Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
The appellant wrote to the Toronto District School Board (the Board) seeking access under the
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the following information pertaining to her son (who is less than 16 years of age, and of whom the appellant has lawful custody):
1.
The computer printed notes that were read aloud from at [my son’s Identification, Placement and Review Committee (IPRC)] meeting on Dec 05/01 by [named school vice-principal] and [named school teacher].
2.
Any & all printed papers pertaining to my son within the [Board] from every person, department, right on up to the Director of Education.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The appellant wrote to the Toronto District School Board (the Board) seeking access under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the following information pertaining to her son (who is less than 16 years of age, and of whom the appellant has lawful custody):
1. The computer printed notes that were read aloud from at [my son’s Identification, Placement and Review Committee (IPRC)] meeting on Dec 05/01 by [named school vice-principal] and [named school teacher].
2. Any & all printed papers pertaining to my son within the [Board] from every person, department, right on up to the Director of Education.
The Board wrote to the appellant advising that it had not located a record fitting the description of “computer printed notes” and, with respect to the second part of the request, stated:
By “any and all printed papers” we conclude your request relates to communications and not to official files, such as the Ontario Student Record, a copy of which you may request from the principal at your child’s current school.
Additionally, the Board is only required under the Act to make reasonable efforts to locate records relating to your son. With thousands of employees, it is not possible to make inquiries to each and every employee. However, we have made inquiries to every location within the Board which in our opinion would be likely to have the records described in the foregoing paragraph.
Under separate cover, we are providing you with a number of records that have been located in response to your request.
There are records located in response to your request which are not being provided to you pursuant to ss. 1, 2, 4(1), 12, 14, 32(a)(b), 36 and 38(a)(b) of the Act. The Board’s position is that these records variously are not in the custody and control of the Board or, alternatively, are either privileged or the personal information of others the release of which would constitute an unjustified invasion of privacy.
By separate letter, the Board provided copies of 40 records to the appellant, some of which were severed pursuant to section 4(2) of the Act.
The appellant appealed the Board’s decision to this office. In her appeal letter, the appellant stated the following with respect to the first part of her request:
. . . I know that the Vice-Principal & Classroom Teacher sat down together to co-ordinate their notes for the IPRC meeting.
I requested verbally in front of everyone at the IPRC meeting for a copy of their notes. There is specific content in those notes that I never became aware of until that IPRC meeting plus incorrect information. The request was ignored & they simply left the meeting.
In a meeting with the Principal . . . on Dec 14/01, I again requested the computer printed notes. He replied “The only way you will get those notes are through a subpoena. I won’t give them to you.”
Upon returning from this meeting, on Dec 14/01, I phoned @ 10:30 a.m. . . . Manager Senior Administrative Services for the [Board]. He advised me to file a form under the [Act].
My position is & has always been, that these notes that were read aloud in public at his IPRC meeting are 100% related to my son. They contain supposed actions they took on their part and neglected to inform me. It was impossible to take notes due to the situation & problems myself & [my son’s] father were having to deal with at this meeting . . .
All of the documents that were sent to me on July 9/02 were all already in my possession. They were simply correspondence letters & official documents contained within my son’s Ontario Student Record (O.S.R.) for which I already had replicated many months ago (there were still many letters missing too for which they didn’t send me!).
The appellant went on to explain in detail, with reference to specific Board employees and specific meetings and dates, the types of records she feels exist that the Board has not identified in response to the second part of her request.
The appellant also stated that she believes the Board should not be able to withhold any of the records it claimed were exempt under the Act.
During the mediation stage of the appeal, the Board wrote to the Mediator and the appellant, stating the following with respect to part 1 of her request:
Both [the Vice-Principal] and [the Teacher] prepared, on their own initiative, briefing notes for their own reference and assistance during the meeting. [The Teacher’s] notes were handwritten; [the Vice-Principal’s] notes were composed on a computer, but were not saved on the computer. After the meeting, both [the Teacher and the Vice-Principal] destroyed their notes. For each, this was her standard practice with respect to preparation for an IPRC [meeting].
Accordingly, it appears the records referred to by the Appellant no longer exist.
The appellant does not accept this explanation, and maintains that these records must still exist.
Mediation was not successful in resolving all of the issues in the appeal, and the Mediator issued a Mediator’s Report setting out the issues in the appeal to the appellant and the Board. After receiving the Mediator’s Report, the Board sent an index of records to the Mediator, which described each record and indicated the provisions of the Act the Board relies on for each. Later, the Board sent an amended copy of its index, and in its covering letter stated:
As it is pertinent to consideration of the Appellant’s reliance on s. 17 of the [Act], we suggest that the Mediator’s Report refer to the [Board’s] interpretation of the [appellant’s] request, as communicated in the Board’s letters dated July 2 and July 3, 2002. In particular:
1. The request did not refer to official files, such as the [OSR], relating to the education of the Appellant’s child; and,
2. The Board did not inquire as to each and every employee of the Board, but made inquiries for communications relating to the education of the Appellant’s child to every location within the Board likely to have such records.
. . . . .
It is stated that the Board agreed during mediation that the sections of the Act upon which it intended to rely are “sections 12, 14, 38(a) and 38(b).” As indicated in my letter dated November 13, 2002, in discussions with you, I had agreed to “streamline” the Board’s Index for the ease of reference of the Commission, as follows:
As you requested, I have not included references to various statutory provisions specified in the Board’s response letter of July 2, 2002 – such as s. 2(1) (definition of personal information) or s. 4(2) (severance) – which are not strictly speaking “exemptions” under the Act. This is further to my understanding that the Board may nevertheless cite and rely upon these provisions in the course of any representations which are to be made.
However, as I believe I shared with you during our brief telephone conversations, the Board has in the past cited s. 4(1) of the Act to represent the Board’s intention to raise the issue of “custody and control” of the records. As you know, should the records not be within the custody and control of the Board (or another institution governed by the Act), the Act would not apply to them – and therefore there would be no question of “exemption” from the jurisdiction of the Act. Accordingly, the Index provided to you by the Board includes s. 4(1).
As for your reference to s. 14 of the Act, it would appear not to apply to a request made pursuant to Part II of the Act. Rather, the Board’s assertion that disclosure constitutes an unjustified invasion of another person’s privacy would fall under s. 38(b). Accordingly, I have not included s. 14 in the Index . . .
Additionally, I did not intend to restrict those sections of the Act referable to s. 38(a) to s. 12. The Board also relies upon s. 7 of the Act.
. . . . .
. . . In accordance with the foregoing, s. 7 of the Act ought to be added to the issue “Denial of Access”. “Custody and control”, or s. 4(1), ought also to be added.
The Mediator’s report notes that some of the typed records also contain handwritten notes. It is the Board’s position that all handwritten references on the records ought therefore to be severed. This issue is referred to as “scope of the request” in the Board’s index.
In particular, Records 4, 11, 15, [16], 20, 25 and 26 ought not to be at issue – all these records have been released to the [appellant] with only handwritten notes severed. These Records were included in the Board’s Document Brief to avoid confusion and as a courtesy to the Commission.
Upon review of the Index, I noted that “scope of the request” had inadvertently been referred to for a number of records which do not contain handwriting. Accordingly, I attach an amended Index for your reference.
With respect to s. 17, we would ask that the Board’s letter to you dated October 23, 2002 and copied to the [appellant] be brought to the attention of the Adjudicator . . .
I sought and received written representations from the appellant and the Board. In its representations, the Board advised that it is no longer relying on the exemption at section 7 in conjunction with section 38(a).
RECORDS
The 31 records at issue in this appeal, and the basis for the Board’s decision to withhold them, are described in the following table:
Record |
Description |
Withheld in full or disclosed in part |
Reason for denial of access |
1 |
Notes dated September 20, 21 and 24, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
|
2 |
Notes dated October 31, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
|
3 |
Notes dated November 29, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
|
4 |
Letter from the appellant to the Board dated November 30, 2001 |
Disclosed in part |
Handwritten portions exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
5 |
Notes dated December 4, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
6 |
E-mails dated December 14, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
|
7 |
E-mails dated December 14 and 17, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
|
8 |
Letter dated December 19, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
9 |
E-mail dated December 20, 2001 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
10 |
E-mails dated January 11 and 14, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
11 |
Letter from the appellant to the Board dated January 11, 2002 |
Disclosed in part |
Handwritten portions exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
12 |
E-mail dated January 15, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
|
13 |
E-mails dated January 15, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
|
14 |
E-mail dated January 16, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
15 |
Letter from the appellant to the Board dated January 16, 2002 |
Disclosed in part |
|
16 |
Letter from the appellant to the Board dated January 18, 2002 |
Disclosed in part |
Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
17 |
Facsimile cover sheet with notes dated January 22, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
18 |
E-mail dated January 23, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
19 |
Facsimile cover sheet with notes dated January 29, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
20 |
Letter from the Board to the appellant dated January 29, 2002 |
Disclosed in part |
Handwritten portions exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
21 |
Facsimile cover sheet with notes dated January 31, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
|
22 |
Letter from an individual to the Board dated January 24, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
23 |
Notes, undated |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
24 |
E-mail dated February 7, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
|
25 |
Letter from the Board to the appellant dated February 8, 2002 |
Disclosed in part |
Handwritten portions exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
26 |
Letter from the appellant to the Board dated February 8, 2002 |
Disclosed in part |
Handwritten portions exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
27 |
E-mail dated February 11, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 |
28 |
Facsimile cover sheet with notes dated February 13, 2002, with attached letter from an individual to the Board dated January 24, 2002 (see Tab 22), and attached e-mails dated February 13, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(b)/14 Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
29 |
E-mails dated April 11, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
|
30 |
Facsimile cover page dated May 1, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
|
31 |
Notes dated April 9, 2002 |
Withheld in full |
Exempt under ss. 38(a)/12 (last 4 paragraphs only) and ss. 38(b)/14 Handwritten portions outside scope of request |
DISCUSSION:
CUSTODY OR CONTROL
The Act applies only to records that are in the custody or under the control of an institution (see section 4(1)). The Board takes the position that all of the records at issue are outside its custody or control and that, therefore, the Act does not apply to them.
The courts and this office have applied a liberal and purposive approach to the custody or control question. As stated by the Federal Court of Appeal under the federal access to information scheme in Canada Post Corp. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) (1995), 30 Admin. L.R. (2d) 242 at 244-245:
The notion of control referred to in subsection 4(1) of the Access to Information Act … is left undefined and unlimited. Parliament did not see fit to distinguish between ultimate and immediate, full and partial, transient and lasting or “de jure” and “de facto” control. Had Parliament intended to qualify and restrict the notion of control to the power to dispose of the information, as suggested by the appellant, it could certainly have done so by limiting the citizen’s right of access only to those documents that the Government can dispose of or which are under the lasting or ultimate control of the Government.
The Federal Court of Appeal continued (at p. 245):
It is, in my view, as much the duty of courts to give subsection 4(1) of the Access to Information Act a liberal and purposive construction, without reading in limiting words not found in the Act or otherwise circumventing the intention of the legislature as “[i]t is the duty of boards and courts”, as Chief Justice Lamer of the Supreme Court of Canada reminded us in relation to the Canadian Human Rights Act … “to give s. 3 a liberal and purposive construction, without reading the limiting words out of the Act or otherwise circumventing the intention of the legislature” . . . It is not in the power of this court to cut down the broad meaning of the word “control” as there is nothing in the Act which indicates that the word should not be given its broad meaning . . . On the contrary, it was Parliament’s intention to give the citizen a meaningful right of access under the Act to government information . . .
The Court of Appeal for Ontario adopted this approach under the Ontario Act in Ontario (Criminal Code Review Board) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [1999] O.J. No. 4072 (at p. 6, para. 34).
Based on this approach, this office has developed a list of factors to consider in determining whether or not a record is in the custody or control of an institution, as follows (see Order 120):
1. Was the record created by an officer or employee of the institution?
2. What use did the creator intend to make of the record?
3. Does the institution have possession of the record, either because it has been voluntarily provided by the creator or pursuant to a mandatory statutory or employment requirement?
4. If the institution does not have possession of the record, is it being held by an officer or employee of the institution for the purposes of his or her duties as an officer or employee?
5. Does the institution have a right to possession of the record?
6. Does the content of the record relate to the institution's mandate and functions?
7. Does the institution have the authority to regulate the record's use?
8. To what extent has the record been relied upon by the institution?
9. How closely is the record integrated with other records held by the institution?
10. Does the institution have the authority to dispose of the record?
These questions are by no means an exhaustive list of all factors which should be considered by an institution in determining whether a record is “in the custody or under the control of an institution”. However, in my view, they reflect the kind of considerations which heads should apply in determining questions of custody or control in individual cases.
In similar circumstances to those in this case, in Order MO-1574-F, Adjudicator Donald Hale found as follows:
Addressing the applicable factors outlined in Order 120, I find that the records at issue consist, in the main, of handwritten notes taken by educators and administrators within the schools attended by the appellant’s son. These notes were intended to document the son’s progress and his activities throughout the period for which they were kept. The records were maintained by Board staff on the Board’s premises, regardless of the fact that they were not incorporated into the son’s OSR and other permanent records. In addition, the records relate directly to the professional employment responsibilities of the staff person, recording the writer’s observations and perceptions of the behaviour and progress of the son. As such, I find that the records relate directly to the mandate of the Board and the professional duties of their creators, which is the education and social development of the appellant’s son.
In my view, the records are not the personal records of the individuals who prepared them, but rather, were intended, as the Board concedes, as a “memory aid” to assist these individuals in their evaluation and treatment of the appellant’s son and to assist in addressing the problems identified in them. They are, moreover, directly related to the work responsibilities of its employees and have been integrated into the workplace record-holdings of each of the individuals who created them, who are Board employees.
Taking into consideration all of the indicia of control outlined by former Commissioner Linden in Order 120, I find that the records at issue are all in the Board’s custody and that it also exercises the requisite degree of control for the purposes of section 4(1).
The Board submits:
As set out in numerous decisions of the [IPC], the terms “custody” and “control” in s. 4(1) of the Act requires an investigation of a number of factors to determine whether the records at issue were in the custody and control of the institution. (See, for example, the summary of Commissioner Linden’s Order 120, in Toronto District School Board, Final Order MO-1574-F (“MO-1574-F”), at 4.) It is necessary to consider all aspects of the creation, maintenance and use of particular records to determine whether the records are in the custody or under the control of the Board.
In a British Columbia Supreme Court decision, it was determined that if the record is created during employment with the institution, so long as the record was not created in fulfilment of any employment duty and was not intended to be used for any purpose related to employment, such records are not in the custody or control of the institution. (See Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture et al. v. Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia et al. (2000), 7 C.P.R. (4th) 301 at 6). In this case, the employee had kept her diary of encounters with a man who was stalking her. The notes relate to her personal encounters with this man. The court considered the following facts in concluding that the diary was not in the custody or control of the institution:
(a) the diary was an aide memoire relating to her personal involvement with this man;
(b) the diary was never used or intended to be used for any purpose related to her employment;
(c) the diary was not used for preparation of entries in the Store Log;
(d) the decision to keep the diary was entirely of her own choosing;
(e) the institution did not have authority to regulate or control her use or disposition of the diary (See Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture et al., supra at 6).
An application for judicial review has been filed with respect to [Order MO-1574-F]. It is submitted that the [IPC] had interpreted the words “custody” and “control” incorrectly. Since the determination of “custody” and “control” are essential in determining whether the Act applies to the records, the [IPC] must be correct in its interpretation. The Board submits that the following factors support the determination that the handwritten and personal records at issue in MO-1574-F are not in the Board’s custody and control:
(a) there are no statutory, Ministry or Board requirements that any of the records at issue were required to be made or kept;
(b) the records were kept in confidence and separate from the Board’s official records, including [the appellant’s son’s] Ontario School Record;
(c) the Board was not aware of the records being kept and the employees of the Board kept these notes entirely of their own choosing;
(d) the records were kept on Board property only temporarily and by the determination of the administrators and staff involved in creating the records;
(e) the administrators and staff involved in the creation of the records believed that they were themselves able to decide when the records were to be destroyed or removed from Board property without any authorization or notification of the Board;
(f) the records were made for the personal use of the authors and, in some cases, other staff with whom they worked as memoirs of personal involvement with [the appellant], not for the instruction of [the appellant’s son]; and
(g) the records have not been relied upon by the Board, except insofar as the Board is required to make submissions on this appeal.
Therefore, the Board submits that the [IPC] exceeded its jurisdiction in MO-1574-F, by improperly interpreting “custody” and “control”. The same factors set out above in support of the Board’s position in MO-1574-F are present in this case and are equally applicable.
I see no reason to depart from Adjudicator Hale’s findings in Order MO-1574-F, since the circumstances are very similar. In addition, case law in British Columbia reinforces a finding that the records at issue in this case are within the Board’s control. In Neilson v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [1998] B.C.J. No. 1640 (S.C.), a parent sought access to notes made by a counsellor (who was a school employee) during interviews with students. The court stated (at paras. 31, 35):
The [counsellor] argues that she is not required by the Principal, the School District, or the Minister of Education, to maintain her raw notes. However, as a counsellor and as a teacher within the School District, she is required to write reports in respect of the children she counsels. Presumably, such reports are prepared in part by relying on the notes she keeps and therefore the notes are implicitly required to be taken and retained.
. . . . .
In my view, the facts in this case support the correctness of the Commissioner’s finding that the counsellor’s disputed notes are under the control of the School District as contemplated by the [British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act]. The petitioner counsellor is not an independent contractor; she is an employee of the School District. During the course of her employment she makes notes. These notes are relied upon in the preparation of school records, which preparation is a requirement of her employment. The notes are created by an employee of a public body and used to make periodic reports, possession of which is held by the public body.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario approved of and applied Neilson in Ontario (Criminal Code Review Board) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (cited above).
In my view, although the facts are not identical, the same reasoning applies in this case. The records were created by Board employees during the course of, and for the purpose of, their employment responsibilities. This case can be contrasted with other cases where individuals create records for reasons other than the fulfillment of an employment duty, such as where an employee had personal concerns that someone was stalking her [see British Columbia (Ministry of Small Business, Tourism and Culture) v. British Columbia (Information and Privacy Commission), [2000] B.C.J. 1494 (S.C.)].
Therefore, I find that all of the records at issue are within the Board’s custody or control, and the Act applies to them.
RESPONSIVENESS OF PORTIONS OF THE RECORDS
As has been noted in many orders, the determination by an institution of which records are relevant to a request is a fundamental first step in responding to a request under the Act. Further, as was stated in Order P-880, it is the request itself that “sets out the boundaries of relevancy and circumscribes the records which will ultimately be identified as being responsive to the request.” In applying the notion of “responsiveness”, prior orders have generally looked to whether information in the records is “reasonably related” to the request. Further, it is well established that a record may contain information that is responsive to a request alongside information which is non-responsive, the latter which may properly be withheld (Order P-880).
I agree with this analysis and adopt it for the purposes of this appeal.
The Board takes the position that any handwritten notes on the records are not responsive to the appellant’s request, and submits:
. . . The handwritten notes are not “reasonably related’ to the request, and therefore are not responsive or relevant to the request.
The Appellant requested “any and all printed papers pertaining to my son within the [Board] from every person, department, right on up to the Director of Education.” The term “printed papers” does not include “handwritten notes” which may be found on those papers.
Further, the handwritten notes . . . are not “within the [Board]” as specified in the Appellant’s request. As explained above, the handwritten notes were the personal notes of the individual author for their confidential, personal use, and were not required pursuant to any statutory requirement. Consequently, they are not records within the Board and not within the scope of the request.
Further, section 4(1) of the Act – which provides the requester with the right of access to a “record or part of a record” (subject to restrictions) – contemplates that some portions of a document may be responsive to a request, while other portions of the same document may not. See Inquiry Officer Fineberg’s Order in Ministry of the Attorney General, Order P-880, at 10, wherein it is noted that the “legislation recognizes that only portions of a document may be responsive to requests for general information.” In this case, the Board disclosed to the Appellant as much as possible in accordance with the requirements of the Act, while excising those portions of the records which were not responsive or which were exempt.
The appellant submits:
This might be rather simplistic but when I looked up the word “printed” in my dictionary it states “a mark made in or on a surface by pressing or hitting with an object.” Is a pen or pencil or whatever was used to mark the surface of paper not an object? Do they not make a mark on paper? There is a direct correlation of the handwritten portions being pertinent to my request. They should display an attitude or perception toward my son and/or myself of discrimination based on my son’s disability. The records directly have [my son] at issue in them – no one else. Why would the Board not consider the handwritten notes to be “reasonably related” or “responsive” to my request? They all pertain to my son . . . It certainly was never my intention to have them excluded as I thought my request was quite clear. I believe the Board instead, wilfully applied their own interpretation and narrowed the scope of the request unilaterally in order to withhold from me whatever they could. How hard would it have been to ask me for clarification, even though I contend my request was broad and all encompassing in order to capture as much as possible? . . .
I find little merit in the Board’s position. The Board’s narrowing of the appellant’s request is overly technical, given that the appellant obviously was seeking all records relating to the appellant’s son, regardless of the particular method by which the information was recorded. The handwritten portions clearly relate to the Board’s interactions with the appellant and her son and concern the son’s education; therefore, they are “reasonably related” and responsive to the request. This finding is consistent with previous orders of this office in similar circumstances [see Orders P-970, P-1564].
I also agree with the appellant that the Board ought to have consulted with the appellant to determine whether she in fact was seeking handwritten notes contained on the responsive records [see section 17(2) which speaks to an institution’s duty to offer assistance to a requester in reformulating a request]. This would have been a reasonable course of action and would have eliminated any ambiguity, given that the appellant, not having seen the records, would not likely have been aware that the records contained handwritten notes.
PERSONAL INFORMATION
The first issue for me to decide is whether the records contain personal information and, if so, to whom it relates. The term “personal information” is defined in section 2(1) to mean, in part, recorded information about an identifiable individual.
The Board submits that all of the records contain the appellant’s son’s personal information. The Board also submits that the records contain personal information relating to other individuals, including Board employees:
Records 1-3, 5, 21, 25 and 31, being handwritten notes concerning interactions between various staff at [the school] and [the appellant] as well as regarding [the appellant’s son’s] behaviour towards the Principal and teachers [at the school]. The typewritten notes make reference to [the Principal] and other staff at the Board. Therefore, these records contain recorded information about identifiable individuals.
. . . [T]he majority of the remaining records include e-mail and facsimile correspondences. These correspondences contain names of individuals, and e-mail addresses or other identifiable information. As such, these records constitute personal information, pursuant to s. 2(1)(d) [which refers to the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual].
. . . Record 22 is private correspondence sent from a third party parent, containing information which constitutes personal information of that parent . . .
The Notice of Inquiry requests that we provide submissions on whether the information outlined above qualifies as “personal information” in light of the personal/professional distinction addressed in various Orders. In particular, Ministry of the Attorney General, Order P-1538.rec (Reconsideration Order R-980015) (“AG”) and Ministry of Health, Order P-80 are cited.
At page 6 of AG, Senior Adjudicator Goodis acknowledged a number of cases in which the names, addresses, telephone numbers and other information relating to professionals or employees were found to be personal information, and not a record associated with an individual in the normal course of performing his or her duties.
. . . [T]he decision of the Senior Adjudicator in AG is consistent with the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Ontario (Solicitor General) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 355. There, in considering the interpretation of the Act, the Court of Appeal found that words ought not to be imported into the text of the statute when doing so would subvert the intention of the legislature (at 369).
. . . [T]he words “except when provided in a professional capacity” do not appear in the Act and, with respect, the personal/professional distinction in previous Commission decisions can no longer stand.
The appellant agrees with the Board that all of the records contain her son’s personal information. However, the appellant states as follows with respect to Board employees:
. . . The records do not contain other people’s personal information rather they contain professional dealings, opinions, and views on [my son] directly pertaining to their employment and mandate by the Board. Each employee was furthering the objectives of the Board and was not acting in a personal capacity. The only things I can think of that might be considered personal information of the creators of the records are e-mail addresses and fax #’s which could easily be blacked out.
Prior decisions of the Commission have drawn a distinction between information relating to an individual in a personal and professional capacity, so that “information associated with a person in his or her professional or official government capacity will not be considered to be about the individual . . . within the meaning of ‘personal information.’” A Commission adjudicator in Reconsideration Order R980015 provided the rationale for this distinction, when he stated that:
the information associated with the names of the affected persons which is contained in the records at issue relates to them only in their capacities as officials with the organizations which employ them. Their involvement in the issues addressed in the correspondence with the Ministry is not personal to them but, rather, relates to their employment or association with the organizations whose interests they are representing. This information is not personal in nature but may be more appropriately described as being related to the employment or professional responsibilities of each of the individuals who are identified therein. Essentially, the information is not about these individuals and, therefore, does not qualify as their “personal information” within the meaning of the opening words of the definition.
The above decision was not varied and has been cited extensively by the Commission in decisions pertaining to the status of information relating to an individual in a professional capacity.
The appellant then refers to and quotes from Order R-980015, and continues:
I can in no way see how the records pertain to the creators as personal information given that the records were created solely in a professional capacity pertaining to [my son]. I also submit that many of these records were used beyond being a “memory aid” and were in all likelihood used towards suspensions and eventual expulsion.
The appellant also takes issue with the Board’s submission that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ontario (Solicitor General) supports the view that the definition of personal information excludes professional or official information.
I do not accept the Board’s submission regarding the impact of Ontario (Solicitor General), a case dealing with the interpretation of an entirely unrelated provision of the Act. I see no reasonable basis on which I should depart from this office’s long-standing interpretation of the limits of personal information and the exclusion of certain professional or official information from the definition. Contrary to the Board’s submission, this office has not read in any words to the section 2(1) definition; the limitation at issue stems directly from the opening words of the definition which require that the information be “about an individual” as opposed to being about an organization or something other than an individual.
The parties are in agreement, and I so find, that all of the records at issue contain the personal information of the appellant’s son.
The information at issue in Records 1, 2, 3, 5, 21, 25 and 31 that is associated with Board employees is strictly of an official government nature as opposed to a personal nature. These records document discussions taking place in the normal course of Board business and interactions with Board staff and the appellant and her son. I see nothing in these records that could be said to “cross the line” into the personal realm that would thus trigger the application of the definition of personal information. Therefore, none of the records at issue contain personal information relating to Board employees.
However, Record 3 contains a passage relating to another individual in a personal capacity (part of the 3rd last line, and the last two lines). This information constitutes personal information of an identifiable individual.
Therefore, only Record 3 contains personal information of an individual other than the appellant and her son, and only this information may be exempt under section 38(b).
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ONE’S OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION/UNJUSTIFIED INVASION OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVACY
Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides a number of exemptions from this right.
Under section 38(b), where a record contains personal information of both the requester and another individual, and disclosure of the information would constitute an “unjustified invasion” of the other individual’s personal privacy, the institution may refuse to disclose that information to the requester.
Sections 14(2), (3) and (4) provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual’s privacy under section 38(b).
The appellant submits that the factors at section 14(2)(a) and (d) weigh in favour of disclosure of personal information. Those sections refer to, respectively, the interest of subjecting the activities of the institution to public scrutiny, and the interest of obtaining information that is relevant to a fair determination of rights.
In my view, neither of these factors is applicable to the small passage of personal information in Record 3, which contains information that is incidental to the main issues between the appellant and the Board.
In addition, I find that the factor weighing against disclosure at section 14(2)(f) applies here, since in this context the information is highly sensitive.
Therefore, I find that the relevant portion of Record 3 qualifies for exemption under section 38(b). In addition, I find no error in the Board’s exercise of discretion in withholding this information.
To conclude, only the identified portion of Record 3 qualifies for exemption under section 38(b).
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ONE’S OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION/SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The Board relies on section 38 in conjunction with section 12 to withhold portions of Record 31.
As stated above, section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access, including where the section 12 solicitor-client privilege exemption applies. Section 12 reads:
A head may refuse to disclose a record that is subject to solicitor‑client privilege or that was prepared by or for counsel employed or retained by an institution for use in giving legal advice or in contemplation of or for use in litigation.
Section 12 contains two branches as described below. The Board must establish that one or the other (or both) branches apply.
Branch 1: common law privileges
This branch applies to a record that is subject to “solicitor-client privilege” at common law. The term “solicitor-client privilege” encompasses two types of privilege:
- solicitor-client communication privilege
- litigation privilege
The Board takes the position that the last four paragraphs of Record 31 are exempt under the litigation privilege aspect of section 12.
Common law litigation privilege
Common law litigation privilege protects records created for the dominant purpose of existing or reasonably contemplated litigation [Order MO-1337-I; General Accident Assurance Co.].
The purpose of this privilege is to protect the adversarial process by ensuring that counsel for a party has a “zone of privacy” in which to investigate and prepare a case for trial. The privilege prevents such counsel from being compelled to prematurely produce documents to an opposing party or its counsel [General Accident Assurance Co.].
Courts have described the “dominant purpose” test as follows:
A document which was produced or brought into existence either with the dominant purpose of its author, or of the person or authority under whose direction, whether particular or general, it was produced or brought into existence, of using it or its contents in order to obtain legal advice or to conduct or aid in the conduct of litigation, at the time of its production in reasonable prospect, should be privileged and excluded from inspection [Waugh v. British Railways Board, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1169 (H.L.), cited with approval in General Accident Assurance Co.; see also Order PO-2037, upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), [2003] O.J. No. 2182 (Div. Ct.)].
To meet the “dominant purpose” test, there must be more than a vague or general apprehension of litigation [Order MO-1337-I].
Where records were not created for the dominant purpose of litigation, copies of those records may become privileged if, through research or the exercise of skill and knowledge, counsel has selected them for inclusion in the lawyer’s brief [Order MO-1337-I; General Accident Assurance Co.; Nickmar Pty. Ltd. v. Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd. (1985), 3 N.S.W.L.R. 44 (S.C.)].