Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
In 1998, the appellant’s construction company sought tenders in respect of two public works projects to be undertaken by the Regional Municipality of Niagara (Niagara). The appellant’s company was not awarded either contract. The appellant launched a civil action against Niagara that same year with respect to the first tender. In 2002, the appellant amended the action to include claims arising from the second lost tender. The litigation concluded in November 2002 to the benefit of Niagara.
Decision Content
BACKGROUND
In 1998, the appellant’s construction company sought tenders in respect of two public works projects to be undertaken by the Regional Municipality of Niagara (Niagara). The appellant’s company was not awarded either contract. The appellant launched a civil action against Niagara that same year with respect to the first tender. In 2002, the appellant amended the action to include claims arising from the second lost tender. The litigation concluded in November 2002 to the benefit of Niagara.
NATURE OF THIS APPEAL
Since 1998, the appellant has made numerous requests to Niagara under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The request at issue in this appeal is for:
. . . [A]ll e-mail, notes, messages, diary entries, journals, scratch pad notes, telephone call message or similar messages left, handwritten notes, memo, etc;
• of the current Director of Public Works, [a named individual], and
• of the former Director of Public Works, [a named individual]
that deal with, or refer in any way to [my company], the low bids on [two specified tenders]. This request covers those records created by or for them, sent by or for them, and/or received by [or] for them from anyone. We are not seeking documents created by [us] or received by [us], nor any technical material addressing the design or specifications for the project.
For e-mail, I request that the e-mail server be checked for, deleted items, archived items, sent items and received items. The period in question is April 1998 to date.
I understand that [the former Director of Public Works] left Niagara in mid 1998, therefore I would ask that [the current Director of Public Works] review the files left to him by [the former Director], including those on computer hard disks.
Internal Niagara sources for e-mail sent to the Director(s) would be [three named individuals] amongst possibly several others at Niagara. I would ask that the e-mail accounts of these Niagara individuals be checked for deleted, archived, sent and received items. If any of these individuals have assistants who manage e-mail, please check the [assistants’] e-mails as well.
Because it did not issue a decision to the appellant within the requisite 30 days, on appeal, this office ordered Niagara to do so (Order MO-1541). Niagara subsequently issued a decision refusing to process the appellant’s request on the basis that it was frivolous or vexatious under section 4(1)(b) of the Act.
The issue for me to decide is whether the appellant’s request is frivolous or vexatious under section 4(1)(b).
The evidence before me is contained in the representations of both Niagara and the appellant.
DISCUSSION
IS THE REQUEST FRIVOLOUS OR VEXATIOUS?
General principles
Section 4(1)(b) provides institutions with a summary mechanism to deal with frivolous or vexatious requests. The relevant portion of that section reads:
Every person has a right of access to a record or a part of a record in the custody or under the control of an institution unless,
. . . . .
the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request for access is frivolous or vexatious.
Section 5.1 of Regulation 823 under the Act elaborates on the meaning of the terms “frivolous” and “vexatious”:
A head of an institution that receives a request for access to a record or personal information shall conclude that the request is frivolous or vexatious if,
(a) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request is part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access or would interfere with the operations of the institution; or
(b) the head is of the opinion on reasonable grounds that the request is made in bad faith or for a purpose other than to obtain access.
Niagara takes the position that the request is frivolous or vexatious because, under section 5.1(a),
- it is part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access, or
- it would interfere with Niagara’s operations.
I consider first whether there is sufficient evidence before me to conclude that the appellant has engaged in a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access.
Is the request part of a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access?
Introduction
This office has explored the meaning of “a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access” in numerous orders. Generally, the approach has been to define the various elements of the concept. From those earlier orders, we can identify some basic requirements.
First, many orders consider certain factors as relevant in deciding whether a pattern of conduct amounts to an abuse of the right of access (see for example Order M-864). These factors include:
• Number of requests
Is the number excessive by reasonable standards?
• Nature and scope of the requests
Are they excessively broad and varied in scope or unusually detailed? Are they identical to or similar to previous requests?
• Timing of the requests
Is the timing of the requests connected to court proceedings or the occurrence of some other related event?
• Purpose of the requests
Are the requests intended to accomplish some objective other than to gain access? For example, are they made for “nuisance” value, or is the requester’s aim to harass government or to break or burden the system?
It has also been recognized that other factors, particular to the case under consideration, can also be relevant in deciding whether a pattern of conduct amounts to an abuse of the right of access. I find that a consideration of these listed factors is appropriate in this appeal. I also find that another factor, which I call “the conduct of Niagara”, is relevant to my decision.
Past orders offer other direction as well. It is clear from past orders that, in examining whether a pattern of conduct exists, the focus should be on the cumulative nature and effect of a requester’s behaviour. It is also clear that in many cases, ascertaining the purpose of requesters requires the drawing of inferences from their behaviour because it is seldom the case that requesters admit to a purpose other than access.
Below, then, I consider whether the facts relevant to this case support a conclusion that the appellant has engaged in a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access.
Number of requests
Between 1998 and the date Niagara sent me its representations in this appeal, the appellant had filed a total of 28 requests: 3 in 1998, 1 in 1999, 2 in 2000, 7 in 2001, 11 in 2002 and 4 in the first three months of 2003.
The request at issue here deals with the subject of tenders for two specific municipal projects for which the appellant was an unsuccessful bidder.