NATURE OF THE APPEAL: This is an appeal from a decision of the Orangeville Police Services Board (the Police), made under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The requester (now the appellant) sought access to a police occurrence report with respect to the attendance by a police officer at a workplace. The Police located the report and provided partial access to it. In withholding portions of the report, the Police cited section 38(b) of the Act (discretion to refuse requester’s own information) in conjunction with section 14(2)(h) (information supplied in confidence). The appellant appealed the decision to withhold portions of the report. As mediation through this office did not result in a resolution of the appeal, it was referred to me for adjudication. At issue in this appeal is whether I ought to uphold the decision by the Police to withhold portions of the occurrence report. I sent a Notice to the Police initially, inviting them to provide representations on the appeal. I also sent the Notice to two individuals (the affected parties) who are identified in the record. These affected parties provided joint representations. I then sent the Notice of Inquiry to the appellant, including a summary of parts of the representations I received from the Police and the affected parties. The appellant has not provided any representations in the appeal. RECORD: At issue are the withheld portions of a one-page General Occurrence Report. The report is authored by a police officer, based on information provided by an individual. The severed portions contain the name of this individual and another, and the information provided by or about these individuals. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION In order to determine which sections of the Act may apply, it is necessary to decide whether the record contains “personal information” and, if so, to whom it relates. Under section 2(1), personal information is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual , including the address or telephone number of the individual (paragraph (d)), the personal opinions or views of that individual except where they relate to another individual (paragraph (e)) or the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual (paragraph (h)). The meaning of “about” the individual To qualify as personal information, the information must be about the individual in a personal capacity. As a general rule, information associated with an individual in a professional, official or business capacity will not be considered to be “about” the individual [Orders P-257, P-427, P-1412, P-1621, R-980015, MO-1550-F, PO-2225]. Even if information relates to an individual in a professional, official or business capacity, it may still qualify as personal information if the information reveals something of a personal nature about the individual [Orders P-1409, R-980015, PO-2225]. The meaning of “identifiable” To qualify as personal information, it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information is disclosed [Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe , [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.)]. On my review of the record, I find that it contains personal information of the appellant, some of which has been disclosed to him by the Police. Other information not disclosed includes information provided by the affected parties about the appellant. The record also contains the personal information of the affected parties. Although these individuals are identified in connection with a workplace dispute, I find that the information about them in the occurrence report is of a personal, rather than professional nature. My conclusion here is consistent with that reached in Order P-1014, in which Senior Adjudicator John Higgins found that information about a complainant and respondent in relation to an investigation under a Workplace Discrimination and Harassment Prevention policy was the personal information of these individuals. In that order, the Senior Adjudicator also found that the identity of witnesses in the investigation was their personal information. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ONE’S OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION/PERSONAL PRIVACY OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides a number of exemptions from this right. Under section 38(b), where a record contains personal information of both the requester and another individual, and disclosure of the information would constitute an “unjustified invasion” of the other individual’s personal privacy, the institution may refuse to disclose that information to the requester. If the information falls within the scope of section 38(b), that does not end the matter. Despite this finding, the institution may exercise its discretion to disclose the information to the requester. This involves a weighing of the requester’s right of access to his or her own personal information against the other individual’s right to protection of their privacy. Thus, I will first consider whether section 38(b) applies and then whether the Police properly exercised their discretion under this section. Sections 14(1) through (4) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure would result in an unjustified invasion of an individual's personal privacy under section 38(b). Section 14(2) provides some criteria for determining whether the personal privacy exemption applies. Section 14(4) lists the types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. In this case, the Police have relied on the factor in section 14(2)(h) to support their conclusion that disclosure of the information would be an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. That section provides: A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether, the personal information has been supplied by the individual to whom the information relates in confidence; In their representations, the Police describe the circumstances under which the information in the record was supplied. The Police submit that the information was given in confidence. The representations of the affected parties also state that the information was provided in confidence. On my review of the representations and the record, I am satisfied that the affected parties supplied their personal information to the Police in confidence. Section 14(2)(h) applies in the circumstances, and is a significant factor weighing against disclosure of the information. As I indicated, the appellant did not submit any representations. On my review of the materials, I am not convinced that any of the other factors in section 14(2), or any unlisted factors, apply in favour of disclosure of the information. I further find section that section 14(4) does not apply to the information at issue in this appeal. I therefore conclude that disclosure of the information of the affected parties in