Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
The requester made a request to the Ministry of Public Safety and Security (now the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (the Ministry) under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) for access to information relating to an investigation by the Ontario Fire Marshal’s Office into a fire in Richmond Hill, Ontario. In particular, the requester sought access to “the notes, coloured photographs, and final report prepared by [named investigators] and any other representatives of the Ontario Fire Marshall’s Office that were involved in this occurrence.” The requester is a consulting engineering firm retained by the insurer of the owner of the property where the fire occurred.
The Ministry issued a decision to the requester denying access to the responsive records, relying on the following exemptions in the Act:
• sections 14(1)(a), 14(1)(b), 14(1)(l) and 14(2)(a) (law enforcement); and
• section 21(1) (invasion of privacy) with specific reference to sections 21(2)(f) (highly sensitive) and 21(3)(b) (information compiled and identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law).
The requester (now the appellant) appealed the Ministry’s decision.
At mediation the appellant advised that it did not wish to pursue access to correspondence between the appellant and the Ministry but sought access to all other responsive records. The Ministry maintained its refusal to release any responsive records because the fire was still under investigation. Mediation did not resolve this appeal, and the file was transferred to adjudication.
A Notice of Inquiry was sent to the Ministry, initially, outlining the facts and issues and inviting it to make written representations. Prior to its filing its representations, in accordance with section 28 of the Act, the Ministry sent a letter to an affected party advising that as the fire was no longer under investigation by the Ontario Fire Marshal’s Office (OFM), it was considering the possibility of disclosing the records, and asked for the person’s views. The affected party objected to the release of any records to the appellant.
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Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The requester made a request to the Ministry of Public Safety and Security (now the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (the Ministry) under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) for access to information relating to an investigation by the Ontario Fire Marshal’s Office into a fire in Richmond Hill, Ontario. In particular, the requester sought access to “the notes, coloured photographs, and final report prepared by [named investigators] and any other representatives of the Ontario Fire Marshall’s Office that were involved in this occurrence.” The requester is a consulting engineering firm retained by the insurer of the owner of the property where the fire occurred.
The Ministry issued a decision to the requester denying access to the responsive records, relying on the following exemptions in the Act:
- sections 14(1)(a), 14(1)(b), 14(1)(l) and 14(2)(a) (law enforcement); and
- section 21(1) (invasion of privacy) with specific reference to sections 21(2)(f) (highly sensitive) and 21(3)(b) (information compiled and identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law).
The requester (now the appellant) appealed the Ministry’s decision.
At mediation the appellant advised that it did not wish to pursue access to correspondence between the appellant and the Ministry but sought access to all other responsive records. The Ministry maintained its refusal to release any responsive records because the fire was still under investigation. Mediation did not resolve this appeal, and the file was transferred to adjudication.
A Notice of Inquiry was sent to the Ministry, initially, outlining the facts and issues and inviting it to make written representations. Prior to its filing its representations, in accordance with section 28 of the Act, the Ministry sent a letter to an affected party advising that as the fire was no longer under investigation by the Ontario Fire Marshal’s Office (OFM), it was considering the possibility of disclosing the records, and asked for the person’s views. The affected party objected to the release of any records to the appellant.
The Ministry then filed partial representations. In its partial representations, the Ministry confirmed that the OFM investigation was complete and stated that it was in the process of consulting with the York Regional Police (the Police) to ascertain if their investigation was also complete. The Ministry also withdrew its reliance on section 14(2)(a), maintaining its reliance on the exemption in section 21(1), and requested an opportunity to consult with the Police before addressing the application of the section 14 exemptions.
Shortly thereafter, the Ministry advised this office that it had conducted the necessary consultations with the Police and was withdrawing its reliance on sections 14(1)(a), 14(1)(b) and 14(1)(l) of the Act. Accordingly, only the application of the section 21(1) exemption remains at issue in this appeal. The Ministry also advised that one of the pages (page 28) of the records was released to the appellant, because, the Ministry said, it did not contain personal information.
A Notice of Inquiry together with a copy of the Ministry’s representations, with confidential portions removed, was then sent to the appellant.
The appellant, in turn, provided representations. Amongst other things, the appellant made factual and legal submissions with respect to whether the information at issue was “personal information” and the application of sections 21(1) and 23 of the Act, to which I decided the Ministry and the affected party should be given an opportunity to reply. A Notice of Inquiry setting out the issues to be addressed in reply was then sent to the Ministry and the affected party. Both provided representations in reply.
RECORDS:
The records consist of internal correspondence, fire investigation reports, engineering equipment examination and radiographic report, occurrence reports, handwritten notes and photographs. The undisclosed portions of the records remain at issue.
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Section 2(1) of the Act defines personal information as “recorded information about an identifiable individual,” including the individual’s age, sex or family status (section 2(1)(a)), the individual’s address or telephone number (section 2(1)(d)), the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they relate to another individual (section 2(1)(e)), the views or opinions of another individual about the individual (section 2(1)(g)), and the individual’s name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual (section 2(1)(h)).
The Ministry submits that the information at issue qualifies as personal information in accordance with the above-mentioned sections, and points to the contents of the records in support of its position.
The appellant submits:
… a distinction must be made between the individual’s personal information and the individual’s professional official government capacity information. The records contain information that was produced in a professional or official government capacity. … In addition, the records contain certain photographs, to which access has been denied. In prior representations made by the Ministry, they have stated that photographs do not contain personal information and are therefore exempt. … Photographs by their very nature “are what they are” and do not contain personal information as defined by the Act.
Analysis
With respect to the appellant’s first assertion, if the information in a record is “personal information”, the nature of the information does not change simply because the record is prepared by individuals acting in a professional capacity. [Orders PO-2066 and PO-2339]
With respect to the reference to “prior representations made by the Ministry”, in its reply representations, the Ministry submits that the appellant appears to be referring to the circumstances of his request under the Act for access to OFM photographs addressed in order PO-2313.
I can only deal with submissions of fact and law that are relevant to this appeal. In Order PO-2313, the Ministry sought to rely on the discretionary exemption at section 22(a) (information publicly available) to deny access to the photographs at issue in that appeal. In this appeal, the Ministry has only raised section 21(1), and not 22(a), as an applicable exemption and that is the exemption that will be addressed. As a result, Order PO-2313 has no bearing on the appeal before me.
As in Order PO-2066, all the records at issue in this appeal, including the photographs, relate to the investigation into the circumstances of the fire and this information is inextricably linked to the individuals identified in the records, in particular the affected party, as in some way being personally involved in or connected to the matter being investigated. The appellant is well aware of the individual who was the focus of the investigations. None of the records contain the appellant’s personal information or the personal information of any party he is representing. I therefore find that all the records, including the photographs, contain the personal information of the affected party and/or another individual.
INVASION OF PRIVACY
Section 21 reads, in part:
(1) A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,
(a) upon the prior written request or consent of the individual, if the record is one to which the individual is entitled to have access; or
…
(f) if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
(2) A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether,
(f) the personal information is highly sensitive;
(h) the personal information has been supplied by the individual to whom the information relates in confidence; and
(3) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy where the personal information,
(b) was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation;
Section 21(1) is a mandatory exemption protecting information whose disclosure constitutes an unjustified invasion of another individual’s privacy. Where a requester seeks access to another individual’s personal information, section 21(1) prohibits an institution from disclosing this information unless any of the exceptions at sections 21(1)(a) through (f) apply. If any of these exceptions apply, the information cannot be exempt from disclosure under section 21(1). Section 21(1)(f), in particular, permits disclosure only where it “does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.”
Sections 21(2) through (4) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure would result in an unjustified invasion of an individual’s personal privacy. Section 21(2) provides some criteria for determining whether the personal privacy exemption applies. Section 21(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 21(4) lists the types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
The Divisional Court has ruled that once a presumption against disclosure has been established under section 21(3), it cannot be rebutted by either one, or a combination, of the factors set out in section 21(2). A section 21(3) presumption can be overcome, however, if the personal information at issue is caught by section 21(4) or if the “compelling public interest” override at section 23 applies (John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767).