Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
This is an appeal from a decision of the City of Toronto (the City), made under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The decision arises out of a request for information about the amount of debt owed by the requester as a result of a sponsorship default. The requester sponsored a named individual’s immigration to Canada and, as a result of his sponsorship default, is obliged to repay any social assistance benefits paid to the individual. The request therefore relates to the amount of social assistance benefits the named individual received. The City decided to release the information requested, and notified the named individual that it intended to disclose this information. The named individual (now the appellant) objected to release of the information, and filed this appeal, on the basis that the information is exempt under section 14(1) of the Act (invasion of privacy). The information has not been released pending the resolution of this appeal. Mediation did not resolve the appeal, and it was transferred to the inquiry stage of the process. This office sent a Notice of Inquiry to the City and the requester initially, inviting them to provide representations on the issues.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
This is an appeal from a decision of the City of Toronto (the City), made under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The decision arises out of a request for information about the amount of debt owed by the requester as a result of a sponsorship default. The requester sponsored a named individual’s immigration to Canada and, as a result of his sponsorship default, is obliged to repay any social assistance benefits paid to the individual. The request therefore relates to the amount of social assistance benefits the named individual received.
The City decided to release the information requested, and notified the named individual that it intended to disclose this information. The named individual (now the appellant) objected to release of the information, and filed this appeal, on the basis that the information is exempt under section 14(1) of the Act (invasion of privacy). The information has not been released pending the resolution of this appeal.
Mediation did not resolve the appeal, and it was transferred to the inquiry stage of the process. This office sent a Notice of Inquiry to the City and the requester initially, inviting them to provide representations on the issues. In response to the Notice of Inquiry, the requester provided a blank copy of the Sponsorship Agreement form provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The requester refers to the consent portion of that form in support of his position that the appellant has consented to the disclosure of any personal information to him as her sponsor. This office provided the City with a copy of the letter and the form referred to by the requester, and invited the City to address the issue of whether or not this constituted consent for the purpose of section 14(1)(a) of the Act.
The City then also provided representations in response to the Notice of Inquiry. In the circumstances of this appeal I decided not to seek the representations of the appellant.
RECORDS
The record at issue consists of a list of the payments made by the City to the appellant, and contains the appellant’s name, date of payment, benefit month, amount paid and type of payment.
DISCUSSION:
PERSONAL INFORMATION
The personal privacy exemption in section 14(1) applies only to information that qualifies as personal information. Under section 2(1) of the Act, personal information is defined as follows:
“personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including,
(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual,
(b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,
(c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,
(d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,
(e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they relate to another individual,
(f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence,
(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and
(h) the individual’s name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual;
Furthermore, the list of examples of personal information under section 2(1) is not exhaustive. Therefore, information that does not fall under paragraphs (a) to (h) may still qualify as personal information [Order 11].
The City provided representations in support of its position that the information contained in the record is the personal information of the appellant. It states:
… the severed information falls under the definition of personal information as it contains information set out in paragraphs (b), (c) and (h) of the definition of personal information. In particular, the record indicates that the appellant is in receipt of social assistance benefits and the amount of those benefits. The City submits that the personal information relates to the appellant only, not the requester.
I accept the position put forward by the City, and find that the requested information is the personal information of the appellant, as it contains her name along with information describing the payments made to her, including the dates of the payments, the amount paid and the type of payment.
Notwithstanding the requester’s position that he requires the information in the record for the purposes he identifies, in my view the record does not contain the personal information of the requester as defined under section 2(1). I have also considered whether the record may contain the requester’s personal information based on his position that it contains the amount of assistance the appellant received, and thereby would reveal the amount of debt he owes to the Government. In my view, regardless of the fact that the record may indirectly provide the requester with information concerning financial obligations he may have taken on, I find that this is not sufficient to support a finding that the record contains the requester’s personal information for the purpose of the Act.
Accordingly, I find that the record contains the personal information of the appellant only.
INVASION OF PRIVACY
Where a requester seeks personal information of another individual, section 14(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 14(1) applies. The only sections which may apply in the circumstances of this appeal are sections 14(1)(a) and (f), which read:
A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,
(a) upon the prior written request or consent of the individual, if the record is one to which the individual is entitled to have access;
…
(f) if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
Section 14(1)(a)
Section 14(1)(a) contains an exception to the section 14(1) mandatory exemption, by providing that personal information can be disclosed if the individual consents to the disclosure.
Representations of the parties on section 14(1)(a)
The City and the requester take the position that the appellant has consented to the release of the requested information, based on the consent clause found in the sponsorship agreement she entered into when she immigrated to Canada.
The requester sponsored the appellant when she immigrated to Canada in 2002. Under the terms of the sponsorship agreement, a sponsor commits to ensure that the sponsored person will not need to apply for social assistance benefits. The requester identifies that due to the breakdown of the sponsorship arrangement, the appellant did apply for and receive social assistance. The requester then indicates that the amount of the assistance she received became his debt to the Government as a result of the obligations he agreed to in the sponsorship agreement.
The requester also states:
Please note that all family class immigrants have an obligation to sign a Sponsorship Agreement before the entry visa is granted. This agreement outlines the rights and responsibilities of a sponsor and a sponsored person. The last paragraph of the Agreement refers to authorization for disclosure of personal information. It says:
The sponsored person consents to the release to the sponsor or co-signor of information concerning social assistance the sponsored person or his or her family members applied for or received during the validity period of the sponsorship undertaking.
…
It means that [the appellant] has already given her consent for disclosure of the requested information. Otherwise, she would not have entered Canada.
Along with his representations, the requester provides a blank copy of the Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Sponsorship Agreement which contains the clause referenced above. He confirms that the original, signed agreement is available at Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
The City also provided representations in support of its view that the record can be disclosed to the requester on the basis of section 14(1)(a). In support of its position, the City summarizes the steps required to be taken by sponsors and sponsored persons immigrating to Canada, and reviews the various commitments and obligations undertaken by the sponsor and the sponsored person.
The City also refers to the wording of a different clause in the sponsorship agreement that states:
An undertaking is unconditional and may not be terminated. Under no circumstances does the granting of Canadian citizenship, divorce, separation or relationship breakdown, financial deterioration or moving to another province cancel the undertaking.
On the basis of this clause, the City takes the position that the sponsored individual (the appellant in this case) is not able to retract her consent to release the relevant information to the sponsor (the requester in this case).
The City also confirms that it regularly receives requests from sponsors for a statement of the social services benefits paid to a family member or other relative that they have sponsored to come to Canada. The City states:
When the individual provides a written consent, the information is disclosed pursuant to section 32 of the Act. However, when the individual cannot provide a written consent, he or she is asked to make a formal access request.
The City then reviews the circumstances resulting in this appeal, which can be summarized as follows:
1) the requester sponsored the appellant’s immigration to Canada;
2) since 1997, an agreement containing the clauses referred to above must be signed before the appellant could come to Canada, and the appellant would have entered such an agreement as a condition of entering the country;
3) the appellant is in receipt of social service benefits during the validity period of the agreement;
4) the requester/sponsor has an obligation to repay these benefits under the Sponsorship Agreement;
5) the appellant would have signed the agreement, which contains the consent to the disclosure of the relevant information to the sponsor/requester; and
6) the consent cannot be retracted.
Findings
Previous orders have established the requirements necessary for section 14(1)(a) to apply. In Order PO-2033, former Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson stated:
In order for consent to operate as an exception to the mandatory section 14(1) exemption, it must be in writing, and provided to the institution that has custody and control of the records containing the individual's personal information. The individual can provide this consent either directly to the institution or indirectly through this office on appeal.
Similarly, in Order PO-1723, Adjudicator Cropley stated as follows with respect to the similar provision in section 21(1)(a) of the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act:
In my view, section 21(1)(a) requires that consent be provided under the Act, that is, the consenting party must provide a written consent to the disclosure of his or her personal information in the context of an access request. The affected persons' disclosure of their personal information to the appellant was done in the context of their dispute and does not, in my view, extend to disclosure under the Act. (PO-1723)