Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: This appeal concerns a decision of the Timmins Police Service (the Police) made pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The requester sought access to copies of all relevant documents with respect to the death of her son (the deceased) on April 22, 2001. The requester also specified that she was seeking access to either audio tapes or written transcripts of 911 calls made to the Police, the times these calls were made, and when the Police phoned her brother to confirm the deceased’s death. The Police denied access in full to the records in accordance with section 14 (personal privacy), read in conjunction with 14(3)(b) (investigation into violation of law) of the Act. The requester (now the appellant) appealed the Police’s decision. In her letter of appeal the appellant advised that she was seeking the information on behalf of herself and her husband. During the mediation stage, the Police confirmed that a 911 call was made but that the tape recording of the call no longer exists as tapes of 911 calls are only kept for a period of one year. However, the Police indicated that the time of the call did exist on a dispatch log and the Police agreed to release this record in full to the appellant. Shortly after the close of mediation, the mediator confirmed that the dispatch log had been released in full to the appellant. With respect to the time that the brother was phoned, the Police confirmed that this part of the request is addressed in the records remaining at issue in this appeal. Also during mediation, the mediator discussed with the Police the possibility that sections 54(c) (person less than sixteen years of age) and 38(b) (unjustified invasion of another individual’s personal privacy) of the Act could apply in this appeal. At the time of his death the deceased was fifteen years of age. The Police declined to revise their decision to address the possible application of these sections. However, in light of the circumstances, I will consider their application in my inquiry. I commenced my inquiry by sending a Notice of Inquiry to the Police, seeking representations on the application of section 54(c) and section 38(b), read in conjunction with section 14. The Police submitted representations and agreed to share them with the appellant in their entirety. I then sent a Notice of Inquiry to the appellant and included with it a copy of the Police’s representations. The appellant submitted representations in response. I subsequently received further representations from the appellant on the application of section 54(c) to the circumstances of this case. RECORDS: There are four records remaining at issue, described as follows: Record 1 (pp. 8-10) – Homicide/Sudden Death Report (3 pages) Record 2 (p. 11) – Supplementary Occurrence Report (1 page) Record 3 (p. 12) – Supplementary Occurrence Report (1 page) Record 4 (p. 13) – Supplementary Occurrence Report (1 page) DISCUSSION: PERSON LESS THAN SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE General principles Section 54(c) states: Any right or power conferred on an individual by this Act may be exercised, if the individual is less than sixteen years of age, by a person who has lawful custody of the individual; Under this section, a requester can exercise another individual’s right of access under the Act if he/she can demonstrate that the individual is less than sixteen years of age; and the requester has lawful custody of the individual. If the requester meets the requirements of this section, then he/she is entitled to have the same access to the personal information of the individual as the individual would have had. The request for access to the personal information of the individual will be treated as though the request came from the individual him or herself (Order MO-1535). The parties’ representations The Police state that section 54(c) is a “very relevant and very important section to consider in a sudden death case as we are dealing with extremely sensitive issues.” The Police acknowledge that the first requirement has been met since the deceased was fifteen years of age at the time of his death. However, the Police challenge the appellant to prove that she had lawful custody of the deceased at the time of his death. In response, the appellant submitted a sworn statement that she had custody of the deceased up until his death on April 22, 2001. Analysis and findings In making their submissions regarding the application of section 54(c) both parties have assumed that this section can apply in circumstances where the individual in question is deceased. However, this office has not made a ruling on this point. Therefore, I must first determine whether section 54(c) can be interpreted in a way that includes a situation where an individual was less than sixteen at the time of death but is no longer alive. Interpretation of section 54(c) There is no legislative history that sheds any light on the purpose of section 54(c), so resort must be had to other tools of interpretation. The modern rule of statutory interpretation is articulated by R. Sullivan in Driedger on the Construction of Statutes , 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at p. 131: There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that can be justified in terms of (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with the legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; and (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just. This office therefore should adopt an interpretation of section 54(c) that is plausible in the context of the Act , promotes its purposes and leads to a reasonable and just outcome [see Order MO-1238]. Plausibility Driedger states (at p. 101) that to be plausible, an interpretation “must be one that the text of the legislation is reasonably capable of bearing”. This suggests that more than one definition may be considered plausible. One way of ascertaining the “range” of plausible definitions is to refer to dictionary definitions. As Driedger states (at p. 12): The chief virtue of dictionary definition is that it fixes the outer limits of ordinary meaning. It offers a more or less complete characterization of the conventional ways in which a word or expression is used by literate and informed persons within a linguistic community. It thus indicates the possible range of meanings that the word or expression is capable of bearing. This is valuable information because, generally speaking, the courts prefer meanings that are plausible, that is, meanings that the words are reasonably capable of bearing.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
This appeal concerns a decision of the Timmins Police Service (the Police) made pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The requester sought access to copies of all relevant documents with respect to the death of her son (the deceased) on April 22, 2001. The requester also specified that she was seeking access to either audio tapes or written transcripts of 911 calls made to the Police, the times these calls were made, and when the Police phoned her brother to confirm the deceased’s death.