Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: The Hearst Planning Board (the Board) received a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ) for a copy of a letter sent to an identified individual on a specified date. The Board responded to the request by indicating that, in accordance with the requirements of the Act , the individuals who received the letter (the affected parties) were being given the opportunity to make representations as to their views on the disclosure of the record. After receiving the representations of the affected parties (through their solicitor), the Board issued a decision denying access to the record. The Board’s decision stated that it was denying access to the record on the basis of the exemptions in section 8(2)(a) (law enforcement) and section 14(1) (invasion of privacy), with reference to the presumptions in sections 14(3)(b) and (f) and the factors in sections 14(2)(d) and (e). The Board also claimed that the request was frivolous or vexatious under section 5.1 of the Act . The requester (now the appellant) appealed the Board’s decision. During mediation, the Board agreed to remove the claim that the request was frivolous or vexatious. Mediation did not resolve the remaining issues, and this file was transferred to the adjudication stage of the process. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the Board and the affected parties, initially, identifying the issues and inviting the parties to provide representations in response. I did not receive representations from either the Board or the affected parties. I then sent the Notice of Inquiry to the appellant, and the appellant provided representations in response to the Notice. RECORD: The record at issue is a one-page letter addressed to the affected parties, including a one-page attachment. DISCUSSION: PERSONAL INFORMATION Under section 2(1) of the Act , “personal information” is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, and includes the following specific types of information: (d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, ... (h) the individual’s name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual; The Board denied access to the record on the basis that the disclosure of the record would result in the unjustified invasion of the privacy of the affected parties. The affected parties also did not consent to the disclosure of the information. The appellant takes the position that the record does not contain the personal information of the affected parties. The appellant states: We take the position that there is no personal information in the document as defined in section 2(1) of the Act . We have not seen the document so it is difficult to describe precisely what is in it. However, our understanding is that the correspondence deals with the positioning of buildings on a residential lot. We are assuming that the only information that is provided is whether or not in the opinion of the Planning Board the existing distances from the building to the lot line are in compliance with the existing by-laws. “Personal Information” as defined in section 2(1) of the Act would appear to be far more personal in nature than the location of buildings on a lot. To extend the definition to include such information would be to exaggerate the common sense approach to a reasonable interpretation of “personal information”. I have reviewed the record at issue, which consists of a letter written to the affected parties, and a one-page attachment. Based on my review of the record, I am satisfied that it contains the personal information of the affected parties. The letter is addressed to the affected parties and therefore contains their address for the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition. Furthermore, the letter identifies and summarizes various activities that have occurred involving the affected parties. It therefore falls under paragraph (h) of the definition because it contains the names of the affected parties appearing with other information relating to them. Accordingly, I find that the record contains the personal information of the affected parties. It does not contain the personal information of the appellant. INVASION OF PRIVACY Where a requester seeks personal information of another individual, section 14(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 14(1) applies. As the affected parties did not consent to the disclosure of the record, the only exception which may apply in the present appeal is that set out in section 14(1)(f), which reads: A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except, if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. In order to establish that section 14(1)(f) applies, it must be shown that disclosure of the personal information would not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy (see, for example, Order MO-1212). Sections 14(2) and (3) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the individual to whom the information relates. Section 14(2) provides some criteria for the institution to consider in making this determination. Section 14(3) lists the types of information the disclosure of which is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 14(4) of the Act refers to certain types of information the disclosure of which does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. The Divisional Court has stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established, it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in 14(2) [ John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767]. A section 14(3) presumption can be overcome if the personal information at issue falls under section 14(4) or if a finding is made under section 16 of the Act that a compelling public interest exists in the disclosure of the record that contains personal information which clearly outweighs the purpose of the section 14 exemption. [See Order PO-1764] If none of the presumptions in section 14(3) applies, the institution must consider the application of the factors listed in section 14(2), as well as all other considerations that are relevant in the circumstances of the case. In its decision letter, the Board referred to the presumptions in section 14(3)(b) and (f), as well as the factors listed under sections 14(2)(d) and (e) of the