61 at paragraph 102. See also Vancouver Police Department (Re), 2007 Canlii 9595 (BC IPC) and Order PO-3025.