Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
• Records relating to possible transfer of duties from FOI office to the office of the Integrity Commissioner
• Scope of request – some unresponsive information to be severed
• Section 22(1)(b) (adequacy of decision letter) – no further action required
• Section 52(3)3 (labour relations and employment) – not upheld
• No exemptions claimed
• Responsive records ordered disclosed.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The requester submitted a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the City of Toronto (the City) seeking access to:
[a]ny records containing or discussing a proposal that the duties of the City’s Freedom of Information Office (officially known as the Corporate Access and Privacy Unit) be transferred to the Integrity Commissioner. This request covers records created from December 1, 2003, to the present.
The City issued a decision letter and denied the requester access in full to the responsive records on the basis that the Act did not apply to the records pursuant to section 52(3). The requester (now the appellant) appealed the decision of the City to this office.
During mediation, the City advised this office that it was not prepared to participate in mediation because the records that were responsive to this request were the subject of another access request in a related file (MA-050193-1) that had already been through the mediation process. As a result, no further mediation was possible and the file was moved to the adjudication stage, in which an adjudicator conducts an inquiry under the Act.
This order is being issued concurrently with the order in appeal MA-050193-1 (Order MO-2227) which deals, in part, with the same records and related issues.
This office began the inquiry by issuing a Notice of Inquiry to the City and the City’s Integrity Commissioner. The Notice of Inquiry sent to the City invited it to respond to all identified issues, including the application of section 52(3). As the decision letter of the City did not identify any exemptions as an alternative to section 52(3), the Notice of Inquiry specifically invited the City to comment on the possible application of the discretionary exemption found in section 7 (advice to government) and to identify any other exemptions in the Act that might apply to the records in the event that section 52(3) were found not to apply. The Notice of Inquiry sent to the Integrity Commissioner invited him to respond to the issue of the application of section 52(3) to the responsive records.
In representations filed in response to the first notice, the City stated that:
The City did not make any representations on the application of any exemptions, discretionary or otherwise, in [MA-050193-1] and have not done so in the current appeal.
The City believes that the outcome of the previous appeal will have a bearing on the current one. Should the IPC find that section 52(3)3 does not apply in either of these appeals, the City would be pleased to provide representations on the possible application of exemptions under the Act.
The Integrity Commissioner did not provide representations in response to this notice. This office then contacted the Integrity Commissioner to determine what his intentions were with respect to providing representations. The Integrity Commissioner advised that he did not intend to make representations in this appeal. He added that he wished to adopt the comments that he made in correspondence to this office in Appeal MA-050193-1 for the purposes of this appeal.
This office then issued a Notice of Inquiry to the appellant, provided him with a severed copy of the City’s representations and invited him to make representations on the application of section 52(3)3 to the records. The appellant filed representations that addressed section 52(3)3 and raised a number of other issues.
After receiving the appellant’s representations, this office forwarded them to the City and invited it to provide reply representations. This office also repeated the invitation to the City to make representations on the applicability of section 7 or any other exemptions under the Act upon which it intended to rely. Further, this office indicated that the decision in this case would include findings on the application of the exemptions without further notice to the City if the City failed to file representations in that regard at that time. In particular, this office stated:
Please consider this letter as a further invitation to make representations concerning the applicability of section 7 or any other exemptions under the Act that would apply to the records. Should you fail to make representations at this time and I find that the Act applies to the records I will proceed to consider the application of the other exemptions without further notice to you.
The City filed representations in reply. In the representations, the City stated:
If the IPC still requires the City to address alternative exemptions under the act, please advise accordingly and the City would be pleased to do so.
This office responded to the reply representations of the City and stated:
I note that despite two requests to date, the City has not provided representations on what exemptions it will rely on to deny access, should I not accept its position that the records are excluded from the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under section 52. Please consider this letter as your final invitation to make any such representations. Should you fail to make representations at this time and I find that the Act applies to the records, I will proceed to consider the application of the other exemptions without further notice to you.
The City responded to this letter by acknowledging receipt and advising that it would not be submitting further representations. No further explanation was offered by the City for its position.
Following the exchange of representations, this matter was re-assigned to me to complete the adjudication.
RECORDS:
The records comprise 32 pages in total, and consist of memoranda, handwritten notes and an e-mail. Duplicates of some of the records have been provided to this office. There are seven different documents that comprise the responsive records, which can be described as follows (using the page numbers assigned by the City):
1. Memorandum from Integrity Commissioner to Mayor – March 3, 2005 (pages 1-6)
2. Draft Report – November 1, 2004 (pages 7-11)
3. Memorandum from Mayor to Integrity Commissioner – November 12, 2004 (page 12; duplicate at page 27))
4. Discussion points for [Integrity Commissioner] re: Mayor’s memo of Nov. 12/04 (pages 13-17; duplicate at pages 23-27)
5. Notes from Discussion – undated (pages 18-20; duplicate at pages 28-30)
6. E-mail from Integrity Commissioner – January 5, 2005 (page 21)
7. Handwritten Notes - August 25, 2004 (pages 31-32).
I will refer to these records by number in the discussion that follows, and my findings also apply to the duplicate pages. All seven records were also at issue in Order MO-2227 and are identified as such in Appendix A to that decision. Regarding record 7, page 32 is a duplicate of page 31, but the version of this record addressed in Order MO-2227 consists of two different pages. In this order, I am addressing record 7 as consisting of the two pages identified in Order MO-2227 (referred to as pages 99-100 in Order MO-2227).
DISCUSSION:
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The appellant raised a number of preliminary issues in his representations that I will consider here.
Adequacy of Decision Letter
The appellant objects to the fact that the decision letter issued by the City in this appeal did not specify which paragraph within section 52(3) it relies on to exclude the records from the scope of the Act. The appellant states that he only became aware of the paragraph that the City relies on when he received the City’s representations at the adjudication stage of the appeal.
In representations filed in response, the City acknowledges that its initial decision did not identify which paragraph of section 52(3) it relies upon and stated that this omission was the result of inadvertence.
The obligation to issue a decision letter is established by section 19. The contents of a decision to deny access are set out in section 22(1)(b) of the Act:
Notice of refusal to give access to a record/ or part under section 19 shall set out,
(b) where there is such a record,
(i) the specific provision of this Act under which access is refused,
(ii) the reason the provision applies to the record,
(iii) the name and position of the person responsible for making the decision, and
(iv) that the person who made the request may appeal to the Commissioner for a review of the decision.
In Order M-913, former Adjudicator Anita Fineberg made the following comments regarding the purpose of including the required information in a decision letter. She stated:
In my view, the purpose of the inclusion of the above information in a notice of refusal is to put the requester in a position to make a reasonably informed decision on whether to seek a review of the head's decision (Orders 158, P-235 and P-324).
This position was adopted by Adjudicator Bernard Morrow in Order MO-1731. In that case, the appellant had essentially the same objection to the decision letter as the concern raised by the appellant in this appeal. In Order MO-1731, the City of London’s decision did not refer to the paragraph of section 52(3) that it relied upon to support its decision to withhold access to records. Adjudicator Morrow found that the decision did not comply with the requirements in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of section 22(1)(b). Nevertheless, Adjudicator Morrow stated:
[I] also see no useful purpose in requiring the City to provide a new decision letter to the appellant to address this inadequacy, or in providing any other remedy [Gravenhurst (Town) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [1994] O.J. No. 2782 (Div. Ct.); Brown v. Troia Investments Inc. (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 637 (Div. Ct.)]. The appellant has been given a full and fair opportunity to argue the issues in this appeal. I would urge the City to be mindful of its responsibilities under the Act, in this case to provide more detailed reasons for withholding information, in accordance with section 22(1)(b).
I adopt the approach taken by Adjudicators Fineberg and Morrow. Despite the fact that the decision letter did not comply with the requirements of section 22(1)(b) of the Act, the appellant has been given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the issues in this appeal by the exchange of representations. Further, there is no suggestion in the appellant’s representations that he has been prejudiced in any ongoing way by the inadequacy of the decision letter. In the circumstances, I find that no useful purpose would be served by any remedy that I might order to deal with this omission. Nevertheless, it would be a good practice for the City to identify the paragraph(s) it relies on when claiming section 52(3) in future cases.
Mediation
The appellant also objects to the failure of the City to participate in mediation in this appeal. The appellant states:
You will also be aware that the City has failed to cooperate in mediation and that its participation was cursory at best.
While the statute does not explicitly make mediation mandatory, I respectfully submit that an institution is required to participate in mediation in a sincere, meaningful and constructive manner.
Section 40 of MFIPPA provides that “The Commissioner may authorize a mediator to investigate the circumstances of any appeal and to try to effect a settlement of the matter under appeal.” You will note that the discretion belongs to the Commissioner, not to the parties. It is clear from section 40, and from the implicit optimism for settlement in section 41, that the Legislature sees mediation as a positive process that serves the public interest.
…
Clause 48(1)(d) provides that no person shall “wilfully obstruct the Commissioner in the performance of his or her functions under this Act.” I respectfully submit that to frustrate the mediation process, is a form of obstruction contemplated by section 48.
The City’s conduct has done more than to frustrate the mediation process. Its conduct is also disrespectful of my rights as a requester.
In response, the City stated that mediation was not successful in this appeal because mediation had already been attempted, and was not successful, in the related appeal (MA-050193-1) where the records at issue included the records that are at issue in this appeal. Appeal MA-050193-1 had already moved to the adjudication stage of the appeal process and the records in common in the two appeals were to be adjudicated upon. The City takes the position that it refused to participate in mediation in an attempt to be consistent in its treatment of the records in common in the two appeals. The City thought that this appeal should be moved to the adjudication stage of the appeal process in an attempt to have both appeals considered by this office at the same time. In the result, I note that the orders are, in fact, being issued concurrently in the two appeals.
While it is generally desirable to participate in mediation, it is not mandatory for parties to do so, and I find the City’s approach to the issue was reasonable in the circumstances of this case. In this regard, the decision to proceed with mediation is a discretionary decision of the Commissioner. Former Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson made the following comments about the mediation process in Order PO-2187:
As the language of [section 40] makes clear, mediation is entirely an optional step in the appeal process, which can be invoked by this office at its sole discretion. The Commissioner may authorize a mediator to investigate the circumstances of any appeal and to try to effect a settlement of the matter under appeal.
While the purpose of mediation is “to try to effect a settlement”, by definition mediation is a voluntary and open-ended means of dispute resolution. No particular process, form of investigation, consultation, or substantive outcome is mandated.
…
The Act does not mandate that the mediation stage of the inquiry take any particular form, involve any specified level of contact with the parties, be of a certain duration or necessarily enjoy a particular level of success. A mediator may engage in substantial investigation and negotiation efforts, or may determine based on very limited activity that further efforts would not prove fruitful. No party is entitled to insist on a specific level of mediation or to control when an appeal should proceed to adjudication. As the plain wording of section [41(1)] of the Act indicates, the jurisdiction and authority to proceed to conduct an inquiry in the circumstances provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) lies within the Commissioner’s discretion. [Emphasis added.]
In view of the fact that participation is not mandatory, and given the nature of mediation itself, that the Commissioner cannot insist on any particular level of participation or outcome, I am not satisfied that declining to participate could reasonably be construed as “willfully obstruct[ing] the Commissioner in the performance of his or her functions under this Act” as contemplated by section 48(1)(d). As well, the decision to proceed to the adjudication stage of the appeal process was made by this office at its discretion, and having regard for the circumstances of this appeal.
Scope of Request/Responsiveness of Records
The appellant raises two other preliminary issues that relate to the responsiveness of the records produced and the scope of the request. I will deal with both of the issues here. The appellant states that the City has included in the group of responsive records a number of records that are not responsive to his request. The appellant states that by including non-responsive records with responsive, the City has “mudd[ied] the waters concerning section 52.”
The City responded to this argument by stating that it adopted a “liberal interpretation of the request in order to best serve the purpose of the spirit of the Act” and that it provided this office with records that were “reasonably related to the request.”
The precise wording of the appellant’s request was as set out at the beginning of this order. For ease of reference, I will reproduce it here again. The appellant requested:
[a]ny records containing or discussing a proposal that the duties of the City’s Freedom of Information Office (officially known as the Corporate Access and Privacy Unit) be transferred to the Integrity Commissioner. This request covers records created from December 1, 2003, to the present.
In his appeal letter and representations, the appellant offers a number of interpretations of the scope of the request.
The appeal letter refers to a campaign promise by the Mayor, to the effect that “(a) there be an Integrity Commissioner and (b) that the Integrity Commissioner’s duties include responsibility for the [access to information] process.” The appellant goes on to state:
I seek documents related to the decision not to implement the policy in the manner it was proposed during the campaign.
In other words, I seek records that relate to that policy decision, taken by the City, about what would and would not be the responsibilities of … the Office of the Integrity Commissioner. Specifically, I am looking for records that reveal why the Commissioner was not given responsibility for [access to information].
In his representations, the appellant states:
The City’s representations claim that, “The records that are at issue relate to the possible role of the Integrity Commissioner with respect to the City’s access and privacy functions.” This bald and general statement is much broader than my request. I only asked about “a proposal that the duties of the City’s Freedom of Information Office (officially known as the Corporate Access and Privacy Unit) be transferred to the Integrity Commissioner.” Any other “possible role” for the Integrity Commissioner is not part of my request.
The issue of what criteria to apply in determining the issue of responsiveness was addressed in Order P-880. Adjudicator Anita Fineberg stated:
In my view, the need for an institution to determine which documents are relevant to a request is a fundamental first step in responding to the request. It is an integral part of any decision by a head. The request itself sets out the boundaries of relevancy and circumscribes the records which will ultimately be identified as being responsive to the request. I am of the view that, in the context of freedom of information legislation, "relevancy" must mean "responsiveness". That is, by asking whether information is "relevant" to a request, one is really asking whether it is "responsive" to a request. While it is admittedly difficult to provide a precise definition of "relevancy" or "responsiveness", I believe that the term describes anything that is reasonably related to the request.
In my view, an approach of this nature will in no way limit the scope of requests as counsel fears. In fact, I agree with his position that the purpose and spirit of freedom of information legislation is best served when government institutions adopt a liberal interpretation of a request. If an institution has any doubts about the interpretation to be given to a request, it has an obligation pursuant to section 24(2) of the Act to assist the requester in reformulating it. As stated in Order 38, an institution may in no way unilaterally limit the scope of its search for records. It must outline the limits of the search to the appellant.
I agree with and adopt these observations by Adjudicator Fineberg. I have reviewed all of the records that the City states are responsive to the request. Adopting a liberal interpretation of the request, I find that all of the records that have been provided to this office are responsive to the request. In fact, many of the records address the precise issue mentioned by the appellant in his appeal letter, i.e., they relate to why the Commissioner was not given responsibility for access to information. Some records also discuss a further role for the Integrity Commissioner in relation to access to information, and in that instance, I disagree with the appellant’s apparent view that this is non-responsive. In my opinion, based on a liberal reading of the request, it was appropriate for the City to view this as responsive. I am satisfied that the City’s approach here is entirely consistent with Order P-880.
There is one exception to this finding that the identified records are responsive. This relates to Record 6, which I find contains non-responsive portions that have nothing to do with the subject matter of the request. The non-responsive portions can be easily severed from the responsive portion and doing so does not in any way affect the meaning of the responsive portion. For clarity, I will highlight the non-responsive portions of this e-mail on a copy of the record that will be provided to the City with this order. The non-responsive portions of the e-mail should not be disclosed.
As I have found that all of the records that have been identified as responsive records by the City are responsive, with the exception of portions of Record 6, there is insufficient evidence before me to support the argument of the appellant that the City has attempted to “muddy the waters” or confuse the issues in this appeal by including non-responsive records.
LABOUR RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT RECORDS
I now turn to consider the claim by the City that section 52(3)3 applies and therefore the records are excluded from the Act. Section 52(3)3 states:
Subject to subsection (4), this Act does not apply to records collected, prepared, maintained or used by or on behalf of an institution in relation to any of the following:
3. Meetings, consultations, discussions or communications about labour relations or employment related matters in which the institution has an interest.
If section 52(3) applies to the records, and none of the exceptions found in section 52(4) applies, the records are excluded from the scope of the Act.
The term “in relation to” in section 52(3)3 means “for the purpose of, as a result of, or substantially connected to” [Order P-1223].
For section 52(3)3 to apply, the institution must establish that:
1. the records were collected, prepared, maintained or used by an institution or on its behalf;
2. this collection, preparation, maintenance or usage was in relation to meetings, consultations, discussions or communications; and
3. these meetings, consultations, discussions or communications are about labour relations or employment-related matters in which the institution has an interest.
The phrase “labour relations or employment-related matters” has been found to apply in the context of:
- a job competition [Orders M-830, PO-2123]
- an employee’s dismissal [Order MO-1654-I]
- a “voluntary exit program” [Order M-1074]
- a review of “workload and working relationships” [Order PO-2057]
- the work of an advisory committee regarding the relationship between the government and physicians represented under the Health Care Accessibility Act [Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2003] O.J. No. 4123 (C.A.)]
The phrase “labour relations or employment-related matters” has been found not to apply in the context of:
- an organizational or operational review [Orders M-941, P-1369]
- litigation in which the institution may be found vicariously liable for the actions of its employee [Orders PO-1722, PO-1905]
The phrase “in which the institution has an interest” means more than a “mere curiosity or concern”, and refers to matters involving the institution’s own workforce [Ontario (Solicitor General) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner) (2000), 55 O.R. (3d) 355 (C.A.), at para. 35].
If the records fall within any of the exceptions in section 52(4), the Act applies to them. Section 52(4) states:
This Act applies to the following records:
1. An agreement between an institution and a trade union.
2. An agreement between an institution and one or more employees which ends a proceeding before a court, tribunal or other entity relating to labour relations or to employment‑related matters.
3. An agreement between an institution and one or more employees resulting from negotiations about employment‑related matters between the institution and the employee or employees.
4. An expense account submitted by an employee of an institution to that institution for the purpose of seeking reimbursement for expenses incurred by the employee in his or her employment.
The City’s Representations
The City submits that the Integrity Commissioner is an employee of the City reporting directly to City Council. In its representations, it states that the responsive records that are at issue relate to “the possible role of the Integrity Commissioner with respect to the City’s access and privacy functions.” The City states:
The City collected, prepared, maintained or used the records at issue in relation to meetings, consultations, discussions or communications concerning the possible role and responsibilities of a City employee, i.e., the Integrity Commissioner, in particular with respect to the City’s access and privacy functions (currently handled by the City Clerk and her CAP staff).
Therefore, requirements 1 and 2 have been met.
The City also submits that requirement 3 under section 52(3)3 (outlined above) has been met since the meetings, consultations, discussion and communications are about whether the Integrity Commissioner’s employment roles and responsibilities should include specific functions relating to access and privacy. The City submits that these are all employment-related matters and that they are matters in which the City has an interest. The City explains its position as follows:
The City further submits that it has certain obligations/responsibilities as an employer with respect to all of its employees, including the determination of the appropriate assignments of job duties and responsibilities for which an employee is qualified to do within the City’s current organization…. Further, the City is obliged to consult and consider the views and input of the employee in making these determinations. Therefore, the City has an interest in all of the employment–related matters noted above.
Therefore, requirement 3 has been met.
Appellant’s Representations
The appellant states that he cannot comment on requirement 1 because he has not seen the records. The appellant comments as follows regarding requirement 2:
With respect to the second branch of the test, I cannot dispute that e-mails and memoranda are ipso facto communications. On the other hand, handwritten notes and draft reports do not necessarily relate to meetings, consultations, discussions or communications. I note that on this point the City provides no detail to back up its representations – see top of page 3 of the City’s representations. It asserts that the records were “collected, prepared, maintained or used … in relation to meetings, consultations, discussions or communications” but it does not support or justify that assertion.
As you know, the City bears the onus of proving that the records meet each branch of the subs. 52(3)3 test: Order P-55 Commissioner Linden. In my respectful submission, Toronto has not met the onus of demonstrating that the handwritten notes and the draft report relate to meetings, consultations, discussions or communications.
I note that this topic was never considered or discussed at a Council or committee meeting. It is therefore impossible for the City to argue that the records relate to such meetings.
With respect to part three of the test for the application of section 52(3)3, the appellant states:
… that provision was never intended to apply to the sort of records that I have requested.
I am not interested in [the Integrity Commissioner’s] employment contract or employment duties. I am only concerned with a policy decision about whether this new office would not be responsible for FOI. I seek documents related to the decision not to implement Mayor Miller’s policy in the manner he proposed it during the campaign.
Just because organizations contain employees does not mean that all organizational matters are employment-related. To use an example, employees staff the information desk at City Hall, but that does not mean that a campaign promise to change the hours or the services provided to the public at the information desk is employment related.
The appellant then cites Order M-941, in which a finding was made by this office that an organizational review of a department, incidentally involving the creation and elimination of certain positions, and primarily related to the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation, did not fall within section 52(3)3 of the Act on the basis that it was not about employment-related matters. The appellant submits that the records at issue in this appeal are not about employment but are about organizational and public policy issues. The appellant submits that to treat these records as employment-related is “both a mischaracterization of the records and a misinterpretation of [the Act].”
The appellant also cites former Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson’s decision in Order P-1223, which discusses the meaning of “in relation to” in section 65(6) of the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act , which is that statute’s equivalent of section 52(3). The former Assistant Commissioner stated that, in order for the collection, preparation, maintenance or usage of a record to qualify as being “in relation to” an activity listed in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the section, “the connection must be fairly substantial.” He went on to explain:
In the context of section 65(6), I am of the view that if the preparation (or collection, maintenance, or use) of a record was for the purpose of, as a result of, or substantially connected to an activity listed in sections 65(6)1, 2, or 3, it would be “in relation to” that activity.
The appellant states that any connection to employment in this appeal is tangential and attenuated and cannot be said to be “fairly substantial.”
The appellant also refers to Order MO-1711 of Adjudicator Donald Hale for an understanding of the distinction between records that are personal to particular employees and those related to organizational principles or practices. The appellant states:
The IPC should not accept the City’s contention that the meetings, consultations, discussions or communications for which the records were collected, prepared, maintained or used relate to ‘the employment of a person’ by the City.
Meetings, consultations, discussions or communications concerning, David Miller’s Government Ethics Policy do not relate to the employment of a person by the City.
While Mr. Miller’s Government Ethics Policy may touch on matters relating to the activities of certain City employees, in my view the issues under consideration relate primarily to addressing systemic problems within the City’s administration and not specifically to issues pertaining to the ‘employment of a person.’
City’s Reply Representations
Although the City was given the opportunity to file reply representations on all of the issues in the appeal, it did not make any further comments in its reply representations regarding the application of section 52(3)3 of the Act.
Analysis
Having carefully reviewed the records at issue and the representations of the parties, I find that section 52(3)3 does not apply in the circumstances of this appeal. I am satisfied that the records were collected, prepared, maintained and/or used by the City, meeting requirement 1. As well, given that the records consist of memoranda, e-mails, notes taken in discussions, and a draft description of an access and privacy role for the City’s Integrity Commissioner that was clearly intended for circulation, and all the records relate to consultations concerning the functions to be assigned to the City’s Integrity Commissioner, I am satisfied that the records were prepared, etc., in relation to consultations, discussions or communications, meeting requirement 2.
However, requirement 3 is not met. It is clear that the consultations, discussions or communications in this case were not about labour relations. I am also not satisfied that the consultations, discussions or communications in question were “about employment-related matters”. Rather, the consultations, discussions, and communications reflected in the records relate to organizational, management and public policy issues, and do not relate to the terms of employment of the Integrity Commissioner, nor to the City’s employment relationship with him. Because all three requirements must be met, the section does not apply and the records are not excluded from the scope of the Act. I will explain this conclusion in more detail, in relation to each record, below.
The distinction between records that are about employment-related matters and records that are about organizational issues has been considered in a number of orders of this office (Orders M-941, P-1369, P-1223, MO-1654-I)
In Order MO-1711, referred to by the appellant as mentioned above, Adjudicator Donald Hale reviewed these earlier orders:
In Order P-1369, [Senior] Adjudicator John Higgins adopted the requirement articulated in Order P-1223 that the collection, preparation, maintenance or use of a record must have a “fairly substantial” connection to an activity listed in section 65(6) in order for it to be “about” that activity. In Order P-1369, the [Senior] Adjudicator described the record at issue as a review of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) whose purpose was to set “the policy and direction for the future management of the LCBO”. As a “broadly-based organizational review which touches occasionally, and in an extremely general way, on staffing and salary issues”, the review was found to have too remote a connection to labour relations negotiations for section 65(6) [the equivalent of section 52(3) in the provincial Freedom of Information and protection of Privacy Act] to apply. As section 65(6) did not apply, the review was subject to the Act. [Emphasis added.]
In Order MO-1654-I, Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson examined the treatment of records which are similar in nature to those under consideration in this appeal to determine whether they contain information which fits within the ambit of the term “employment-related matters” for the purposes of section 52(3)3. He found that: