During the mediation stage, the appellant confirmed that he is not appealing the Town’s position that there are no records relating to a current dog licence.  He also clarified that “letter of history” comprises letters written to the affected person by the Town.  The mediator communicated this to the Town, which then issued a new decision letter stating that there are four letters responsive to part 3 of the appellant’s request.  The Town provided partial access to three of the letters, pursuant to sections 14, read in conjunction with sections 14(2)(h) and 14(3)(b).  A fourth letter was withheld in full also pursuant to sections 14, read in conjunction with sections 14(2)(h) and 14(3)(b).  The four letters are also responsive to part 1 of the appellant’s request. 

Further mediation was not possible and the file was transferred to inquiry.

I first sought and received representations from the Town.  The Town agreed to share its non-confidential representations with the appellant.  In its representations the Town indicates that it had requested representations from the affected person regarding the release of his personal information.  Prior to seeking representations, I received a letter from the Town in which it indicates that the affected person does not consent to the release of his personal information, specifically his name.  In addition, the Town advised that it had reconsidered its decision regarding the severance of information relating to the issuance of a dog tag, initially withheld pursuant to section 14.  The Town stated that it has issued a new decision letter in which it released information previously withheld.  The Town forwarded a copy of this decision letter along with copies of the records that contain the released information to this office.  Accordingly, the information relating to the issuance of a dog tag is no longer at issue.  Only the affected person’s name and the names of his family members remain at issue under section 14.

I then sought representations from the appellant.  The appellant was provided with a copy of the Town’s non-confidential representations.  The appellant submitted representations in response.

RECORDS:

The following four records remain at issue:

Introduction

Where an appellant seeks the personal information of another individual, section 14(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 14(1) applies.

The only exception which may apply in the present appeal is that set out in section 14(1)(f), which reads:

A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,

if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.

In order to establish that section 14(1)(f) applies, it must be shown that disclosure of the personal information would not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy (see, for example, Order MO-1212).

In applying section 14(1)(f), sections 14(2), (3) and (4) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the individual to whom the information relates.

In this case, the Town is relying on the presumption at section 14(3)(b) to support its decision to deny access to the information at issue.  That section reads:

A disclosure of personal information is presumed to constitute an unjustified  invasion of personal privacy if the personal information,

was compiled and is identifiable as part of an investigation into a possible violation of law, except to the extent that disclosure is necessary to prosecute the violation or to continue the investigation;

If the section 14(3)(b) presumption applies, disclosure constitutes an unjustified invasion of privacy [John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767]. 

Although neither party made representations on the application of section 14(3)(b), I find that it applies.  On my review of the records, it is clear that the personal information was compiled as part of an investigation into the affected person’s possible violation of the Town’s Canine Control By-law 93-90, for allowing his dog to run at large and for failure to obtain a dog licence.  Contravention of the by-law is an offence under the Provincial Offences Act and, upon conviction, the guilty party may be subject to a fine of up to $5,000.00.

It is not clear whether quasi-criminal proceedings were commenced.  However, whether or not they were commenced does not have a bearing on this issue since section 14(3)(b) only requires that there be an investigation into a possible violation of law (Order PO-1849).

While the appellant has not specifically raised the application of any of the factors in section 14(2), his representations strongly hint at the application of section 14(2)(d), suggesting that the information is relevant to a fair determination of the appellant’s rights.  However, having found that section 14(3)(b) applies, I am precluded from considering any of the factors weighing for or against disclosure under section 14(2), because of the John Doe decision. 

In conclusion, due to the application of section 14(3)(b), I find that the information does not fit within the section 14(1)(f) exception.  Therefore, the information remaining at issue is exempt under section 14.

ORDER:

I uphold the Town’s decision that the withheld portions of the records at issue qualify for exemption under section 14 of the Act.

Original Signed By:                                                                       June 15, 2004                                        

Bernard Morrow