Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
• Information relating to social assistance payments made to the third party appellant, which the requester must repay pursuant to an immigration sponsorship undertaking.
• 38(b) (invasion of privacy) found to apply, but City’s exercise of discretion to disclose the information upheld.
• City's exercise of discretion upheld.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
This appeal arises as a result of the decision by the City of Toronto (the City) to disclose a record to a requester under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The requester had asked the City for access to the total amount of money owed by him as a result of his sponsorship default. The City decided to disclose the requested information to the requester and notified the sponsored person (the third party appellant) of its decision to do so. The third party appellant appealed the City’s decision and as a result, this file (MA-040144-2) was opened.
The requester had sponsored the immigration of the third party appellant to Canada according to the terms of Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Sponsorship Agreement. Under the terms of that agreement, and as a result of his sponsorship default, the requester is obliged to repay any social assistance benefits paid to the third party appellant. The request, therefore, relates to the amount of money the requester owes as a result of the social assistance benefits the third party appellant received.
This file is the second appeal file opened by this office as a result of the third party appellant appealing a decision of the City to disclose a record to the requester, resulting from the same request. The first appeal (MA-040144-1) was resolved by Order MO-1906. Due to the nature of the issues in this appeal, I will review the history of this matter, and will also review other orders which address a similar issue (Orders MO-2126-I and MO-2136-F).
Background
Appeal MA-040144-1 (Order MO-1906)
In appeal MA-040144-1, a request was submitted to the City under the Act for access to the total amount of money owed by the requester as a result of his sponsorship default. The City decided to disclose the requested information to the requester and notified the third party appellant of its decision to do so.
The third party appellant objected to the disclosure of the information and appealed the City’s decision. Appeal file MA-040144-1 was opened, which concluded with the issuance of Order MO-1906. In Order MO-1906, I did not uphold the City’s decision to disclose the requested information to the requester.
However, in appeal MA-040144-1, the record at issue was described as follows:
… a list of the payments made by the City to the [third party appellant], and contains the [third party appellant’s] name, date of payment, benefit month, amount paid and type of payment.
In Order MO-1906, I found that the record at issue contained the personal information of the third party appellant, and did not contain the personal information of the requester. After reviewing the issues, I determined that disclosure of the record to the requester was presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of the privacy of the third party appellant and was, therefore, exempt from disclosure under section 14(1).
I also addressed the City’s position that the third party appellant had consented to the disclosure of her information to the requester for the purpose of section 14(1)(a) of the Act, as she would have signed an agreement to consent to the disclosure of the information to the sponsor/requester as a condition of her sponsorship. In MO-1906, I made the following finding when I addressed that issue:
In the circumstances of this appeal under the Act, based on the position taken by the [third party appellant] that she does not consent to the disclosure of her personal information, I find that the exception in section 14(1)(a) has no application.
Accordingly, I found that the information contained in the record qualified for exemption under section 14(1) of the Act, and I did not uphold the City's decision to grant access to the record.
Other orders addressing a similar issue - Orders MO-2126-I and 2136-F
In a subsequent appeal involving different parties (appeal MA-050117-1), issues similar to those in Order MO-1906 were addressed. That appeal also arose as a result of a request to the City by a sponsor for access to information relating to social assistance payments made to a sponsored person. In that case, based on Order MO-1906, the City denied access to the record. However, the record in that appeal was different from the one at issue in Order MO-1906, and is described in Order MO-2126-I as follows:
The record at issue in this appeal is a letter prepared by the City, which has been created in response to the … request. The letter (which has not been sent) is addressed to the [requester] and states:
I am replying to your request for access to the amount of Ontario Works Assistance that has been issued to [the named former spouse]. …
Please be advised that the total amount of General Welfare/Ontario Works Assistance to be reimbursed to the City of Toronto is [a specified dollar amount].
The letter then describes the manner in which the “reimbursement of social assistance by a defaulting sponsor” can be made.
After inviting representations from the parties and reviewing the issues, I found that the record described above contained both the personal information of the requester, as well as the personal information of the affected person.
I again found that the disclosure of the personal information of the affected person would be presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of her privacy. However, I also reviewed the City’s exercise of discretion in that appeal. The City had stated that, as a result of Order MO-1906, it could not disclose the record. I did not agree with the City, and stated:
As set out above, the City submitted that it had exercised its discretion not to disclose the record on the basis that it was constrained from doing so on the basis of the reasoning in Order MO-1906. However, as I set out above, Order MO-1906 can be distinguished from the circumstances of this appeal. I find that the circumstances in Order MO-1906 are different from those in the present appeal in the following two significant ways:
- the record at issue in MO-1906 was different than the record at issue in this appeal; and
- the discretionary exemption in section 38(b) was not an issue in MO-1906.
In light of these two significant differences, and given that the City has stated that it exercised its discretion not to disclose the record on the basis that it was constrained from doing so by Order MO-1906, I find that the City took into account an irrelevant factor in exercising its discretion not to disclose the record. This irrelevant factor is the City’s position that it is constrained from disclosing the record on the basis of Order MO-1906 when it is not, in fact, constrained from doing so. Although Order MO-1906 is a factor to consider in exercising its discretion, in my view, it does not prohibit the City from disclosing the record. By stating that it does, the City is taking into account an irrelevant factor, and I will order it to re-exercise its discretion without taking into account that irrelevant factor.
The City then re-exercised its discretion and chose to disclose the record to the requester. I upheld that decision in Order MO-2136-F.
The Current Appeal (MA-040144-2)
The above information is provided as background to the current appeal.