Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Toronto Police Services Board (the Police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to certain information found in a specified police report made in July of 1997 and relating to an incident in which the requester was the victim of an assault. The request specified that it was for: the name and identity of the assailant and a copy of the statement the assailant made to the Police; a copy of the Police Report made by the officers who arrested the assailant; a copy of the Police Report made by [a named officer] and signed by the requester. The Police responded to the request by locating the responsive records and granting access to them, in part. The Police denied access to the remaining portions of the records on the basis of the following sections of the Act : 8(1)(l) (facilitate commission of an unlawful act), 38(a) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information), and 49(b) (invasion of privacy) in conjunction with the presumption in section 14(3)(b) (compiled as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law). The Police also identified that some of the severed portions of the records contained information that was not responsive to the request. The requester, now the appellant, appealed the Police’s decision. Mediation did not resolve this appeal, and it was transferred to the inquiry stage of the process. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the Police, initially, and received representations in response. I then sent the Notice of Inquiry, along with a copy of the non-confidential portions of the representations of the Police, to the appellant. The appellant also provided representations. RECORDS: The Police located 13 pages of responsive records. The records consist of the relevant portions of three officers’ notebooks (comprising a total of nine pages), and 4 pages of police reports. Those portions of the officers’ notebooks identified as “not responsive” to the request also remain at issue in this appeal. DISCUSSION: SCOPE OF THE REQUEST The Police state that portions of some of the notebooks are not responsive to the request. They state: The portions of withheld records identified as “non-responsive” document other completely unrelated events in which the police are involved. These events and resulting records are of a completely different matter, and have no relevance to the original request, or this appeal. The withheld portions of pages 1, 3, 8, 10, 11 and 13 relate to calls otherwise assigned to the identified officer. The appellant has no involvement in these matters. The Police also refer to Order MO-1219 in which Adjudicator Cropley made a finding that the information contained in police officers’ notebooks that is unrelated to the matters for which a request has been made, are not responsive to the request. Previous orders of the Commissioner have established that in order to be responsive, a record must be “reasonably related” to the request: In my view, the need for an institution to determine which documents are relevant to a request is a fundamental first step in responding to a request. It is an integral part of any decision by a head. The request itself sets out the boundaries of relevancy and circumscribes the records which will ultimately be identified as being responsive to the request. I am of the view that, in the context of freedom of information legislation, “relevancy” must mean “responsiveness”. That is, by asking whether information is “relevant” to a request, one is really asking whether it is “responsive” to a request. While it is admittedly difficult to provide a precise definition of “relevancy” or “responsiveness”, I believe that the term describes anything that is reasonably related to the request [Order P-880; see also Order P-1051]. In the circumstances of this appeal, the appellant’s request was clear and specific, seeking access to records concerning an identified incident. The Police located the requested records and disclosed portions of them to the appellant. The portions of the records that the Police claim are not responsive to the request are from police officers’ notebooks. I have reviewed these portions of the notebook entries and am satisfied that the information severed by the Police is, in fact, not responsive to this request. As an additional matter, the appellant identifies in his Submission #3 that he did not receive a page of the records (a page identified by him as page 22). This page is in fact page 22 of the notebook of one of the responding officers, and is identified as page 2 of the records. Access to this page was denied in full, on the basis of section 38(b), and my decision regarding access to this record is set out below. PERSONAL INFORMATION In order to determine which sections of the Act may apply, it is necessary to decide whether the record contains “personal information” and, if so, to whom it relates. Under section 2(1), personal information is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, including the age, sex and marital status of an individual [paragraph (a)], the address or telephone number of the individual [paragraph (d)], the personal opinions or views of the individual [paragraph (e)], the views or opinions of another individual about the individual [paragraph (g)] or the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual [paragraph (h)]. The request resulting in this appeal is for information concerning the appellant. I find that, because the records relate to an incident involving the appellant, they contain his personal information within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act . With respect to whether the records contain the personal information of other identifiable individuals, the Police submit: The records at issue contain the name, address, date of birth and telephone numbers of the accused person as well as verbal interaction between the accused and the Police. The majority of exempted information is that of the accused party within the context of a Police investigation initiated by the appellant. It is by definition “personal” in nature .... I have reviewed the portions of the records remaining at issue, and find that, with one exception, they also contain the personal information of an identifiable individual other than the appellant, as they include his name, marital status and date of birth [paragraph (a)], address and telephone numbers [paragraph (d)] and describe his actions and indicate his views and opinions [paragraph (e)]. Portions of the records also contain the individual's name along with other personal information relating to the individual [paragraph (h)]. The one exception is one portion of page 10 of the records, which is a reference to a police “ten- code” found in one of the officer’s notebooks. It does not contain the personal information of any identifiable individual other than the appellant. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ONE’S OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION/PERSONAL PRIVACY OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL General principles Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides a number of exemptions from this right. Under section 38(b), where a record contains p
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The Toronto Police Services Board (the Police) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) for access to certain information found in a specified police report made in July of 1997 and relating to an incident in which the requester was the victim of an assault. The request specified that it was for:
- the name and identity of the assailant and a copy of the statement the assailant made to the Police;
- a copy of the Police Report made by the officers who arrested the assailant;
- a copy of the Police Report made by [a named officer] and signed by the requester.