Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The City of Toronto (the City) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for access to records maintained by the Fire Department relating to two fire incidents that occurred at a single, specified address. The requester also sought access to any fire violation or inspection reports relating to this property, where the requester is a tenant. The City located responsive records and granted access to them, in part. Access to the undisclosed information was denied on the basis that it was exempt from disclosure under the invasion of privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Act . The requester, now the appellant, appealed this decision. During the mediation stage of the appeal, the appellant narrowed the scope of the request to include only certain severed information contained in pages 47, 50 and 53. This severed information consists of the unit numbers where inoperable smoke alarms were discovered in the building. I sought and received the representations of the City, which were then shared with the appellant, along with a Notice of Inquiry. I did not receive any submissions from the appellant. RECORDS: The information at issue consists of the undisclosed portions of pages 47, 50 and 53 consisting of the unit numbers of those apartments where inoperative smoke alarms were found. DISCUSSION: PRELIMINARY ISSUE – RESPONSIVENESS OF THE RECORDS I note that the request specifies that access is sought only to records relating to the address of the building where the appellant resides. Two of the records identified as responsive to the request, Records 50 and 53, clearly contain information about only that building. Record 47, however, contains information about inspection results for another building. In my view, Record 47 contains information that is not reasonably related to the appellant’s request and I will not, accordingly, address it further in this decision. PERSONAL INFORMATION In order to determine which sections of the Act may apply, it is necessary to decide whether the record contains “personal information” and, if so, to whom it relates. “Personal information” is defined in section 2(1) of the Act to mean information about an identifiable individual. In circumstances where individuals are not specifically named, this office has found that in order to qualify as personal information, it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information is disclosed [Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe , [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.)]. The City submits that the two responsive records contain the personal information of the tenants who occupy the units identified by number, as this information represents their address. It takes the position that the information qualifies as “personal information” within the meaning of the definition of that term in section 2(1)(d), which states as follows: “personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including, the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, The City states that the unit numbers “can be easily linked to other identifying information such as the name of the individual” and, for this reason, the unit numbers qualify as the personal information of the tenants occupying the units. It then goes on to rely on the findings of Adjudicator Anita Fineberg in Order P-1168 in which she held that: The Rent Roll (pages 46-57) contains a listing of the apartment numbers, tenants’ names, and the dollar amounts for the last month’s rent, the April unit rent, parking charges, total rent and the difference between the last month’s rent and the April total for each apartment. In my view, information concerning the amount of rent and other charges is personal information. Even with the removal of the tenants’ names, the dollar figures are linked to an apartment number. It is a relatively simple matter for anyone to use these apartment numbers to identify the unit occupants. This is especially true for an individual such as the appellant who is another tenant in the building. In Order P-230, Commissioner Tom Wright stated: I believe that provisions of the Act relating to protection of personal privacy should not be read in a restrictive manner. If there is a reasonable expectation that the individual can be identified from the information, then such information qualifies under subsection 2(1) as personal information. Applying this reasoning to the Rent Roll, I find that there is a reasonable expectation that the tenants can be identified from their unit numbers. Accordingly, even if the names of the tenants are removed, the information contained in this record constitutes their personal information. The same analysis applies to group three of the records, the rent surveys (pages 167-429). If the appellant were provided with only the unit numbers of those individuals who returned the surveys, the tenants themselves could be identified. The City concludes this portion of its representations by adding that: . . . since the appellant is a tenant in the building, he can easily identify the unit occupants from the [unit] numbers. The City submits therefore that the information at issue meets the definition of ?personal information’ in section 2(1) of the Act . The personal information is that of individuals other than the appellant. In Order PO-2265, Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson made the following finding with respect to whether unit numbers of apartments in a specific building constitute the personal information of the occupiers of those units. He found that: In this appeal, the appellant is seeking the street address, city, postal code and specific unit number that is subject to an application before the Tribunal. In my view, if all of this address-related information is disclosed, it is reasonable to expect that the individual tenant residing in the specified unit can be identified. Directories or mailboxes posted in apartment buildings routinely list tenants by unit number, and reverse directories and other tools are also widely available to search and identify residents of a particular unit in a building if the full address is known. Accordingly, I find that the full addresses of units subject to Tribunal applications consist of the “personal information” of tenants residing in those units, as contemplated by paragraph (d) of the definition. In the present appeal, the appellant is aware of the street address, city and postal code of the building, as he specified it in his request. I adopt the reasoning of the Assistant Commissioner in Order PO-2265 and conclude that the unit numbers contained in Records 50 and 53 constitute the personal information of the tenants who reside there within the meaning of section 2(1)(d). I note that the unit numbers in Records 50 and 53 do not include that of the appellant. Having concluded that the records contain personal information, I must now determine whether their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14(1). INVASION OF PRIVACY General principles Where a requester seeks personal information of another individual, section 14(1) prohib
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The City of Toronto (the City) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) for access to records maintained by the Fire Department relating to two fire incidents that occurred at a single, specified address. The requester also sought access to any fire violation or inspection reports relating to this property, where the requester is a tenant.
The City located responsive records and granted access to them, in part. Access to the undisclosed information was denied on the basis that it was exempt from disclosure under the invasion of privacy exemption in section 14(1) of the Act.
The requester, now the appellant, appealed this decision. During the mediation stage of the appeal, the appellant narrowed the scope of the request to include only certain severed information contained in pages 47, 50 and 53. This severed information consists of the unit numbers where inoperable smoke alarms were discovered in the building.
I sought and received the representations of the City, which were then shared with the appellant, along with a Notice of Inquiry. I did not receive any submissions from the appellant.
RECORDS:
The information at issue consists of the undisclosed portions of pages 47, 50 and 53 consisting of the unit numbers of those apartments where inoperative smoke alarms were found.
DISCUSSION:
PRELIMINARY ISSUE – RESPONSIVENESS OF THE RECORDS
I note that the request specifies that access is sought only to records relating to the address of the building where the appellant resides. Two of the records identified as responsive to the request, Records 50 and 53, clearly contain information about only that building. Record 47, however, contains information about inspection results for another building. In my view, Record 47 contains information that is not reasonably related to the appellant’s request and I will not, accordingly, address it further in this decision.
PERSONAL INFORMATION
In order to determine which sections of the Act may apply, it is necessary to decide whether the record contains “personal information” and, if so, to whom it relates. “Personal information” is defined in section 2(1) of the Act to mean information about an identifiable individual. In circumstances where individuals are not specifically named, this office has found that in order to qualify as personal information, it must be reasonable to expect that an individual may be identified if the information is disclosed [Order PO-1880, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, [2002] O.J. No. 4300 (C.A.)].
The City submits that the two responsive records contain the personal information of the tenants who occupy the units identified by number, as this information represents their address. It takes the position that the information qualifies as “personal information” within the meaning of the definition of that term in section 2(1)(d), which states as follows:
“personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including,
the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,
The City states that the unit numbers “can be easily linked to other identifying information such as the name of the individual” and, for this reason, the unit numbers qualify as the personal information of the tenants occupying the units. It then goes on to rely on the findings of Adjudicator Anita Fineberg in Order P-1168 in which she held that:
The Rent Roll (pages 46-57) contains a listing of the apartment numbers, tenants’ names, and the dollar amounts for the last month’s rent, the April unit rent, parking charges, total rent and the difference between the last month’s rent and the April total for each apartment. In my view, information concerning the amount of rent and other charges is personal information. Even with the removal of the tenants’ names, the dollar figures are linked to an apartment number. It is a relatively simple matter for anyone to use these apartment numbers to identify the unit occupants. This is especially true for an individual such as the appellant who is another tenant in the building.
In Order P-230, Commissioner Tom Wright stated:
I believe that provisions of the Act relating to protection of personal privacy should not be read in a restrictive manner. If there is a reasonable expectation that the individual can be identified from the information, then such information qualifies under subsection 2(1) as personal information.
Applying this reasoning to the Rent Roll, I find that there is a reasonable expectation that the tenants can be identified from their unit numbers. Accordingly, even if the names of the tenants are removed, the information contained in this record constitutes their personal information.
The same analysis applies to group three of the records, the rent surveys (pages 167-429). If the appellant were provided with only the unit numbers of those individuals who returned the surveys, the tenants themselves could be identified.
In Order PO-2265, Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson made the following finding with respect to whether unit numbers of apartments in a specific building constitute the personal information of the occupiers of those units. He found that:
In this appeal, the appellant is seeking the street address, city, postal code and specific unit number that is subject to an application before the Tribunal. In my view, if all of this address-related information is disclosed, it is reasonable to expect that the individual tenant residing in the specified unit can be identified. Directories or mailboxes posted in apartment buildings routinely list tenants by unit number, and reverse directories and other tools are also widely available to search and identify residents of a particular unit in a building if the full address is known. Accordingly, I find that the full addresses of units subject to Tribunal applications consist of the “personal information” of tenants residing in those units, as contemplated by paragraph (d) of the definition.
In the present appeal, the appellant is aware of the street address, city and postal code of the building, as he specified it in his request. I adopt the reasoning of the Assistant Commissioner in Order PO-2265 and conclude that the unit numbers contained in Records 50 and 53 constitute the personal information of the tenants who reside there within the meaning of section 2(1)(d). I note that the unit numbers in Records 50 and 53 do not include that of the appellant.
Having concluded that the records contain personal information, I must now determine whether their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under section 14(1).
INVASION OF PRIVACY
General principles
Where a requester seeks personal information of another individual, section 14(1) prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 14(1) applies. If the information fits within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 14(1), it is not exempt from disclosure under section 14. In the circumstances, it appears that the only exception that could apply is paragraph (f).
Section 14(1)(f) states:
A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,
if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
The factors and presumptions in sections 14(2), (3) and (4) help in determining whether disclosure would or would not be “an unjustified invasion of privacy under section 14(1)(f). I find that none of the exceptions in section 14(4) apply and the appellant has not claimed the application of the “public interest override” provision in section 16 of the Act.